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Abstract
This dissertation studies corruption and collusion with data derived from a laboratory experiment
and household data. In Chapter 1 I study experimental procurement auctions with bribery and a
public reserve to test for the tacitly collusive equilibrium described by Compte et al. (2005).
Three sellers compete for 40 periods to sell a single item to a computerized buyer who accepts
bribes and determines ties in bids and bribes randomly. In the closing periods, only 13.5% of
auctions display the collusive equilibrium, but 58.7% of selling prices are noncompetitive. In
comparison with simulated predictions for auctions that are corrupt but competitive, the mean
selling price is 6.2% higher, efficiency is 35.2% lower, and the mean subject profit is 464%
higher. Confusion leads to imperfect collusion, though some subjects learn to bid higher by
observing bids. Men are more likely to bid the reserve. In Chapter 2 I present a method to detect
corruption using only household data. I apply stochastic frontier (SF) analysis to measure the
degree to which corrupt Chinese households underreport their income in comparison with other
households, assuming the resultant differential is illegal income. Corrupt households on average
underreport their income by 10%. I compare my results and method to those of Zhong (2018),
who uses the same data but another method. Our results are similar, though only SF analysis 1)
provides evidence of statistical significance, and 2) addresses endogeneity. My method provides
an easy way to quantify the relative corruption between groups, regions, and countries. In
Chapter 3 I apply the method of Chapter 2 to an Indonesian dataset. I find that the true incomes
of public-sector households are, on average, about 50% higher than their reported income. I then
divide the sample to support the findings of Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017), who exploit the fact
that district mayors of the Suharto regime could finish their terms during the democratic
transition, leading to exogenous variation in corruption exposure. When I restrict my sample to

shorter-exposed districts, my measurement falls to 37.1%; when I restrict my sample to longerexposed districts, my measurement rises to 56.2%.
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1 Introduction
Testing theories in corruption and collusion with data can be difficult: the people who generate
such data usually hide their actions. The three essays of my dissertation study these two topics
with data derived from a laboratory experiment and household data. In both cases, the people
who generate the data are unaware of my purpose, which produces an objectivity especially
suited for testing theories.
In Chapter 1 I use a laboratory experiment to test the theory of Compte et al. (2005), who
show that bribery in procurement auctions may lead to tacit collusion. This contradicts previous
papers that describe conditions under which bribery and bidding lead only to a transfer from the
government to the agent. These papers assume perfect competition in bribes. Compte et al., on
the other hand, invoke an agent who has upper-limit reserves for both bribes and bids,
determining ties in both randomly. The winner of the bribery contest pays a bribe, matches the
lowest bid, and sells the item. A collusive equilibrium exists in which all sellers submit the
maximum bribe and then allow the tie-breaking rule to determine the winner. I implement a
version of Compte et al.’s model in the lab. Three continually rematched sellers compete for 40
periods to sell a single item to a computerized buyer who accepts bribes and determines ties in
bids and bribes randomly. In the closing periods, only 13.5% of auctions display the perfectly
collusive equilibrium, but 58.7% of selling prices are above the competitive price. In comparison
with simulated predictions for auctions that are corrupt but noncollusive, the mean selling price
is 6.2% higher, efficiency is 35.2% lower, and the mean subject profit is 464% higher.
In addition to testing the theory, I contribute to the more general literature on collusion in
experimental auctions. Researchers in the lab have found scant evidence of tacit collusion among
subjects who are continually rematched. Here limited bribery presents a coordinating device. If
1

only a portion of bidders in this simplified environment try to take full advantage of this device,
perhaps sellers in the real world, due to their bounded rationality, also fail to exploit collusive
opportunities. Much of my paper explains why many subjects, having chosen to bid
noncompetitively, attempt only imperfect collusion. First I exploit the results of a pre-experiment
comprehension test to create a measurement of confusion. I show that unconfused subjects are
about twice as likely to bid the reserve. Next, research has found that women tend to bid more
aggressively and are more empathetic (Chen et al. 2013 and Toussaint and Webb 2005,
respectively). I show that men are twice as likely to bid the reserve. Women are just as likely to
be competitive, so the difference arises from a greater proportion of women choosing imperfectly
collusive bids. Finally, subjects each period observe the bids of their two competitors, allowing
them to learn from others. I find that among subjects who do not bid the reserve, those who
observe one bid (two bids) higher than their own are more likely to bid higher in the next period
compared with those who observe no higher bids (one higher bid).
In Chapter 2 I present a novel method to detect corruption using only household data. I apply
stochastic frontier (SF) analysis to measure the degree to which Chinese households with
opportunities for corruption underreport their income in comparison with other households,
assuming the resultant differential is illegal income. I compare my results and method to those of
Zhong (2018), who uses the same data but another method to find that the true incomes of
households with corruption opportunities are, on average, about 15% higher than their reported
incomes, an estimate that Zhong cannot statistically test. SF analysis produces an estimate of
about 10% that is statistically significant. Given similarities in our robustness checks, my results
vindicate Zhong’s approach, though only SF analysis 1) provides evidence of statistical
significance, and 2) addresses endogeneity, which may explain the estimate difference. My

2

method provides a cheap and easy way to quantify the relative corruption between groups,
regions, and countries. Most existing micro-level empirical analyses of corruption rely on
administrative records, special-purpose surveys, or field experiments, which can be difficult or
very costly to obtain. Most corruption studies in general rely on perception-based country-level
corruption indices, which use corruption ratings based on expert opinions or surveys of business
executives. Several studies, however, have found that perceptions of corruption are not perfect
measures of actual corruption (e.g., Olken 2009 and Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). Chapter 2 adds
to this literature by exploiting a corruption-related question in the same household survey. Using
both Zhong’s method and the SF method to measure corruption, I find that households that report
being less concerned about corruption live in areas with much more corruption. This may be the
case because the least informed citizens live in the most corrupt areas — in which officials and
the press do little to expose that corruption to the community.
In Chapter 3 I apply the method presented in Chapter 2 to an Indonesian dataset. I find that
the true incomes of public-sector households are, on average, about 50% higher than their
reported income, providing a rare measure of corruption’s magnitude. I then divide the sample to
support the findings of Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017), who exploit the fact that district mayors of
the Suharto regime could finish their terms during the democratic transition. Suharto appointed
these mayors in 1994, 1995, 1996, or 1997, leading to exogenous variation in corruption
exposure. When I restrict my sample to shorter-exposed districts (those with mayors whose
appointments were in 1996 or 1997), my corruption measurement falls to 37.1%; when I restrict
my sample to longer-exposed districts, my measurement rises to 56.2%. My results provide a
correlation absent from Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017): that between mayor exposure and
corruption magnitude.

3

2 Chapter 1
Bribery and Tacit Collusion in Experimental Procurement Auctions
Abstract
In the lab I study procurement auctions with bribery and a public reserve to test for the tacitly
collusive equilibrium described by Compte et al. (2005). Three sellers compete for 40 periods to
sell a single item to a computerized buyer who accepts bribes and determines ties in bids and
bribes randomly. In the closing periods, only 13.5% of auctions display the collusive
equilibrium, but 58.7% of selling prices are noncompetitive. In comparison with simulated
predictions for auctions that are corrupt but competitive, the mean selling price is 6.2% higher,
efficiency is 35.2% lower, and the mean subject profit is 464% higher. Confusion leads to
imperfect collusion, though some subjects learn to bid higher by observing bids. Men are more
likely to bid the reserve.

4

2.1 Introduction
Government agencies often try to deter explicit collusion at their procurement auctions by
implementing sealed-bid auctions (Carpineti et al. 2006), but what if the procurement agent
accepts bribes?1 Compte et al. (2005) show that such corruption (in the form of bribery) may
lead to tacit collusion. This contrasts sharply with Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986), who
describe conditions under which bribery and bidding in thin markets lead only to a transfer from
the government to the agent.2 These earlier papers, however, fail to appreciate that competition
in bribes is likely imperfect. Compte et al. model this imperfection through agents who are
unwilling to accept bribes beyond a certain amount because higher bribes imply a greater
probability of detection. Under this assumption, the authors show that corruption can lead to
collusion at the government’s upper-limit reserve price.
The importance of understanding the links between corruption and collusion is patent. Public
procurement comprises about 15% of worldwide GDP (OECD 2008). Of the 427 foreign bribery
cases concluded worldwide from mid-February 1999 to June 2014, 57% involved public
procurement (OECD 2014). According to Compte et al., the primary policy implication of their
findings is that the antitrust authorities should coordinate with criminal law enforcement. Each
set of officials should be well-versed in the other’s specialty. Compte et al. also show how the
introduction of just one efficient honest bidder to a corrupt procurement auction can help restore
competition. The policy implication is that governments should promote, or even subsidize, the
entry of efficient firms.

1

Sealed-bid auctions prevent sellers from observing deviations from collusive agreements, making it more difficult
for them to sustain collusion.
2
Beck and Maher even claim that under these conditions “controversies about the relative efficiency of bribery
versus bidding may be moot.”

5

Other recent papers also show how corruption in procurement can lead to efficiency losses.
Burguet and Che (2004), for example, present a model in which sellers submit offers specifying
quality and price. Simultaneously, they bribe the agent, who then manipulates the quality
assessment to favor the high briber. If the agent’s manipulation power is large, corruption is a
device for facilitating collusion. Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) show that in a singleitem, first-price auction with no reserve price, corruption can change the competitiveness of
uncorrupt bidders. An agent reveals to a favored bidder all rival bids and then allows the bidder
to modify her original bid upward or downward.
In addition to a fuller understanding of the theoretical links between corruption and collusion,
empirical evidence is needed. Compte et al. — as well as a related paper, Lambert-Mogiliansky
(2011) — find corroboration for their theory in French authority reports and court cases.3 But
compared with rich countries like France, poor countries experience both corruption and
collusion more intensely because of their less developed enforcement and judicial systems — the
very institutions tasked with producing evidence.
I contribute to the empirical literature by implementing a version of Compte et al.’s model in
the lab. For 40 periods I study auctions involving three continually rematched sellers and a
computerized buyer who accepts bribes. Whereas Compte et al. make inferences based on
indirect observations, the lab allows me to observe corruption directly. Only 13.5% of auctions
in later periods display the perfectly collusive equilibrium of all sellers bidding the reserve, even
though half of subjects attempt such collusion by bidding the reserve. Nevertheless, 58.7% of

3

For example, Lambert-Mogiliansky (2011) cites the testimony of J.C. Mery, a Paris City Hall official. When he
died, Mery left behind a videotape on which he describes how he accepted bribes from 1985 to 1994 in exchange for
organizing collusion in the allocation of construction and maintenance contracts. The contracts generated up to 30%
profit in an industry that averages 5%, despite the contracts’ allocations to the lowest bidders.

6

selling prices are noncompetitive. Furthermore, compared with simulated predictions for
competitive corrupt auctions, the mean selling price is 6.2% higher, efficiency is 35.2% lower,
and mean subject profit is 464% higher. These changes, however, fall well short of those that
would have prevailed had all subjects colluded at the reserve in every period. Confusion seems to
explain much of this failure, though I find evidence that subjects learn from each other to raise
their bids. In addition, men are nearly twice as likely to attempt collusion at the reserve.
This paper also contributes to the more general literature on price-matching schemes and
collusion in experimental auctions. Researchers in the lab have found scant evidence of tacit
collusion among subjects who are continually rematched. Here limited bribery presents a
coordinating device. If only half of sellers in this simplified environment try to take full
advantage of this device, perhaps sellers in the real world, due to their bounded rationality, also
fail to exploit collusive opportunities. Yet, also like experimental subjects, some criminals may
learn from each other to perfect their art. To hamper such learning policymakers should
familiarize themselves with the mechanics of both bribery and collusion. This paper reveals and
delineates those mechanics with a starkness possible only in the lab.
Büchner et al. (2008) is the only other lab experiment to study corruption and public
procurement. Unlike Compte et al., the authors do not consider ex post collusion opportunities.
Instead they assume that potential suppliers compete by simultaneously posting prices and
offering bribes. The authors derive the optimal price-and-bribe bid, for which their experimental
data provide qualitative support.
2.2 Theory and Experimental Design
Compte et al. consider a corrupt procurement agent who conducts a first-price sealed-bid auction
for a single contract with a public reserve price 𝑝 chosen by the government. There are 𝑛 sellers
7

indexed by 𝑖 that bid for the contract. Seller costs 𝑐𝑖 are drawn from distributions with positive
and continuous density 𝑓𝑖 (∙) on [𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 ], known to the firms only. For convenience, order sellers
so that 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑐𝑛 and let 𝑐 = min 𝑐𝑖 . Absent corruption, the agent simply allocates the
𝑖

contract to the seller with the lowest bid. In the case of ties, the agent chooses among lowestbidding sellers with equal probability. Assuming that 𝑐1 < 𝑝, in any Bayesian equilibrium the
first-price auction allocates the contract at a price equal to at most min{𝑐2 , 𝑝}.4
With corruption, a second stage follows the bidding. The agent, after disclosing to all sellers
the lowest bid, allows one seller to match the lowest bid and win the auction. The sellers
compete for this favor by offering bribes, but only the winner actually pays a bribe. This
competition is imperfect because the agent will not accept bribes above some threshold 𝐵. If
multiple sellers submit the highest bribe, the agent chooses among them with equal probability
— unless one seller bids strictly below the others, in which case the agent chooses this seller
with probability 1/𝑛 and the other(s) with equal probability. In this way, sellers cannot increase
their chances of winning by bidding so low that some sellers cannot match the bid without the
risk of losing money.
Compte et al. show that corruption facilitates collusion and thereby generates a price increase
beyond the bribe amount. A Pareto dominant equilibrium exists in which all sellers bid 𝑝 and offer
𝐵 as a bribe. The agent then randomly picks one of the sellers as the winner. Compte et al.’s main
result is as follows. Assume 𝑝 is high compared to cost levels.5 Then there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which the contract is sold at 𝑝.

Note that even if the densities 𝑓𝑖 are important in deriving equilibrium behavior, Compte et al.’s results depend
only on the bounds 𝑐 and 𝑐𝑖 .
5
Formally, assume 𝑝 − 𝑐1 − 𝐵 > 0 and 𝑐2 − 𝑐 < (1⁄𝑛)[𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝐵].
4
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Compte et al. present the following intuition for their result. Because competition in bribes
stops at 𝐵, if sellers compete only in bribes (and not in bids), they all profit in expectation as
long as their cost parameters do not exceed 𝑝 − 𝐵. Because the value of the bribe is bounded,
any increase in bids translates into higher joint profits for the sellers. They thus have a joint
interest in bidding as high as possible. Still, because sellers do not get the contract with certainty,
some might compete in bids to increase their chances. But there is a high cost to doing so. For
small bid deviations, bribe competition leads to ties because many sellers can propose 𝐵 and still
profit, and the agent need not pick the deviator with a larger probability. Thus, increasing the
probability of winning would require decreasing the bid to a level at which other sellers cannot
match the price without the risk of losing money. This level may be so low that each seller
prefers to stick to the collusive outcome.
Compte et al. show that their findings are robust to more general models of imperfect bribery
competition, as well as more complicated corruption mechanisms.6 They also note that the
assumption of a public reserve can be relaxed if one assumes that the corrupt agent reveals the
reserve during the bribing stage (and presumably all firms bid above any possible reserve in stage
one).7
Table 1 provides a summary of the experiment, which consisted of six sessions, each with
nine subjects, conducted at the Behavioral Business Research Lab at the University of Arkansas.
Subjects participated in three-person computerized auctions in which they were randomly

Details can be found in unnumbered subsections of the paper’s third section.
Kagel (1995) note that “reserve prices, when they exist in practice, are typically not announced,” adding that
“when a reservation price is announced, it serves as a focal point for the collusive outcome.”
6
7

9

rematched for 40 periods.8 All subjects were sellers whose costs to produce a homogenous item,
measured in experimental dollars to two decimal places, were drawn from 𝑈[375.00, 400.00].
Subjects knew that their competitors’ costs came from the same distribution. All sessions used
the same sequence of cost draws and group draws. I read the instructions aloud to ensure
common knowledge. Subjects answered 18 computerized comprehension questions that provided
explanations after each answer entry. Subjects also participated in three trial periods before the
start of the paid periods. Earnings were given in experimental dollars (E$) with an exchange rate
of E$40.00 = U.S.$1.00 for sessions lasting for 70 to 90 minutes (average earnings were
U.S.$13.76, including a U.S.$5 show-up fee). Unless otherwise stated, all monetary figures are
in experimental dollars.
Subjects first learned their cost privately and submitted an “initial offer price” that could be
no higher than the reserve price of 475. They then learned the initial offers of their two
competitors and entered a “resubmission fee” of up to 20.9 The subject who offered the highest
resubmission fee automatically matched the lowest initial offer and won the auction for this
amount. The computer determined ties in fees randomly, and only the auction’s winner actually
paid the fee, which subjects knew. At the end of each auction subjects learned their “final offer
price,” which was potentially different from their initial offer only when they won the auction. If
all subjects submitted zero as their fee, the subject with the lowest initial offer won, with ties
determined randomly.10

8

I chose random rematching in part to match the static theory of Compte et al., who do not describe how sellers
reach the collusive equilibrium. Also, in comparison with repeated play, random rematching makes collusion in the
absence of communication (or limited bribery) much less likely (Kagel 1995).
9
Subjects could choose values up to two decimal places for both the initial offer price and the resubmission fee.
10
All subjects submitted zero as their fee in only 5 of 720 auctions (0.7%).
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The cost and reserve parameters meet Compte et al.’s equilibrium conditions. They also
correspond to a highest possible profit margin of 25.3% and a maximum resubmission fee of
4.2% of the reserve. According to Compte et al., the French Ministry of Equipment considers
rejecting all bids when the lowest bids exceed its own cost estimate by about 25%. Recall that
Compte et al.’s general theory describes an agent who punishes sellers who knock out other
sellers. Given my specific cost distributions and parameters, however, this rule is not necessary
to sustain the equilibrium of all sellers bidding 475 and submitting 20.11 Subjects cannot
profitably deviate even if they draw a cost of 375 while believing both competitors draw the
highest realization of costs, 400.12 Under these circumstances subjects could bid 419.99 and earn
24.99 with certainty, but they could earn 26.67 in expectation by not deviating. Of course there is
no reason for subjects to believe that their competitors draw particular costs. If subjects bid
according to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium described in the next section, subjects who draw
375 earn only 8.33 when they win. Furthermore, many subjects are probably risk-averse, leading
to an even lower competitive profit and less incentive to deviate from the collusive equilibrium.
I chose to reveal to subjects their competitors’ initial offer prices both before and after they
submitted their fees. Thus subjects could use their bids as signals of collusive intent. The corrupt
agent of the model might encourage such signaling, given that collusive sellers are more likely to
afford maximum bribes. A history table at the bottom of the computer screens included the
subject’s past costs, initial offers, final offers, and profits, along with the competitors’ past initial
offer prices (all in experimental dollars). The experiment was programmed in z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). See the Appendix for the instructions and screenshots of the user interface.

11

I also chose symmetric sellers and a uniform distribution to allow for standard predictions and simpler
instructions, though research has shown that symmetry fosters collusion.
12
Like Compte et al., I assume risk-neutrality and that subjects submit the highest fee they can afford.
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2.3 Predictions and Results
2.3.1 Nomenclature
Table 2 summarizes the nomenclature of the analysis. To make comparisons with the
experimental outcomes, I often simulate the outcomes of “honest auctions,” i.e., auctions with
the same (relevant) parameters as the corrupt auctions but with no bribery stage. Also for
comparison’s sake, I often simulate the outcomes of “competitive auctions”: corrupt auctions in
which, as I explain later, all subjects add 20 to the bids they would have submitted in an honest
auction.13 Note that subjects in honest auctions also act competitively, but I use the term only
when referring to subjects in corrupt auctions who augment their bid in the manner described.
“Perfectly collusive auctions” are corrupt auctions in which all three subjects bid 475, leading to
a selling price of 475. “Imperfectly collusive” auctions are corrupt auctions in which the selling
price is above 420 but below 475. For reasons I explain later, I classify bids and selling prices
into three groups: “competitive” if they are 420 or below, “imperfectly collusive” if they are
above 420 but below 475, and “perfectly collusive” if they are equal to 475.
2.3.2 Predictions
For honest auctions the risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium (RNNE) bidding function is 𝑏𝑖𝑑 =
(2⁄3) × 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 400⁄3, the expected selling price is 387.5, and the expected profit is 2.08. In
previous experimental auctions (Kagel and Levin 2014) subjects bid slightly lower (or higher in
the case of forward auctions). Efficiency, defined as the percentage of auctions won by the
lowest-cost subject, should be 1.00.

13

I simulate the outcomes of honest auctions by transforming the cost draws of the experiment using the Nash
equilibrium bidding function for risk-neutral sellers (defined in the next subsection). I simulate the outcomes of
competitive auctions by transforming the cost draws with the same bidding function shifted upward by 20, and by
assuming subjects submit the highest resubmission fee they can afford.

12

With bribery, competitive subjects may react mechanically by increasing their bid by the
maximum resubmission fee of 20. In comparison with honest auctions, both the RNNE bidding
function and predicted selling price shift upward by 20. That is, the function becomes 𝑏𝑖𝑑 =
(2⁄3) × 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 400⁄3 + 20, the same function for an honest auction in which costs are drawn
from 𝑈[395.00, 420.00]. The expected selling price rises 5.2% to 407.5. The predicted net-offee selling price, 387.5, does not change. The resubmission-fee mechanism simply transfers 20
from the government to the agent. The predicted efficiency, however, is no longer 1.00. To see
why, consider a set of three cost draws in order of increasing magnitude: 𝐶1 , 𝐶2 , and 𝐶3 . If
subjects with these draws compete in a corrupt auction using the bidding function described, the
lowest-cost subject wins with certainty only when his bid is so low that neither competitor can
submit a fee of 20, match the minimum bid, and not lose money. Otherwise, each subject who
can afford a fee of 20 has an equal chance of winning. The condition under which the lowest-cost
subject knocks out both competitors is 3𝐶2 − 2𝐶1 > 400.14 A similar expression describes the
condition under which the subject knocks out only one competitor. A simulation of 300,000
auctions indicates that the probability of knocking out one competitor is 0.45, and the probability
of failing to knock out either competitor is 0.11.15 Given these probabilities, the expected
efficiency is 0.70. The same simulation shows that the mean subject profit is 1.78, down from the
2.08 that would have prevailed if it weren’t for the efficiency loss. In this regard, sellers actually
earn more with honest auctions than with corrupt auctions that are competitive. Again, when I
refer to competitive auctions, I mean those in which all three sellers add 20 to the RNNE bids

14

The lowest-cost subject hopes to bid low enough to knock out the subject with the second lowest cost (naturally
knocking out the other competitor as well). This happens when (2⁄3) × (𝐶1 + 20) + 140 − 20 − 𝐶2 < 0.
Rearrangement of terms leads to 3𝐶2 − 2𝐶1 > 400.
15
I created 900,000 observations, divided into 300,000 groups, along with a cost draw and bid for each observation.
Then I found the lowest bid of each group (minbid), and for each group counted the number of 20-bribers, i.e.,
observations in which 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 20 ≥ 0. I chose a winner randomly among these 20-bribers.
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they would have offered in an honest auction. To better organize my results, however, I broaden
my definition of competitive bids to 420 or below because the highest possible bid under this
strategy is 420.
Competitive subjects choose the highest resubmission fee they can afford, and they have a
chance of winning only if they can afford 20. In the simulation, the mean fee offer is 17.22 with
a standard deviation of 4.13 and a minimum of 3.34. The percentage of fee offers equal to 20 is
55.6%.
Subjects also may bid noncompetitively in the hope that their two competitors do likewise.
Once subjects commit to collusive bids (above 420) the profit-maximizing bid is 475, which I
call perfectly collusive. Bids that are above 420 but below 475, which I call imperfectly
collusive, do not increase a subject’s chances of winning and can potentially lower the prize for
which the subjects are competing. If all three subjects of an auction bid 475, then the expected
selling price, efficiency, and subject profit are 475, 0.33, and 22.50, respectively, and the
expected fee offer is 20 — as it is when all subjects bid 420 or above.
When all three subjects bid either competitively (according to the function) or collusively,
they have an equal chance of winning. On the other hand, some subjects may bid competitively
while others bid collusively. According to simulations, when only two subjects bid
competitively, their chances of winning increase to 0.38. A subject who alone bids competitively
wins with probability 0.50. Behaviorally, the most interesting questions in the lab are whether
subjects choose to bid competitively or collusively, and if the latter, whether they realize that the
most sensible bid is 475 — a realization that requires only one step of backward induction. Other
questions are whether subjects choose the highest fee they can afford, and whether some subjects
learn to bid higher by observing competitors’ bids. In sum, I test four hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: Subjects submit the highest resubmission fee they can afford.
Hypothesis 2: When subjects bid 420 or below, they bid according to 𝑏𝑖𝑑 = (2⁄3) × 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 +
400⁄3 + 20.
Hypothesis 3: When subjects bid above 420, they bid 475.
Hypothesis 4: Among subjects who do not bid 475, those who observe one bid (two bids) higher
than their own are more likely to bid higher in the next period compared with those who observe
no higher bids (one higher bid).
2.3.3 Main Results
I wish to study how behavior changes during the sessions, so I focus on the opening periods and
the closing periods. Specifically, I look at periods 1-7 and 34-40, with the data from the latter
acting as a proxy for an equilibrium.16, 17 For these period ranges, Table 3 reports means for the
bid, the selling price, subject profit, and efficiency, and makes comparisons between these values
and the predictions for competitive auctions and perfectly collusive auctions. These predictions
are the result of simulations using the same sequences of cost draws. As a robustness check,
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix reproduce Table 3 using, instead of the first and last seven
periods, the first and last five periods, as well the first and last 10 periods.
Because Compte et al. present a static theory, statistics for the final periods are my main
results, and I refrain from reporting these figures for all periods. Thus consider only the 126

16

Because I rematched subjects from period to period, only observations at the session level are independent.
Standard deviations thus capture variation among the six sessions. In what follows, I report all p-values using
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Almost all main results are also significant according to more conservative sign tests.
17
To decide which opening and closing periods to study, I examine the overall mean bid (using the six session
observations of the mean) for blocks of periods at both ends of sessions. The mean for the first 20 periods is not
statistically different from the mean for the last 20 periods. I continue to reduce the periods from both ends until I
discover a difference at the 5% level.
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auctions of periods 34-40. Compared with predictions for honest auctions, the mean selling price
is 11.7% higher, efficiency is 54.0% lower, and mean subject profit is 359% higher. All
differences are significant at the 5% level. Compared with predictions for competitive auctions,
these same differences are as follows: 6.2% higher, 35.2% lower, and 464% higher, respectively,
all significant at the 5% level. Clearly collusive bidding takes place. But the magnitudes of these
percentage changes fall well short of those that would have prevailed had all subjects colluded
perfectly (bid 475) in every period, in which case (using further simulations) the same
percentage changes would have been 16.5% higher, 60.6% lower, and 1,240% higher when
compared with the competitive predictions.
Nevertheless, for periods 34-40, the modal bid is 475, which is the bid of 186 of the 378
decisions (49.2%, Figures 1-2 and Table 4). The second most common bid is 450 (4.8% of
decisions), followed by 440 (4.0%) and 420 (3.7%). On the other hand, bids of 420 or below are
prevalent in the closing periods: 16.4% of bids. The remaining bids, 34.4% of the total, are above
420 but below 475. As I noted earlier, such choices are imperfectly collusive in the sense that
they potentially limit profits for no obvious reason. So perhaps confusion is a bigger hindrance to
perfect collusion than competitiveness. It bears emphasizing, however, that 83.6% of bids are
noncompetitive.
Given the heterogeneity in bidding behavior, only 17 of the 126 auctions (13.5%) display the
perfectly collusive outcome in which all subjects bid 475 and submit 20.18 But for period 40
alone this percentage doubles to 27.8% (5 out of 18 auctions), and this behavior still leads to a
modal selling price of 475, which is the cost of procurement for 18 of the 126 auctions (14.3%,
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In only one auction of the closing periods did all three subjects submit 20 and bid the same initial offer not equal
to 475: an auction in which all subjects bid 445. In only one auction did all three subjects submit the same fee not
equal to 20: an auction in which all subjects bid zero due to one subject’s bid of only 2.00 above cost.
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Figures 1-2 and Table 4).19 The second most common selling price is 440 (7.1% of auctions),
followed by 420 (5.6%) and 430 (4.8%). Competitive bidding has a strong effect: 40.5% of
selling prices are 420 or below. This leaves 45.2% of selling prices in the region between 420
and 475. In sum, 58.7% of selling prices are noncompetitive, and 475 is still modal. Figure 3
shows the kernel densities of bids and selling prices, illustrating how bids skew leftward while
selling prices skew rightward.
The difference between collusive attempts and outcomes is further revealed when examining
the changes in overall means from the opening periods to the closing periods. The mean bid
grows significantly (p = 0.046), as shown in Figure 4; the means for the selling price and profit
do not (p = 0.116 and p = 0.176, respectively). In the last subsection I investigate whether
learning can partly explain why the mean bid changes.
2.3.4 Resubmission Fee Behavior
Finding 1: Subjects usually submit the highest resubmission fee they can afford when that fee is
20.
Hypothesis 1 is that subjects submit the highest resubmission fee they can afford. The data for
periods 34-40 include 378 fee choices, 286 of which (75.7%) are 20. All subjects who bid the
maximum can afford to do so; however, an additional 5.3% of fee decisions could have been 20
without risk of losing money.20 The bids tied to these latter fee choices are more likely to be
imperfectly collusive: 20.0%, 60.0%, and 20.0% of these bids are competitive, imperfectly
collusive, and perfectly collusive, respectively, compared with 16.4%, 34.4%, and 49.2% for all
19

The last-period jump may be an end-game effect resulting from last-ditch efforts to win big. However, the
percentage of bids equal to 475 for periods 34-40 and period 40 are similar: 49.2% and 53.7%, respectively. So the
jump may be more the result of chance.
20
Two of these subjects won anyway, raising their profit on average by 7.50 relative to the profit they would have
made had they chosen 20; the others, by not bidding 20, forwent their chance of winning an average profit of 27.65.
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bids of the final periods. In regard to the remaining 72 fee choices (19.0% of the total), in which
subjects can afford at most a value below 20, every fee choice is lower than the highest
affordable fee except for seven instances in which both the most affordable fee and the actual fee
are zero. In 68.1% of these remaining choices, subjects cannot afford the maximum because of a
competitor’s bid. Otherwise, the subject’s own low bid precludes a fee of 20. Thus,
unsurprisingly, the bids corresponding to these 72 fee choices are unusually competitive: 40.3%,
30.5%, and 29.2% are competitive, imperfectly collusive, and perfectly collusive. For all 40
periods Figure 5 compares the mean fee offer with the mean highest fee offer subjects can afford.
Table 5 shows that compared with these two means for periods 1-7, these means for periods 3440 are much closer in value while still remaining distinguishable. Recall that subjects choose
their fee after learning the lowest bid, i.e., the selling price. These subjects, therefore, may be
choosing a fee corresponding to some minimum acceptable profit (instead of zero) in the offchance they win.21 Also, subjects often heuristically choose a multiple of five, perhaps in lieu of
bothering to calculate the highest affordable fee.22
Table 5 also shows that the mean winning fee is slightly lower than predicted. I discuss later
how fee behavior relates to bid behavior. In particular, subjects theoretically should choose a fee
below 20 only after competitive bidding, to which I now turn.
2.3.5 Competitive Behavior
Finding 2: When subjects bid 420 or below, they do not bid according to 𝑏𝑖𝑑 = (2⁄3) × 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 +
400⁄3 + 20, but the function’s slope is qualitatively predictive.
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In 16 of the closing 126 auctions (12.7%), the winner does not submit a fee of 20. The mean fee of these auctions
is 8.85 with a range of 0 to 17.5. The mean selling price is 395.00 with a range of 376.5 to 405. Recall that
according to both the competitive and collusive theories, the winning fee should always be 20.
22
For this heuristic Lynn et al. (2013) reviews both the evidence and the explanations.
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Because I later explore how subjects learn during sessions, I often expand my analysis to all
periods in addition to just periods 34-40. Here I consider both ranges. For all periods 18.0% of
bids are 420 or below, a percentage only slightly higher than the 16.4% reported for the closing
periods. If subjects had adhered to the competitive bidding function, because of the uniform cost
distribution, the distribution of these bids would have approached uniformity between 403.33
and 420. Figure 6’s histogram shows this is not the case (the histogram for periods 34-40 is
similar). Subjects disproportionately choose bids that are multiples of five — in particular,
24.2% of bids in this region are 420. Furthermore, 24.0% of the bids are below the theoretical
lower limit of 403.33. For all periods (alternatively, periods 34-40), the proportion of bids in the
420-and-below region that are lower than the bidding-function predictions is 42.5% (48.4%), but
this proportion grows to 56.1% (62.5%) when I consider only bids strictly below 420. Figure 7
shows line graphs of the mean bid and mean predicted bid for values strictly below 420. The
actual mean is always lower. The mean bid and mean predicted bid are uncorrelated across
periods, and the bids summarized by the means are very weakly correlated, with a Spearman
coefficient of 0.19 (p = 0.001).
If all bidding had been collusive, presumably there would have been no correlation between
bids and costs. Yet the Spearman correlations for periods 34-40 of two sessions are statistically
significant (though weak): 0.31 and 0.32 (p-values ≤ 0.014). Seven subjects (13.0%) among five
sessions have significantly positive coefficients for the closing periods, and the correlations are
strong: at least 0.73 (p-values ≤ 0.060). For all periods the correlation for 16 of the 54 subjects is
0.30 or above (p-values ≤ 0.053). As an example of a competitive subject, Figure 8 shows the
bids of a subject in the fifth session whose correlation coefficient for all periods is 0.72 (p =
0.000) and mean bid 412.63. The competitive predictions capture the subject’s choices well,
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especially in the closing periods. The bids for a significant percentage of other subjects follow a
pattern similar to the one shown here, at least for some periods.
Bid-cost correlations do not indicate necessarily that subjects are bidding low to knock out
competitors. For 7 of the 16 subjects above, correlations are greater than 0.30 and significant
even for bids above 420. Recall that there is no reason for subjects to react to costs when bidding
above 420. Despite this caveat, I continue to use the 16 subjects as a proxy for competitive
bidders. Competitive bidding leads to very low profits in terms of real dollars. Asymptotically
the expected winner’s profit per auction is 6.25, which translates to $0.16. In comparison, sellers
who win after bidding 475 can expect to earn 67.5, which translates to $1.69. As a group the 16
competitive subjects on average earn $10.62 during a session; the other 38 subjects earn $15.08.
Subjects may persist in competitive behavior despite the low profits because they disregard the
exchange rate, or they experience spite or the joy of winning.23
Compte et al. examine the effect of introducing to their model an efficient “outsider,” a firm
that cannot bribe.24 As long as the upper limit of the outsider’s cost support is below the upper
limit of the most efficient corrupt seller, the selling price is below this corrupt seller’s upper limit
in any Bayesian equilibrium. The outsider is ready to harden price competition due to its
exclusion from the bribery stage. By proposing a low enough price, the outsider can ensure that
other less efficient firms cannot afford to compete in bribes. In a similar fashion, even though

23

For example, a post-session survey asks subjects to describe their strategies for choosing bids and fees. One
subject writes: “I played a price close to my cost to get people to not bid and I would sell the item. I took a small
profit over 0 profit. And if my competitor won, they would get very little.”
24
The authors also show that increasing control over the agent, i.e., reducing the upper limit for bribes, does not
reduce (and can even increase) the ability of firms to collude. Controls on efficient firms may partly restore
competition in prices, assuming the agent cannot sufficiently favor a bid from a briber based on something other
than price.
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corruption shifts bids upward, the few subjects who persist in competitive bidding severely limit
session-wide profits.
To study more precisely how subjects respond to costs, I regress bid on cost and session
dummies. As other papers have done with similarly structured experimental data (EngelbrechtWiggans et al. 2007 and Fugger et al. 2015), I use a Tobit approach to account for censoring at
both costs and the reserve, and I account for dependence among bids by using random effects. I
estimate the following model:
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑗≠1 𝛽𝑗 𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .
Note that there are two error components — one that is independent across all observations, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
and one that is subject-specific (the random effect), 𝜂𝑖 . Both error terms have a mean of zero and
a positive standard deviation. Recall that for subjects who bid competitively, the predicted
marginal effect is 0.67, but subjects in the literature tend to bid more aggressively. The five
columns of Table 7 report marginal effects for all bids, bids of periods 1-7, bids of periods 34-40,
bids above 420, and competitive bids. All but one effect is significant at the 1% level (p = 0.012
for bids above 420), and differences in the effect corroborate the correlation findings. The effect
declines to 0.25 from 0.43 from the opening to the closing periods, with an effect of 0.34 for all
periods. The effect is 0.10 for bids above 420, and 0.44 for competitive bids. For bids strictly
below 420 and after the removal of one extremely low bid (304.76), the effect grows to 0.53 (p =
0.000). In the next subsection I show that the effect grows further after the addition of covariates.
As mentioned earlier, competitive bidding affects fee choice. For all periods, in 58.4% of
cases in which subjects do not submit 20, they cannot do so without the risk of losing money.
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This percentage translates to 17.6% of all fee choices.25 Subjects who bid competitively increase
their chances of winning from 0.31 to 0.43 (p = 0.035), with the latter probability having a wide
range among sessions: 0.33 to 0.52.26 A post-session survey asks subjects to describe their
strategies for choosing bids and fees. I cannot clearly classify many of the answers. Several
subjects mention adding 20 to their preferred initial offer, or bidding “safely,” but these subjects
may be operating under alternate rules. Some subjects are unambiguously competitive. For
example:
I decided to use lower initial offers in order to beat out my
competition. I found that I won more often when I came in with a
low offer than when I tried to randomly be selected to win the
battle with everyone having high initial offer prices.
Even more subjects clearly state the perfectly collusive strategy, which I address next. For
example:

Why put anything less than $475 and $20? You have a 1/3 chance
of winning. People are too dumb to get that though.
2.3.6.a Collusive Behavior
Finding 3: When subjects bid above 420, they bid 475 about three-fifths of the time.
For periods 34-40, the value of 58.9% of bids above 420 is the reserve. The corresponding
percentage for all periods is 48.5%. There is strong evidence that some subjects do not
understand the auction rules, or at least doubt their understanding. Subjects, having once bid 475,
often deviate in subsequent periods by offering lower noncompetitive amounts, starting with

More specifically, in 12.5% of fee choices subjects cannot bid 20 safely due to a competitor’s low bid (as opposed
to their own).
26
Recall from Section 3.2 that when only two subjects bid competitively, their chances of winning increase to 0.38.
A subject who alone bids competitively wins with probability 0.50.
25
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474.99. The average run length of consecutive 475 bids is 7.4 periods (s.d. = 2.05). More than
half of runs (54.2%) are just one period. Another 14.4% are only two or three periods. Many
subjects don’t seem to understand that their bid, when it is beyond 420, has no bearing on their
chances of winning.27
2.3.6.b Confusion
The post-session survey asks subjects to rate the statement “The instructions for the experiment
were clear and easy to follow” on a five-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree.” Nobody strongly disagrees, but nine subjects disagree, and eight subjects neither agree
nor disagree. Reported confusion may be a poor proxy for actual confusion, so I also report the
number of comprehension questions that subjects missed on their first try. On average, subjects
missed 3.5 questions out of 18 (s.d. = 2.40) with a range from zero to nine. I construct a
measurement of actual confusion: an indicator of whether subjects missed four or more
comprehension questions, as 23 subjects (42.6%) did. I will refer to these subjects as “confused.”
Table 6, which takes all 40 periods into account, shows that unconfused subjects are about twice

The experimental literature on deception reports instances “incomplete cheating” (see Hao and Houser 2017 for an
overview). Although I never insinuated to subjects that collusive bidding was cheating, I cannot rule out the
possibility that some subjects held this view and refrained from “complete cheating” (bidding the reserve).
27
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as likely to bid 475, and about twice as unlikely to bid competitively (p = 0.075 and p = 0.028,
respectively). 28, 29, 30, 31
Partly driving results are subjects who alternate between collusive and competitive bids.
Among subjects who bid above 420 and then lower their bid in the next period, 34.8% lower to
420 or below. This percentage drops to 18.5% among subjects who bid 475 in the previous
period. Among subjects who bid 420 and below and then raise their bid, 66.7% raise to above
420. Occasionally subjects seem to decide their strategy based on their cost draw. Those who
draw 387.5 and below are twice as likely to bid competitively, taking advantage of their low cost
draw, as those who draw above 387.5: 0.24 vs. 0.12 (p = 0.028).
2.3.6.c Gender Effects
Subjects are comprised of 24 men and 30 women. Research has found that women tend to bid
more aggressively (Ham and Kagel 2006, Chen et al. 2013). Here aggressiveness might matter
not only for subjects who bid competitively, but for subjects who bid above 420 but below 475,
because confused subjects (even if not measured as such) are presumably bidding in this region.

A subject’s missing of at least four test questions is above mean by at least one-fifth of a standard deviation. As a
robustness check, I redefine my confusion measurement as the missing of at least five questions, representing threefifths of a standard deviation. The number of subjects measured as confused drops 30.4% to just 16. The proportion
of unconfused subjects who choose 475, 0.44, remains above the proportion of confused subjects who choose 475,
0.34, but the difference is not significant (p = 0.250).
29
I recognize that my measurement of confusion could be interpreted as a measurement of other attributes, such as
attentiveness or intelligence. It is also possible that quiz performance and competitiveness are directly correlated,
though that story is less convincing. Of the 23 subjects measured as confused, 10 describe a competitive strategy in
the post-session survey, 10 describe a collusive strategy, and three are ambiguous. Only four confused subjects state
a clear misunderstanding of the rules, half of whom describe a collusive strategy and half of whom describe a
competitive strategy. These observations, combined with the description of how confused and unconfused subjects
actually behave, imply that some confused subjects learn the rules (or change preferences) during the course of the
experiment. In the final periods unconfused subjects are still more likely to bid 475, but confusion no longer predicts
competitiveness (see Footnote 30).
30
For periods 34-40, unconfused (confused) subjects bid 475 with probability 0.59 (0.38, p = 0.028). Unconfused
subjects bid competitively with probability 0.11, indistinguishable from confused subject’s 0.25 (p = 0.206).
31
In the Appendix are the results of one session in which subjects participate in honest auctions. Standard
predictions capture the results well, providing evidence that subjects are capable of understanding the novelty of a
procurement auction.
28
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Another reason why women might be more inclined to bid in this region is that they feel greater
pity for the computerized buyer — that is, the researcher whose budget declines more under
perfect collusion than under imperfect collusion.32 Table 6 reports that for all periods men are
nearly twice as likely, 0.54 versus 0.29, to bid 475 (p = 0.046).33 Furthermore, 30.0% of women
never bid 475, while the corresponding figure for men is just 12.5% (p = 0.140). The end result
of both confusion and gender effects is that unconfused males bid the reserve 69.9% of the time.
Women are just as likely to be competitive, so the difference arises from a greater proportion of
women choosing imperfectly collusive bids: 0.53 vs. 0.29 (p = 0.028). The proportions of
women measured and self-reported as confused are greater than those for men — 0.49 versus
0.39 and 0.37 vs. 0.23, respectively — though these differences are not significant. Nor are the
differences in the mean total profit and the mean selling price, partly because the winner’s bid
becomes the price in just 43.2% of auctions. Mean bids, both unconditionally and in the
competitive and imperfectly collusive regions, also show no difference by gender. But a
difference does arise (p = 0.046) for bids greater than 420: men on average bid 464.81 and
women 456.20.34 Women who choose imperfectly collusive bids tend to bid high values more
often: 56.9% of their choices in the imperfectly collusive region are 450 or higher, compared
with men’s 47.1%. When considering all bids, women are much more likely to bid 450: 0.09 vs.
0.05. Finally, research has found men to be more confident than women in strategic situations
(Croson and Gneezy 2009). There is evidence that this is occurring here: men and women who
bid 475 do so again in the next period with probability 0.94 and 0.76, respectively (p = 0.028).

Toussaint and Webb (2005), citing several papers, note that “empirical researchers have found that gender
differences in empathy commonly indicate that women have higher levels than do men.”
33
For periods 34-40, men (women) bid 475 with probability 0.66 (0.36, p = 0.046).
34
For periods 34-40, these same figures for men and women, respectively, are 467.49 and 460.06 (p = 0.075).
32
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2.3.6.d Regression Analysis
I continue the Tobit regression analysis from section 3.3. I regress bid on cost, the ex ante
confusion indicator, the period, session dummies, and gender.35 The five columns of Table 7
report marginal effects. As expected, the average male bid is 8.75 higher. Men who bid
competitively, however, on average bid 3.97 lower. Confused subjects on average bid 15.5
lower, and confusion is not significant for competitive bids. Bids on average grow 0.30 per
period (or 11.70 during a session). Changes between the opening periods and the closing periods
also are as expected: the period effect drops drastically in both magnitude and significance; the
cost effect drops to 0.26 from 0.47; the gender effect is insignificant for the opening periods but
is significant (p = 0.031) and strong (12.26) for the closing periods; and confusion’s effect drops
in both significance (p = 0.000 to p = 0.065) and magnitude (-18.79 to -10.33). For competitive
bids, the marginal effect for cost is 0.45. For bids strictly below 420 and after the removal of the
extremely low bid mentioned earlier, the effect grows to 0.55 (p = 0.000), with 0.67 as the upper
bound of the 95% confidence interval.
2.3.6.e Fairness
Feelings of unfairness also may have influenced behavior. After all, in most auctions the price is
not the winner’s bid. Usually winners settle for a lower price set by a competitor, with an
average lowering of 19.03. One subject at the end of the experiment voiced irritation, saying he
didn’t understand why others chose to decrease payouts by bidding below 475, in some cases for
“pennies.” The post-session survey also asks subjects to rate the statement “The experiment was
fair” on a five-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Two subjects
strongly disagree, four subjects disagree, and eight subjects neither agree nor disagree. In

35

When I add gender/confusion interactions, none of accompanying coefficients are significant.
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response to the strategy question, some subjects describe prices that are “too high,” but the
subjects may be fairness-minded or confused. No subject mentions fairness per se.
2.3.7 Learning Effects
Finding 4: Evidence supports Hypothesis 4.
Some subjects seem to learn. One subject, for example, writes:
At first I did not understand that I did not need to have the best
offer in the first turn. After the practice, I decided to stay with 475
as it would not decrease the selling price.
Many subjects immediately understand the collusive strategy, submitting bids that act as signals.
Figure 9 shows how 475-bidding (and 20-submitting) grew significantly during the sessions,
contributing to the steadily growing mean bid of Figure 4. In periods 1-7, the mean bid is already
444.96 (s.d. = 12.29). Subjects bid 475 about a quarter of the time and 450 another 11.1% of the
time. In periods 34-40, subjects bid 475 nearly half the time and 450 only 4.8% of the time.
In the opening seven periods, 22 out of 54 subjects (40.7%) choose the 475/20 pair at least
once, and three choose it every period. In the last seven periods, 33 subjects (61.1%) choose the
pair at least once, and 12 choose it every period (p = 0.035 for the comparison between
percentages). For all periods, 40 subjects (74.1%) choose the pair at least once, with five subjects
bidding 475 in every period.
Each period subjects receive two types of signals: their winning or losing, and the bids of
their two competitors. In regard to winning and losing, the resubmission fee is paramount:
subjects who submit 20 increase their probability of winning from 0.14 to 0.41 (p = 0.028).36
Among subjects who did not submit 20 in the previous period, those who lost submit a higher fee

36

Also recall that choosing a competitive bid increases the probability of winning by 0.12.
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with probability 0.80, compared with 0.66 for those who won (p = 0.046). In regard to
competitors’ bids, Table 8 reports the probabilities that subjects raise or lower their bids after
observing bids in the previous auction. My approach borrows from the learning direction theory
devised in the late 1990s (Selten 2004) and further developed in recent years (see Crawford 2013
for an overview). In the table, a “higher” (“lower”) signal is competitor’s bid in the previous
auction that was higher (lower) than the subject’s own bid. Subjects who did not bid 475 in the
previous period and faced two lower signals, bid higher with a probability of only 0.27. This
probability rises to 0.41 if the subject faced one higher signal (p = 0.075) and to 0.59 if the
subject faced two higher signals (p = 0.028, for the comparison between 0.41 and 0.59).
Furthermore, subjects are equally likely — with a probability of about 0.40 — to bid lower after
facing either two lower signals or one higher signal. But this probability drops to just 0.29 after
facing two higher signals (p = 0.028). Table 9 re-creates Table 8 using only bids greater than
420. As expected, the learning effects are intensified: the probability of bidding higher after
experiencing two higher signals is now 0.71. The last row of both tables reports that if subjects
did bid 475 in the previous auction, the chances they will decrease their bid in the current period
is roughly 0.10, regardless of signals.
Signals of winning and losing interact with the higher and lower signals only to a degree.
Every probability for a movement toward 475 in Tables 8 and 9 is higher when interacted with
winning, but these differences are not statistically significant. Losing subjects, however, are
significantly more likely to lower their bids in a period after not bidding 475, regardless of
signals. Unconditionally, losing subjects who did not bid 475 in the previous period lower their
bids with probability 0.40; winning subjects with probability 0.24 (p = 0.028 for the
comparison). Are losing subjects more likely to lower their bids even when their bids are above
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420? In this case, lowering their bids to an amount still above 420 cannot help them win and
could actually lower their profit. I find that subjects do respond to these false signals. For bids
above 420 only, the probability that subjects lower their bids after losing is 0.27, compared with
0.19 for winners (p = 0.075).
During the course of most sessions the mean bid grows, and so does the number of bids equal
to 475. Subjects who persist in submitting low bids, therefore, face a greater number of higher
signals toward the end of a session. Because experience and number of signals are correlated,
perhaps the changes in trajectory likelihoods reflect introspection instead of signaling. However,
the probability that subjects who did not bid 475 in the previous auction bid higher does not
change during the sessions when I examine various blocks of periods from both ends of sessions.
In fact, a plot of mean probabilities by period shows a slight downward trend (Figure A1 in the
Appendix). Furthermore, reproductions of Tables 8 and 9 using data from periods 1-20 and then
from periods 21-40 result in only minor differences in likelihood estimates. I also estimate a
linear probability model, regressing the likelihood of bidding higher on cost, period, and the two
types of higher signals, assuming the subject did not bid 475 in the previous auction. I used, at
the individual level, fixed effects and clustered standard errors. The period coefficient is highly
insignificant (p = 0.527), while the coefficients for the signals are highly significant (p = 0.000)
and 50% and 30% greater in magnitude in comparison with the nonparametric estimates for one
and two higher signals, respectively. These observations suggest that recent signals dominate
accumulated signals. But experience likely matters. Subjects, for example, could observe that
they were losing auctions despite their bidding the lowest.
Tables 10 and 11 report the intensive margins of learning effects as represented by changes in
bid/cost. On average, subjects who saw two higher signals in the previous auction and increase
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their bid/cost do so by 0.05, which is larger than the 0.04 increase after they saw only one higher
signal (p = 0.116), and larger than the 0.03 increase after they saw no higher signal (i.e., two
lower signals). Also, subjects who saw two higher signals and decrease their bid/cost do so by a
smaller amount: 0.03 versus 0.04 when they saw only one higher signal (p = 0.075). Many of
these magnitudes change significantly when I consider only bids over 420. The “Away From
475” magnitudes decrease perhaps because the restriction weeds out bids that fall below 420
after being very high in the previous period. I again wonder whether experience is driving these
results, so I reproduce the tables for only periods 1-20 and 21-40. There are only two statistically
significant differences between the halves.37
Figure 10 shows, by session, how the mean bid changes across periods. Sessions two and
three show the most increase; session four and six show the least, though the latter starts out
high. Session three even shows a slight downward trend, though the mean of period 40 is higher
than that of period one. Interestingly, three sessions — one, two and six — end with nearly
identical means, as do sessions four and five, even though each session of these two groups start
out with very different means. Learning may partly explain both the bid increases and drop in
variance.
Of course, subjects also can learn to act unprofitably. The post-session survey asks, “If you
did not submit an initial offer of 475 in every period, why didn’t you?” One subject answers,
“My competitors were submitting very low prices.” More than one subject mentions using the
selling price as a guide, with one subject writing simply, “I decided my initial offer price by what

37

For both all bids and bids above 420, subjects who see no higher signals in the second half raise their bid/cost by
0.04, compared with 0.03 in the first half.
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the previous one sold for.” Subjects see only selling prices that are at most the value of their own
bid, so this strategy could have trapped some subjects in unprofitable behavior.
2.4 Conclusion
Compte et al. prove the general existence of a collusive equilibrium in which all sellers bid the
government’s reserve and submit the highest bribe the agent will accept. In the lab I implement a
specific version of their theory to test the extent to which the equilibrium emerges in a simplified
setting. Only 13.5% of auctions in the closing periods display the perfectly collusive outcome
because only half of subjects attempt such collusion. Yet due to imperfectly collusive bidding,
another 45.2% of selling prices are above 420 but below 475. Therefore in most auctions the
selling price is much higher and efficiency much lower than would be expected if subjects
simply raised their honest-auction bids by the maximum bribe. Much of this paper has tried to
explain why many subjects, having chosen to bid above 420, fail to realize that the most sensible
bid is 475. Confusion and gender seem to be the main reasons, though some subjects learn from
others. My paper, while contributing to the corruption literature, holds a firmer place in the
experimental literature on collusion, in which little evidence exists of tacit collusion among
sellers who are continually rematched. An important difference between my study and previous
auction studies is that bounded rationality, much more than trust, is the limiting factor for
collusion.
My existence proof of Compte et al.’s collusive equilibrium in the lab does not determine
whether the theory is applicable to more complicated markets. Even so, I argue that real-world
firms have a greater chance at optimal collusion. Especially in the world of lucrative government
contracts, corrupt firms probably often do wish to pay a bribe beyond what the agent will accept,
and this market imperfection probably does often lead to collusion, even if such collusion better
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resembles one of the more complicated models described by Compte et al. Furthermore, firms
are less likely than lab subjects to face hindrances such as confusion and joy of winning (which
are not accounted for in Compte et al.’s model anyhow), and thus may achieve collusion more
easily. Firms also may choose explicit collusion over tacit collusion due to the latter’s fragility.
One possibility for future research is allowing subjects to communicate before each period,
which would likely lead to less confusion and more perfect collusion, albeit explicit.
Other research ideas abound, beginning with the study of four sellers instead of three. Also,
Compte et al.’s theory doesn’t preclude fixed matching instead of random matching. Suppliers in
the field likely encounter the same firms again and again. As mentioned earlier, fixed matching
should give collusion a better shot, with the side benefit of greater statistical power. Firm
decisions also are often made by groups, and in the lab two brains (or more) may be better than
one in finding the perfectly collusive equilibrium. Limited bribery is the crux of the equilibrium,
so an obvious treatment idea is to remove the bribe ceiling. Implementation, however, might be
difficult. Compte et al. also show that increasing control over the agent, i.e., reducing the upper
limit for bribes, can increase the ability of firms to collude. So another treatment could be to
lower the bribe limit or, equivalently, adjust the cost spread. Alternatively it might be interesting
to lower the reserve to, say, 430. Subjects trying to collude might benefit from the strategy-space
reduction, and I could more properly incentivize competitive behavior. Due to the current low
exchange rate, one could argue that sensible subjects would bid 475 even when other subjects
attempt to knock them out. This reduces the strategic nature of the setting.
Finally, Fonseca and Normann (2012) study experimental Bertrand oligopolies in which
subjects can communicate. The authors find that subjects continue to collude even after
communication is disabled. In a similar fashion, if a design change could foster substantially
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more reserve-price collusion, a further treatment could be to disable bribery after a certain period
to see if collusion persists.
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Appendix
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary of Experiment
No. of sessions: 6, all identical. No. of subjects per session: 9.
Exchange rate: E$40.00 = U.S.$1.00.
Mean earnings in U.S. dollars: $13.76, including a $5 show-up fee
Note: I report on one additional session of auctions without bribery, in the appendix.

Table 2: Summary of Nomenclature
Types of Auction
Corrupt: the auction of the experiment (with bribery).
Honest: the auction of the experiment minus the bribery stage.
Competitive: corrupt auction in which all subjects add 20 to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium
(RNNE) bid they would have submitted in an honest auction.
Imperfectly collusive: corrupt auction with selling price > 420, < 475 (because at least one
subject bids in this region).
Perfectly collusive: corrupt auction with selling price = 475 (because all subjects bid 475).
Types of Bid
Competitive: bid ≤ 420 (because the highest competitive bid is 420).
Imperfectly collusive: bid > 420, < 475.
Perfectly collusive: bid = 475.
Notes: I report on one session of honest auctions, in the Appendix. I use hypothetical outcomes
of honest auctions, not experimental results, for comparisons. For competitive auctions, selling
price ≤ 420, but the price also can be in this region when at least one subject bids competitively.
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Table 3: Means and Predictions for Bid, Selling Price, Subject Profit, and Efficiency
Competitive
Prediction

Bid

Periods 1-7

411.07

<∗∗

Periods 34-40

412.05

<∗∗

Periods 1-7

406.22

<∗∗

Periods 34-40

407.74

<∗∗

Periods 1-7

2.08
(0.09)

<∗∗

Periods 34-40

1.66
(0.14)

<∗∗

444.96
(12.29)
<∗∗
455.30
(8.98)
Selling
Price
423.82
(14.90)
≈†
433.13
(12.50)
Subject
Profit
7.17
(4.08)
≈††
9.36
(3.83)

<∗∗

Perfectly
Collusive
Prediction
475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

22.77
(0.48)

<∗∗

22.19
(0.38)

>∗∗

0.30
(0.12)

>∗∗

0.28
(0.09)

Efficiency
Periods 1-7

0.73
(0.06)

>∗∗

Periods 34-40

0.71
(0.04)

>∗∗

0.48
(0.11)
≈
0.46
(0.13)

Notes: The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Competitive bid predictions are transformations, shifted upward by 20, of the cost draws using
the Nash equilibrium bidding function for risk-neutral sellers who compete in honest auctions
with the same relevant parameters. Competitive bidders submit the highest bribe they can afford.
Perfectly collusive predictions are simulations in which subjects, with the same cost draws, bid
475 and submit 20 as their bribe. Cost draws were the same in each session. ** indicates a
significant difference at the 5% level, according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. † p = 0.116 ††
p = 0.173.
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Table 4: Bids and Selling Prices by Region for Periods 34-40
% ≤ 420
Bids

16.4

% > 420,
≠ 475
34.4

Selling Prices

40.5

45.2

% = 475

14.3

49.2

Table 5: Means and Predictions for Fee Offer and Winning Fee
Fee Offer
Periods 1-7

Periods 34-40

Periods 1-7

Periods 34-40

15.04
(2.88)
<∗∗
16.98
(2.10)
Winning
Fee
18.49
(1.57)
≈
18.58
(1.80)

Prediction
∗∗

<

<∗∗

≈†
<∗

18.16
(1.67)
≈
17.97
(1.67)

19.18
(0.99)
≈
18.97
(1.26)

Notes: The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Predictions
are the highest fees subjects could afford given the minimum first-stage bid. ** and * indicate a
significant difference at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, according to the Wilcoxon signedrank test. † p = 0.140
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Table 6: Proportion of Bids Classified as Competitive (≤ 420), Imperfectly Collusive (> 420, ≠ 475) and Perfectly Collusive (=
475) by Gender and Confusion
Confusion
Bid
Values

All

≤ 420

0.18
(0.08)
<∗∗
0.42
(0.12)
≈
0.40
(0.19)

> 420,
≠ 475
= 475

Confused

0.26
(0.15)
<∗
0.48
(0.14)
≈†
0.26
(0.18)

Gender

Unconfused

>∗

≈

<∗∗

0.11
(0.09)
<∗∗
0.37
(0.17)
≈
0.51
(0.23)

Male

0.16
(0.08)
<∗∗
0.29
(0.12)
<∗
0.54
(0.16)

Confusion | Male
Female

≈

<∗∗

>∗∗

0.19
(0.10)
<∗∗
0.53
(0.17)
≈
0.29
(0.26)

Confused
Male

0.24
(0.16)
<∗
0.39
(0.10)
≈
0.37
(0.19)

Unconfused
Male

≈†

>∗

<∗∗

0.09
(0.10)
<∗∗
0.21
(0.18)
<∗
0.70
(0.28)

Confusion | Female
Confused
Female

0.29
(0.24)
≈†
0.55
(0.19)
>∗
0.16
(0.16)

Unconfused
Female

>∗

≈

<∗∗

0.11
(0.07)
<∗∗
0.46
(0.25)
≈
0.44
(0.28)

Notes: “Confused” indicates that a subject missed four or more questions on the comprehension test. The unit of observation is the
session. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ** and * indicate a significant difference at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively,
according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. †p = 0.116.
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Table 7: Marginal Effects From Tobit Regressions With Random Effects
Dependent
Variable: Bid
Cost

All Data
0.335***
(0.051)

0.310***
(0.050)

Periods 1-7
0.430***
(0.115)

0.467***
(0.116)

Periods 34-40
0.251***
(0.086)

0.264***
(0.087)

Bids > 420
0.098**
(0.039)

0.066*
(0.036)

Bids ≤ 420
0.436***
(0.059)

0.449***
(0.059)

Period

0.301***
(0.035)

1.82***
(0.415)

0.506*
(0.299)

0.300***
(0.033)

-0.061*
(0.034)

Male

8.75*
(4.95)

4.65
(5.14)

12.26**
(5.68)

8.25**
(3.68)

-3.97*
(2.14)

Confusion a

-15.5***
(5.00)

-18.79***
(5.15)

-10.33*
(5.59)

-10.81***
(3.64)

2.54
(2.10)
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Log
Likelihood

-6,402

Observations
(Groups)

2,160
(54)

-6,342

-1,345
378
(54)

-1,328

-965

-959

378
(54)

-4,297
1,772
(54)

-4,211

-1,351

-1,347

388
(41)

Notes: Regressions also include a set of session dummies. Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. a) “Confusion” indicates that a subject missed four or more questions on the
comprehension test.
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Table 8: Probabilities That Subjects Raise or Lower Their Bids After Observing Their
Competitors’ Bids in the Previous Auction
Trajectory (Subject
did not bid 475 in
previous period)

Toward 475

Away From 475

Unchanged
Trajectory (Subject
bid 475 in previous
period)

Away From 475

2 Lower
Signals
0.27
(0.14)
<∗
0.43
(0.09)
>∗
0.30
(0.14)

1 Higher
Signal
<∗

≈

>∗∗

0 Lower
Signal
0.09
(0.05)

0.41
(0.09)
≈
0.40
(0.05)
>∗∗
0.19
(0.10)

2 Higher
Signals
<∗∗

>∗∗

>∗∗

1 Lower
Signal
≈

0.13
(0.06)

0.59
(0.07)
>∗∗
0.29
(0.07)
>∗∗
0.12
(0.08)
2 Lower
Signals

≈

0.10
(0.03)

Table 9: Re-creation of Table 7 Using Only Bids Greater Than 420, With Indicators of
Significant Differences From Respective Values of Table 7
Trajectory (Subject
did not bid 475 in
previous period)

Toward 475

Away From 475

Unchanged
Trajectory (Subject
bid 475 in previous
period)

Away From 475

2 Lower
Signals
0.32**
(0.17)
≈
0.34**
(0.12)
≈
0.34**
(0.13)

1 Higher
Signal
<∗∗

≈

>∗∗

0 Lower
Signal
0.07
(0.02)

0.50**
(0.10)
>∗∗
0.28**
(0.05)
≈
0.21**
(0.11)

2 Higher
Signals
<∗∗

>∗∗

>∗∗

1 Lower
Signal
≈

0.12*
(0.06)

0.71**
(0.05)
>∗∗
0.18**
(0.05)
≈
0.12
(0.09)
2 Lower
Signals

≈†

0.07*
(0.02)

Notes: A higher (lower) signal is a competitor’s bid in the previous auction that was higher
(lower) than the subject’s own bid. The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are
in parentheses. ** and * indicate a significant difference at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively,
according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. † p = 0.116.

40

Table 10: Mean Change in Bid/Cost by Which Subjects Raise or Lower Their Bids After
Observing Their Competitors’ Bids in the Previous Auction, Conditional on Subjects
Raising or Lowering
Trajectory (Subject
did not bid 475 in
previous period)

Toward 475

Away From 475
Trajectory (Subject
bid 475 in previous
period)

Away From 475

2 Lower
Signals

1 Higher
Signal

0.032
(0.008)
<∗
0.039
(0.012)
0 Lower
Signal

≈

0.059
(0.032)

≈

≈

2 Higher
Signals

0.039
(0.012)
≈
0.041
(0.015)
1 Lower
Signal

≈†

0.084
(0.013)

≈

>∗

0.051
(0.011)
>∗∗
0.028
(0.007)
2 Lower
Signals
0.083
(0.030)

Table 11: Re-creation of Table 10 Using Only Bids Greater Than 420, With Indicators of
Significant Differences From Respective Values of Table 6
Trajectory (Subject
did not bid 475 in
previous period)

Toward 475

Away From 475
Trajectory (Subject
bid 475 in previous
period)

Away From 475

2 Lower
Signals

1 Higher
Signal

0.032
(0.008)
≈
0.030**
(0.007)
0 Lower
Signal

≈

0.043
(0.043)

<∗

≈

2 Higher
Signals

0.040*
(0.012)
≈†
0.031 †
(0.008)
1 Lower
Signal

<∗∗

0.069*
(0.012)

>∗∗

≈

0.059**
(0.014)
>∗∗
0.025
(0.006)
2 Lower
Signals
0.051*
(0.012)

Notes: A higher (lower) signal is a competitor’s bid in the previous auction that was higher
(lower) than the subject’s own bid. The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are
in parentheses. ** and * indicate a significant difference at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively,
according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. † p = 0.116.
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Note: Bin width = 5.00. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the same histograms with bin width =
1.00.
Figure 1: Bids and Selling Prices, Periods 34-40

Figure 2: Bids and Selling Prices, Periods 34-40
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Figure 3: Kernel Densities of Selling Prices and Bids, Periods 34-40

Notes: Honest predictions are transformations of the cost draws using the Nash equilibrium
bidding function for risk-neutral sellers who compete in auctions identical to those of the
experiment but without bribery. Competitive predictions are the transformations of the cost
draws using the same bidding function shifted upward by 20.
Figure 4: Mean Bids and Predictions by Period
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Note: The highest affordable fee offer for each subject is whichever is highest: 20 or the
difference between cost and the lowest bid.
Figure 5: Mean Fee Offers: Actual vs. Highest Subjects Could Afford

Notes: Bin width = 1.00. Histogram excludes one bid of 304.76.
Figure 6: Bids of 420 and Below
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Notes: Competitive predictions are transformations of the cost draws using the bidding function
for honest auctions shifted upward by 20. Cost draws were the same in each session.
Figure 7: Mean Bids Below 420 and Predictions by Period

Notes: Competitive predictions are transformations of the cost draws using the bidding function
for honest auctions shifted upward by 20. Cost draws were the same in each session.
Figure 8: Bids of Subject 3, Session 5
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Periods 1-7

Periods 34-40

% of Bids
= 475

% of Fees
= 20

0.25

0.54

(0.17)

(0.24)

<∗∗

<∗∗

0.49

0.76

(0.21)

(0.17)

Notes: The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ** indicates
a significant difference at the 5% level according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Figure 9: Extreme Values as a % of Bids and Fees
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Figure 10: Change in Mean Bids by Session
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Additional Tables and Figures, and Experimental Instructions

Note: Bin width = 1.00.
Figure A1: Bids and Selling Prices, Periods 34-40

Figure A2: % of Bids in the Direction of 475, Assuming Subject Did Not Bid 475 in
Previous Period
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‘Honest’ Session Results
In addition to the six sessions described in the main text, I conducted one session that lacked the
bribery stage. That is, subjects participated in “honest” procurement auctions. The only other
difference between this session and the others is that subjects faced a different sequence of costs,
drawn from 𝑈[370.00, 400.00]. The instructions, however, stated that costs were drawn from
𝑈[375.00, 400.00], as in the corrupt sessions. Due to a typo in the computer program, subjects
actually faced the wider distribution. Earnings were given in experimental dollars (E$) with an
exchange rate of E$10.00 = U.S.$1.00. Subjects who participated in the 45-minute session
earned on average U.S.$10.53, including a U.S.$5 show-up fee. Henceforth all monetary figures
are in E$.
Results mostly match simulated predictions for the one session with honest auctions (Figure
A2). The mean winning price is 382.90, slightly below the predicted value of 385.40. The mean
bid is 389.21, very close to the predicted 390.17. The mean profit is 1.38, well below the
predicted 2.43. The efficiency rate is 0.85. Spearman correlation between cost and offer price is
0.88, rising to 0.94 after the removal from the data set of one of the nine subjects. Both
coefficients are highly significant.
Besides supporting theory, these results are evidence that subjects are capable of
understanding the rules of a procurement auction. Despite the error in the computer program
mentioned earlier, I did not choose to rerun the session, or to run more sessions. The results
speak for themselves, and previous experimental research already has shown little evidence of
collusion among three sellers who are rematched and cannot communicate.
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Notes: Honest predictions are transformations of the cost draws using the Nash equilibrium
bidding function for risk-neutral sellers: 𝑏𝑖𝑑 = (2⁄3) × 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 400⁄3.
Figure A3: Mean Bids for Session With Honest Auctions

Comparisons Among Tables of Means Using Different Period Blocks
I reproduce Table 3 using different blocks of periods other than the first seven periods and last
seven periods used in main text, specifically the first and last five periods as well as the first and
last 10 periods (Tables A2 and A3). I chose the first and last seven periods because between
these periods is when the mean bid becomes significantly different. So I expected statistical
differences among these tables, even though the point estimates are similar.
Below is a comparison of the statistical significance levels among the tables. First consider
the differences between the beginning and closing periods. As expected, for the comparison
between the first and last 10 periods, the mean bid is statistically different at only the 11.6%
level instead of at the 5% level for the first and last seven periods. All other comparisons in
regard to the first and last 10 periods are even less significant. For the comparison between the
first and last five periods, the selling price is now significantly different at the 7.47% level,
compared with only at the 11.6% level when comparing the first and last seven periods. There
are no other differences between the seven-period tables and five-period tables.
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Next consider the differences between the outcomes and the predictions, all of which are
significant at the 5% level for the seven-period tables and ten-period tables. For the five-period
tables, all are significant at the 5% level except for two. The selling price for periods 1-5 is
significant from the competitive prediction at only the 7.47% level. Efficiency for periods 36-40
is significant from the competitive prediction at only the 14% level.
Now consider the differences in the point estimates among the table entries, all at the 5%
level. The mean bids for periods 1-5, 1-7, and 1-10 are all distinguishable from each other; the
selling price for periods 1-5 is statistically different form the selling price for periods 1-10; and
the subject profit for periods 1-7 is distinguishable from the subject profit for periods 1-10.
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Table A1: Means and Predictions for Bid, Selling Price, Subject Profit, and Efficiency
Competitive
Prediction

Bid

Periods 1-5

410.93

<∗∗

Periods 36-40

412.30

<∗∗

Periods 1-5

406.30

<∗†

Periods 36-40

408.37

<∗∗

Periods 1-5

1.99
(0.09)

<∗∗

Periods 36-40

1.47
(0.14)

<∗∗

443.51
(12.69)
<∗∗
456.09
(9.30)
Selling
Price
423.15
(15.27)
<∗ †
432.81
(14.57)
Subject
Profit
7.17
(4.27)
≈††
9.21
(4.42)

<∗∗

Perfectly
Collusive
Prediction
475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

22.72
(0.33)

<∗∗

22.20
(0.26)

>∗∗

0.30
(0.07)

>∗∗

0.31
(0.05)

Efficiency
Periods 1-5

0.70
(0.06)

>∗∗

Periods 36-40

0.62
(0.11)

≈†††

0.50
(0.14)
≈
0.48
(0.18)

Notes: The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Competitive bid predictions are transformations, shifted upward by 20, of the cost draws using
the Nash equilibrium bidding function for risk-neutral sellers who compete in honest auctions
with the same relevant parameters. Competitive bidders submit the highest bribe they can afford.
Perfectly collusive predictions are simulations in which subjects, with the same cost draws, bid
475 and submit 20 as their bribe. Cost draws were the same in each session. ** indicates a
significant difference at the 5% level, according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. † p = 0.075 ††
p = 0.173. ††† p = 0.140.
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Table A2: Means and Predictions for Bid, Selling Price, Subject Profit, and Efficiency
Competitive
Prediction

Bid

Periods 1-10

411.12

<∗∗

Periods 31-40

412.41

<∗∗

Periods 1-10

406.46

<∗∗

Periods 31-40

408.09

<∗∗

Periods 1-10

2.03
(0.10)

<∗∗

Periods 31-40

1.69
(0.11)

<∗∗

447.02
(12.09)
≈†
454.52
(9.06)
Selling
Price
426.76
(14.81)
≈
431.80
(12.59)
Subject
Profit
8.02
(4.31)
≈
8.83
(3.48)

<∗∗

Perfectly
Collusive
Prediction
475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

475.00

<∗∗

22.63
(0.34)

<∗∗

22.29
(0.38)

>∗∗

0.28
(0.08)

≈

0.36
(0.10)

Efficiency
Periods 1-10

0.74
(0.06)

>∗∗

Periods 31-40

0.72
(0.08)

>∗∗

0.51
(0.10)
≈
0.47
(0.15)

Notes: The unit of observation is the session. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Competitive bid predictions are transformations, shifted upward by 20, of the cost draws using
the Nash equilibrium bidding function for risk-neutral sellers who compete in honest auctions
with the same relevant parameters. Competitive bidders submit the highest bribe they can afford.
Perfectly collusive predictions are simulations in which subjects, with the same cost draws, bid
475 and submit 20 as their bribe. Cost draws were the same in each session. ** indicates a
significant difference at the 5% level, according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. † p = 0.116.

Instructions
Welcome! You are being given US$5.00 for participating in this study. Please read these
instructions carefully. If you make good decisions today, you can make a considerable amount of
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money beyond the US$5.00 starting amount. However, any loss you make will be deducted from
this amount.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand, and I will come to
assist you. Otherwise, please do not talk or communicate with anyone.
You will earn experimental dollars (E$) during the experiment. At the end of the experiment,
you will be paid in cash according to the total amount you earned, at the rate of 40.00 E$ for one
U.S. dollar: E$40.00 = U.S.$1.00. From now on in this experiment, all dollar amounts are in E$.
Overview
There are 40 periods. In each period you are a seller trying to sell an item to a computerized
buyer. There are two other sellers (human participants) in your market trying to sell the same
item. However, only one item can be sold in the market each period.
Random Assignment of Sellers
In each period, two other sellers are randomly assigned to your market from a group of eight
participants. This means you will not be in a market with the same sellers every period.
Furthermore, no one will ever know the identity of the other sellers in his or her market.
How Cost Is Determined
At the beginning of each period, each seller learns how much it costs him or her to produce the
item. A seller’s cost is drawn randomly and is equally likely to be any number (to two decimal
places) between $375.00 and $400.00, including $375.00 and $400.00. A seller’s cost in one
period is unrelated to any seller’s cost in any period. That is to say, your cost in this period is
unrelated to your costs in previous or later periods, and is unrelated to the other sellers’ costs.
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How the Seller of the Item Is Determined
A two-stage process each period determines who sells that period’s item.
Stage 1:
Each seller makes an initial offer price to two decimal places.
The computerized buyer is not willing to pay more than $475.00, so sellers cannot ask for
more than $475.00.
Stage 2:
After each of the three sellers has submitted an initial offer price, sellers learn the initial offer
prices of their two competitors.
Sellers then compete for the ability to match the lowest initial offer price, even if they
themselves submitted the lowest initial offer price. They do so by submitting a resubmission fee
(to two decimal places) between $0.00 and $20.00, including $0.00 and $20.00.
To understand how the computerized buyer selects who sells the item, consider the two
possible cases:
Case 1: At least one seller submits a resubmission fee above zero.
In this case, any seller who alone submits the highest resubmission fee automatically
resubmits a final offer price equal to the lowest initial offer price. If there is a tie in resubmission
fees, one of the tying sellers is randomly selected to resubmit.
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Only the seller selected to resubmit actually pays the resubmission fee. And only the seller
selected to resubmit sells the item at a selling price equal to the lowest initial offer price (now the
lowest final offer price).
For sellers not selected to resubmit, their initial offer price is their final offer price. They do
not pay a resubmission fee or sell the item, even if their final offer price also is lowest.
Sellers who submit a resubmission fee of zero are never selected to resubmit; they also never
sell the item, given Case 1’s assumption that at least one seller submits a resubmission fee above
zero.
Note well: Even sellers who submit the lowest initial offer price in Stage 1 compete in Stage 2
to match their initial offer price and sell the item. Multiple sellers may have the lowest final offer
price, but only the seller who is selected to resubmit sells the item.
Case 2: All three sellers submit a resubmission fee of zero.
When all three sellers submit a resubmission fee of zero, nobody is selected to resubmit, and
everybody’s initial offer price is their final offer price. In this case, the seller offering the lowest
final offer price sells the item, with ties determined randomly.
Your Profit
If you do not sell the item, then your profit for the period is zero.
If you do sell the item and were selected to resubmit, your profit is the difference between
the selling price and your cost, minus your resubmission fee. Keep in mind that it is possible
to lose money if you sell at a price lower than the sum of your cost and resubmission fee. So it is
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important to pay attention to your cost (which changes each period) and how it relates to the
lowest initial offer price (which will be the selling price).
If you do sell the item and were not selected to resubmit (because all three sellers submitted a
resubmission fee of zero), your profit is the difference between the selling price and your cost.
In this case, it is possible to lose money if you sell at a price lower than your cost.
Profit if you do not sell = 0
Profit if you sell = selling price – your cost – your resubmission fee (or, if all sellers
submit a resubmission fee of zero, selling price – your cost)
The total amount you earn is the sum of your profits from all periods. Note that if your
cumulative profits become negative, you will not be allowed to continue playing.
How to Submit Your Initial Offer Price
Below is an example of the screen you will be facing. As you can see, your cost is on the left.
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To submit an initial offer price, enter your initial offer price amount in the “Initial Offer Price
(Up to $475.00)” box and then press the “SUBMIT Initial Offer Price” button.
How to Submit Your Resubmission Fee
Below is an example of the screen you will be facing. As you can see, you are given your cost
and (on the right) your initial offer price and the initial offer prices submitted by your two
competitors.
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Enter your resubmission fee amount in the “Resubmission Fee (Up to $20.00)” box.
You then have the option of using the built-in calculator to view potential profits. The
software will display calculations. Let’s go over the variables and computation:
1. Lowest Initial Offer Price = This is the lowest initial offer price from Stage 1.
2. Cost = This is your cost.
3. Resubmission Fee = This is the resubmission fee you entered.
4. Profit If Fee Is Selected = lowest initial offer price – cost – resubmission fee. This is your
profit if your resubmission fee is selected.
You can use the optional calculator for any number of resubmission fees you wish. When you
are ready to submit your resubmission fee, press the “SUBMIT Resubmission Fee” button.
You also can skip doing calculations and immediately click “SUBMIT Resubmission Fee.”
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The auction ends when all three sellers have submitted their resubmission fees.
Again, only a seller whose resubmission fee is selected actually pays to match the lowest
initial offer price, and this seller always sells the item. For all other sellers (including those who
submit a resubmission fee of zero), their initial offer price is their final offer price. They might
sell the item only if all sellers submit a resubmission fee of zero.
Information You Will See at the End of Each Period
At the end of each period, you will see messages telling you whether your resubmission fee was
selected and whether you sold the item. You will also see summary information, including the
selling price and your profit for the period.
At the bottom of most screens, you will see information from all previous periods. Below is a
sample screen.
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Summary
1. Your cost to produce the item is drawn randomly each period and is equally likely to be
any number (to two decimal places) between $375.00 and $400.00, including $375.00 and
$400.00.
2. The computerized buyer does not accept initial offer prices above $475.00.
3. After submitting your initial offer price and learning the initial offer prices of the other two
sellers, you compete with these sellers for the ability to match the lowest initial offer price and
sell the item. You do this by submitting a resubmission fee of up to $20.00. If your resubmission
fee is above zero and the highest (or randomly chosen in the case of a tie), you are selected to
match the lowest initial offer price and sell the item. If you are not selected to resubmit, your
initial offer price is your final offer price.
4. If you submit a resubmission fee of zero, you will not be selected to resubmit. You might
sell the item only if your initial offer price is lowest (or tied for lowest) and both your
competitors also submit a resubmission fee of zero.
Example: Suppose your initial offer price is $430.25, and the other two sellers’ initial offer
prices are $420.50 and $410.00. Then suppose that in Stage 2 your resubmission fee is $18.00,
and the other two sellers’ resubmission fees are $5.50 and $13.40. Then your resubmission fee is
selected, and your final offer price becomes $410.00. You sell the item and receive a payment
(the selling price) equal to $410.00. Your profit is $410.00 minus your cost, minus $18.00.
Ready to Begin
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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You will now go through a series of comprehension questions to make sure you understand
the experiment. Again, raise your hand if you have any questions.
After everyone has correctly answered these questions, there will be three practice periods
before the actual experiment starts. Profits from the practice periods do not count toward your
total profit.
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3 Chapter 2
Measuring Chinese Corruption With Household Data: A Stochastic Frontier Approach
Abstract
I present a novel method to detect corruption using only household data. I apply stochastic
frontier (SF) analysis to measure the degree to which Chinese households with opportunities for
corruption underreport their income in comparison with other households, assuming the resultant
differential is illegal income. I compare my results and method to those of Zhong (2018), who
uses the same data but another method to find that the true incomes of households with
corruption opportunities are, on average, about 15% higher than their reported incomes, an
estimate that Zhong cannot statistically test. SF analysis produces an estimate of about 10% that
is statistically significant. Given similarities in our robustness checks, my results vindicate
Zhong’s approach, though only SF analysis 1) provides evidence of statistical significance, and
2) addresses endogeneity, which may explain the estimate difference. My method provides a
cheap and easy way to quantify the relative corruption between groups, regions, and countries.
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3.1 Introduction
Corruption scholars are always in search of objective measures of bribery and graft, often
spending a good amount of time, energy, and money. In this paper I present a relatively cheap
method to detect corruption using only household data. I apply stochastic frontier (SF) analysis
to measure the degree to which Chinese households with opportunities to engage in corruption
underreport their income in comparison with other households. I then assume the resultant
differential is illegal income.
To study the same question Zhong (2018) borrows from Pissarides and Weber’s (1989)
method to measure tax evasion.1 Using a Chinese household survey, Zhong first uses OLS to
estimate an expenditure function for households without opportunities for corruption, then
inverts the function to forecast the true income of households with opportunities. The difference
between true income and reported income, he assumes, is the value of illegal income. Using an
expenditure function for household equipment and services — the focus of this study — Zhong
finds that Chinese households with corruption opportunities underreport their incomes by 14.6%.
Using the same dataset, I employ SF analysis, which is a statistical way to estimate a
production frontier and each producer’s efficiency based on that frontier.2 I estimate a
“production” frontier in which the output is household expenditure on equipment and services,
and the input is household income, controlling for location and household characteristics. I then
calculate the degree to which each household “overuses” income in its expenditure. I assume the
differential in overuse between household types, those with and without opportunities for
corruption, is a measurement of illegal income. I find that Chinese households with opportunities

1

Several more-recent papers also inspired Zhong. See his introduction for a summary of the new strand of literature
on forensic economics based on micro-level data.
2
Stochastic frontier analysis is also commonly used to estimate cost and profit frontiers.
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for corruption underreport their incomes by 10.3%, lower than Zhong’s estimate but directionally
consistent. Furthermore, when I conduct Zhong’s robustness checks using the SF method, I
detect mostly similar patterns.
The SF method makes two primary assumptions.3 First, it assumes all households accurately
report expenditures on some items, and that bribes in kind or other forms of corruption do not
influence these expenditures, which are related solely to the household’s true disposable income.
Second, some household groups are not corrupt. Alternatively, the method could assume all
groups corruptible if the goal is to measure how corrupt one group is compared to another. With
these assumptions, I can estimate a reliable expenditure function and uncover illegal income.
The SF method has two substantial advantages over Zhong (2018). First, it can test the
statistical significance of its measure of corruption, whereas Zhong cannot test the significance
of his key parameters, and thus cannot test whether the amount of underreporting is significant.4
Second, it partially corrects for endogeneity, whereas Zhong does not. On the other hand, a
drawback of the SF method is that it employs a complicated maximum-likelihood (ML)
estimation instead of OLS. As long as the ML function converges, however, both methods
provide a cheap and fast way to measure corruption in comparison with other labor-intensive
strategies. Most existing micro-level empirical analyses of corruption rely on administrative
records, special-purpose surveys, or field experiments, which can be difficult or very costly to
obtain. Most corruption studies in general rely on perception-based country-level corruption
indices, which use corruption ratings based on expert opinions or surveys of business executives.
Several studies, however, have found that perceptions of corruption are not perfect measures of

3

Zhong makes the same assumptions.
Zhong acknowledges this in his paper. In his footnote 17 he says one possible way of estimating standard errors
might be to design an appropriate bootstrapping strategy.
4

65

actual corruption (e.g., Olken 2009 and Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). This paper adds to this
literature by exploiting a corruption-related question in the same household survey. Using both
Zhong’s method and the SF method to measure corruption, I find that households that report
being less concerned about corruption live in areas with much more corruption. This may be the
case because the least informed citizens live in the most corrupt areas — in which officials and
the press do little to expose that corruption to the community.
Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) were the first to measure corruption using only household
data. They found that public employees in the Ukraine were underpaid compared with their
private-sector counterparts. The wage gap remained even after they controlled for observable and
unobservable characteristics, corrected for endogeneity, and accounted for differences in
working hours, satisfaction, fringe benefits, job security, bonuses, and secondary employment.
At the same time, the levels of expenditures and asset holdings reported by officials and their
private-sector counterparts were the same, indicating bribery as long as the labor market was free
to reach an equilibrium in which total worker compensation was equalized across sectors.
Gorodnichenko and Peter provided evidence that no mobility constraints existed. Because
Chinese public employees are paid more, on average, than their private counterparts, I cannot
apply Gorodnichenko and Peter’s method.
To the best of my knowledge, only two other papers measure corruption using household
data. Both rely on methods different from those used in this paper. Saha et al. (2014) analyze the
private-public wage gap in India to impute the existence of the unreported income. Because the
gap is both positive and negative, depending on income level, the authors use a quantile
regression technique. Their hypothesis (for which they find support) is that if they observe
positive gaps for both wages and nondurable-good expenditures, but no such gap for durable66

good expenditures, then they provide evidence of unreported earnings for official households.
Nguyen (2017) examines whether natural disasters in Vietnam have the same effect on the
income differential between official and nonofficial households as it does on the expenditure
differential. Relying on the exogeneous effects of disasters on income and expenditure, Nguyen
runs a series of regressions with panel data and fixed effects. Included in his analysis is a
regression for disaster-affected areas only. The dependent variable is the ratio of expenditure to
income, logged to represent the expenditure-income gap. Among the independent variables is an
indicator of whether the household contains an official. The coefficient of this variable is
positive and significant, implying that the official households in the affected areas spend more,
even after controlling for reported income. Nguyen assumes this extra expenditure is funded by
illegal income.
Also to the best of my knowledge, few micro-level papers have employed SF analysis to
uncover the underreporting of income. A noteworthy example is Shonkwiler et al. (2011). They
use SF analysis to measure the underreporting of remittances in Armenia. After controlling for
this, they find a strong negative impact of remittances on incentives to work.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Overview
As discussed above, I estimate a production function in which the output is household
expenditure on equipment and services, and the input is household income, with controls for
location and household characteristics. I then calculate the degree to which firms “overuse”
income. I hypothesize that, in comparison with households without opportunities for corruption,
households with opportunities seem to require less reported income to buy the same amount of
goods and services (i.e., they are more “efficient”) — but only because they do not report their
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illegal income. That is, I assume the differential in overuse between the two household types is a
measurement of the illegal income obtained through corruption such as bribery and graft.
The SF approach requires that households accurately report expenditure for at least one item.
Disposable income must determine this expenditure, meaning bribes in kind must not include
this item. The raw data that I use — the same as Zhong’s — are the 2002 Chinese Household
Income Project (CHIP) data, which include household expenditures on a wide variety of items.
Zhong claims that people in China commonly bribe with food, meals, alcohol, and cigarettes.
Employer-provided fringe benefits — not just disposable income — partly determine household
spending on healthcare, transportation, communication, and education. Zhong concludes that true
disposable income most heavily influences expenditures on clothing and on household
equipment and services. Favor-seekers hardly ever use clothing as bribes because of the
difficulty in obtaining accurate information about the recipient’s size and tastes. Furthermore,
households are unlikely to claim clothing expenditure as a tax-deductible business expense, and
employers are unlikely to subsidize it. Regarding expenditure on household equipment and
services, a major component of this budget item (spending on household services like babysitting
and house cleaning) is difficult to use as bribes, and people in China are much less inclined to
bribe with small items of household equipment. Reports issued by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) empirically support these assumptions.5

Zhong writes: “UNODC supported seven western Balkans countries or areas (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia) to conduct large-scale surveys on corruption in 2010. A
latterly published report indicates that bribery is prevalent in this region, and bribes are paid in the form of cash
(66%), food and drink (22%), valuables (5%), exchange of services (3%), and other goods (4%) (UNODC 2011a).
In Bosnia and Serbia, shares of bribes paid in the form of ‘other goods’ are only 2% (UNODC 2011b,c). This
implies that clothing and household equipment are rarely used as in-kind bribes.”
5
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SF analysis estimates production inefficiency.6 There are two possible measures of
inefficiency: output-oriented (OO) and input-oriented (IO). The IO measure starts from the fact
that if a producer is not efficient, it does not use inputs effectively. That is, there are slacks in the
inputs, and producers can reduce input usage without reducing output. Consequently, the IO
measure is practical and intuitive when output is exogenous and the objective is to maximize the
proportional reduction in input usage without changing output. This potential maximum
reduction — measured as a percentage of all inputs — is the IO measure. By contrast, OO
technical inefficiency measures the potential increase in output without increasing the input
quantities. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a measure of output loss resulting from failure to
produce the maximum possible output permitted by the technology. Thus, the OO measure is
intuitive when the inputs are exogenously given, and the objective is to produce as much output
as possible.
To summarize, a production plan is technically inefficient if a higher level of output is
attainable for the given inputs (OO measure), or the observed output level can be produced using
fewer inputs (IO measure). In my context I assume household expenditure is a response to
household income, so I choose the OO measure of inefficiency, assuming income is exogenous.7
Thus expenditure is the dependent variable, and income is the independent variable. But I do not
wish to measure the magnitude by which households could increase their expenditures given
their income (the OO measure). I wish to measure each household’s overuse of income given its
expenditure choice. This second type of IO measure is subtly different from the one already

6

Kumbhakar et al. (2015) provide a good description of SF analysis.
For his main analysis Zhong also assumes income to be exogenous, though he tries to correct for endogeneity by
using three dummies as instruments in a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation. Hausman tests indicate that the
2SLS results are indistinguishable from the more efficient OLS results. In general, households probably often do
earn more so they can spend more.
7
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described, which would require income to be the dependent variable. That is, this second type of
IO measure is defined as the first type but estimated differently, leading to a different numerical
value.8 Fortunately, as I explain below, I can easily derive this second type of IO measure from
the OO measure.
Estimates of inefficiency are conditional on the given technology (production frontier). An
input-output combination may appear inefficient for one technology, but it could be efficient
with respect to a different technology. The implication for empirical analysis is that when
estimating the technical inefficiencies of different producers, it is important that they are
estimated with respect to the appropriate technology. In my application, technology is
expenditure preferences: both types of households must have similar preferences for equipment
and services. In the next section, I test for equal preferences and partly control for possible
differences through propensity scoring.
3.2.2 Functional Form
To model the production function, I use the Cobb-Douglas functional form:
𝐽
𝛽

𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐴 ∏ 𝑥𝑗 𝑗
𝑗=1

⇒ ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln 𝑥𝑗 ,

(1)

𝑗

where 𝛽0 = 𝐴.
In my application, income is the only input, so the functional forms simplify to

8

Kumbhakar et al. (2015) note that this issue is like regressing y on x and x on y, in which case the estimated slope
coefficients are not reciprocals.
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𝛽

𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐴𝑥1 1
⇒ ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥 .

(2)

OO technical inefficiency enters the production function as the 𝑢 term in the following
expression:
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥)𝑒 –𝑢 .

(3)

The logarithm of the production function makes – 𝑢 an additive term to the corresponding
neoclassical specification
(4)

ln 𝑦 = ln 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑢.
With IO technical inefficiency (𝜂) in the production function, the expression is
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑒 –𝜂 ),

(5)

which, in logarithmic form, generally becomes

ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln 𝑥𝑗 − (∑ 𝛽𝑗 ) 𝜂,

(6)

𝑗

which is essentially the same as the OO model with the reparameterization
𝑢 = 𝜂 ∑ 𝛽𝑗 .

(7)

𝑗

Thus, once I estimate 𝑢, I can easily obtain 𝜂 from the relationship expressed in (7).9 In my
application this means dividing 𝑢 by the coefficient of log income. In general terms, producers

9

The intuition is as follows: think of a single 𝑦 and single 𝑥. Because the relationship between ln 𝑦 and ln 𝑥 is
linear, the vertical distance from a point below the line (which measures OO inefficiency, 𝑢) is the product of the
horizontal distance (IO inefficiency, 𝜂) times the slope (𝛽), that is, 𝑢 = 𝜂𝛽.
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on average use (𝜂 × 100)% more input than necessary due to technical inefficiency. I
hypothesize that households with corruption opportunities overuse income to a lesser degree only
because they do not report their illegal income. So my method for measuring illegal income
consists of estimating 𝑢𝑖 for each household 𝑖 (using the method described below), deriving an
observation-specific 𝜂𝑖 from 𝑢𝑖 , then calculating the average 𝜂𝑖 for both types of households. The
difference between these averages is my measurement of illegal income as a percentage of
reported income.
As already mentioned, I assume that income is exogenous in the expenditure function, even
though it is endogenous. Nevertheless, the SF method addresses this endogeneity by
construction: the corruption measurement is the difference in two measurements of overuse (the
two 𝜂𝑖 averages), each constructed using the same (likely biased) coefficient of log income. If
the two overuse measures are biased similarly due to this biased coefficient, the corruption
measure should be mostly unbiased due to income endogeneity (though, as I discuss later, I must
correct for possible bias in 𝑢𝑖 itself due to heteroskedasticity). In the results section I report the
overuse of income for each household type, but due to their biases, I analyze only their
differences.
I choose to study household expenditure on equipment and services because the proper
specification for such expenditure, the Working-Leser linear (piglog) formulation, mirrors the
Cobb-Douglas form with its assumption of constant elasticity. Zhong also studies expenditures
on equipment and services, but his most prominent analysis is based on clothing expenditure.
Citing several empirical studies, Zhong reports growing evidence that clothing expenditure
functions require a quadratic term for log income. Given this, I could have used the translog
functional form for the production function. Estimation of the overuse measurement (𝜂𝑖 ),
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however, would have been more complicated. To simplify the analysis without loss of generality,
I choose to focus on equipment and services, the data for which support the omission of a
quadratic term.10
3.2.3 Estimation of Mean Inefficiency
To estimate OO technical efficiency, I can specify a stochastic production frontier model with
OO technical efficiency as
ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln 𝑦𝑖∗ − 𝑢𝑖 ,

(8)

𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0,

ln 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑓(𝒙𝑖 ; 𝜷) + 𝑣𝑖 ,

(9)

where the subscript i denotes observations (households), 𝑦𝑖 is a scalar of observed output
(expenditure), 𝒙𝑖 is a J×1 vector of the one input variable (income) and the controls, 𝜷 is a
vector of the corresponding coefficient vector, 𝑣𝑖 is a zero-mean random error, and 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 is
production inefficiency. Equation (9) defines the stochastic production frontier function. Given
𝒙, the frontier gives the maximum possible level of output, and it is stochastic because of 𝑣𝑖 .
Given that 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0, observed output (𝑦𝑖 ) is bounded below the frontier output level (𝑦𝑖∗ ). I also
can write the model in the form:
ln 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝒙𝑖 ; 𝜷) + 𝜖𝑖 ,

(10)

𝜖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 ,

(11)

where 𝜖𝑖 is the error term often called the composed error term.

10

If I ignore the misspecification and use the same method described in this paper with clothing expenditure, I find
that Chinese households with corruption opportunities underreport their income by 17.3% at the 1% level of
significance. Using the correct specification, Zhong finds 18.9% with unknown significance. In Appendix A I fail to
replicate his results based on clothing expenditure.
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I construct a statistic to estimate 𝑢𝑖 as follows. First, recall that I assume the Cobb-Douglas
functional form for the production frontier 𝑓(𝑥). The estimation of the model then involves (i)
estimating the parameters of the frontier function 𝑓(𝑥), and (ii) estimating inefficiency. To
estimate 𝑓(𝑥) I first impose distributional assumptions on the error components, then derive the
log-likelihood function of the model and use numerical maximization procedures to obtain the
ML estimates of the model parameters. A zero-mean normal distribution for 𝑣𝑖 is widely
accepted in this context (Kumbhaker et al. 2015). The choice of distributional assumption for the
random variable 𝑢𝑖 is more the issue at stake. The distribution must be in the nonnegative
domain, and its joint distribution with 𝑣𝑖 would ideally have a closed form. The literature has
identified several such distributions. In the first estimation of the SF model with distributional
assumptions on 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 , Aigner et al. (1977) assumed a half-normal distribution for 𝑢𝑖 . The
half-normal distribution has a single parameter and is thus relatively easy to estimate.
Subsequent developments in the literature have suggested more flexible (but harder to estimate)
distribution functions such as the truncated-normal distribution with or without scaling properties
(Stevenson 1980; Wang and Schmidt 2002). For my application, however, a half-normal
distribution is appropriate.11 Recall that I estimate 𝑢𝑖 and then divide by a scalar to obtain 𝜂𝑖 ,
which measures how households overuse income. Households seem to overuse income because
other households do not report their full income and thereby seem “efficient” to varying degrees.
In this way the most dishonest households define the frontier. Studies have shown that survey
respondents tend to underreport income (Ravallion 2003; Freund and Spatafora 2008). I
therefore expect most households to be efficient, which would result in a clustering of 𝜂𝑖 near a

11

In his method Zhong also relies on a distributional assumption. He assumes a log-normal distribution truncated at
1 for his corruption parameter, which measures the percentage by which public officials’ reported income must be
inflated to equal their true income. One drawback of his assumption is that no public official can earn only honest
income (see his footnote 6).
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calibrated zero, with a tail to the right representing the households that report honestly to varying
degrees.12
Based on (8) and (9), a production SF with a normal distribution on 𝑣𝑖 and a half-normal
distribution on 𝑢𝑖 is represented as the following:
ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln 𝑦𝑖∗ − 𝑢𝑖 ,

(12)

ln 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝒙𝒊 𝜷 + 𝑣𝑖 ,

(13)

𝑢𝑖 ~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 ),

(14)

𝑣𝑖 ~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣2 ),

(15)

where 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are distributed independently of each other. The 𝜷, 𝜎𝑢2 , and 𝜎𝑣2 are the
parameters to be estimated. Equation (14) assumes that the inefficiency effect follows a halfnormal distribution. One way to derive the half-normal distribution is to treat it as the
nonnegative truncation of a zero-mean normal distribution. I shall denote the distribution derived
in this way as 𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 ), where 𝜎𝑢2 is the variance of the normal distribution before truncation.
Suppose that a random variable 𝑍 has a normal distribution 𝑧~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑧2 ) with the probability
density function denoted by 𝑔(𝑧). If it is truncated from above at the point 𝛼 so that 𝑧 ≥ 𝛼, then
the density function of 𝑧, 𝑓(𝑧), is
1
𝑧−𝜇
𝜙(
)
𝑔(𝑧)
𝜎𝑧
𝜎𝑧
𝑓(𝑧) =
=
𝛼−𝜇
𝛼−𝜇 ,
1 − Φ( 𝜎 ) 1 − Φ( 𝜎 )
𝑧
𝑧

𝑧 ≥ 𝛼,

According to Zhong, there is no formal estimate of the size of China’s shadow economy. A large one would
further exacerbate underreporting.
12
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(16)

where 𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) are the probability density and probability distribution functions,
respectively, for the standard normal variable.13 The density function of 𝑢𝑖 in (14) can then be
obtained by setting 𝜇 = 0 and 𝛼 = 0 in the above equation to give the following:
1
𝑢
𝜙 ( 𝜎𝑖 )
1
2
𝑢𝑖
𝑢𝑖2
𝜎
−
2
2
𝑓(𝑢𝑖 ) =
= 𝜙 ( ) = 2(2𝜋𝜎 ) exp (− 2 ) ,
1 − Φ(0) 𝜎
𝜎
2𝜎

𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0.

(17)

1
1
𝜖𝑖
𝜇∗𝑖
𝐿𝑖 = − ln ( ) − ln( 𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2 ) + ln 𝜙 (
) + ln Φ ( ),
2
2
𝜎∗
√𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2

(18)

The log-likelihood function based on (12)-(15) for each observation 𝑖 is

where
−𝜎𝑢2 𝜖𝑖
𝜇∗𝑖 = 2
,
𝜎𝑣 + 𝜎𝑢2

(19)

𝜎𝑣2 𝜎𝑢2
= 2
.
𝜎𝑣 + 𝜎𝑢2

(20)

𝜎∗2

For detailed derivations, see Appendix A of Kumbhakar et al. (2015). The log-likelihood
function is then the observational sum of (18), which can then be numerically maximized to
obtain the estimates of the model parameters. There is, however, a computational problem. The
variance parameters, 𝜎𝑢2 and 𝜎𝑣2 , must be positive, but an unconstrained numerical maximization
would not guarantee positive estimates. To ensure that the variance parameter estimates are
positive, researchers in the early literature often used the following parameterization scheme for
the unconstrained numerical maximization:

13

See Johnson et al. (1995).
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𝜎𝑢2 = exp(𝑤𝑢 ) ,

(21)

𝜎𝑣2 = exp(𝑤𝑣 ) ,

(22)

where 𝑤𝑢 and 𝑤𝑣 are unrestricted constant parameters (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). As I explain
momentarily, I choose to go step further and correct of heteroskedasticity.
3.2.4 Correcting for Heteroskedasticity
The original half-normal model of Aigner et al. (1977) assumes that the 𝑣𝑖 and the pretruncated
𝑢𝑖 are homoskedastic, that is, both 𝜎𝑣2 and 𝜎𝑢2 are constants. Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill,
Ford, and Gropper (1995), and Hadri (1999) consider models in which these random variables
are heteroskedastic. Unlike a classical linear model in which heteroskedasticity affects only the
efficiency of the estimators and not their consistency, ignoring heteroskedasticity in the SF
framework leads to inconsistent estimates (Wang and Schmidt 2002). Kumbhakar and Lovell
(2000, Section 3.4) provide a detailed discussion on the consequences of ignoring the
heteroskedasticity, assuming 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are heteroskedastic. Ignoring the heteroskedasticity of 𝑣𝑖
still gives consistent estimates of the frontier function parameters (𝜷) except for the intercept,
which is downward-biased. Estimates of the technical efficiency are biased. Ignoring the
heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑖 causes biased estimates of the frontier function’s parameters as well as
the estimates of technical efficiency. Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill, Ford, and Gropper
(1995), and Hadri (1999) propose the heteroskedasticity can be parameterized by a vector of
2
observable variables and associated parameters. For instance, 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
= exp(𝒛𝑢,𝑖 ; 𝒘𝑢 ), where 𝒛𝑢,𝑖 is

an 𝑚 × 1 vector of variables including a constant of 1, and 𝒘𝑢 is the 𝑚 × 1 corresponding
parameter vector. The exponential function is used to ensure a positive estimate of the variance
parameter. Therefore, the parameterizations are
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2
𝜎𝑢,𝑖
= exp(𝒛′ 𝑢,𝑖 𝒘𝑢 ) ,

(23)

2
𝜎𝑣,𝑖
= exp(𝒛′ 𝑣,𝑖 𝒘𝑣 ) .

(24)

The vectors 𝒛𝑢,𝑖 and 𝒛𝑣,𝑖 may or may not be the same vector, and they may contain all or part of
the 𝒙𝑖 vector. In my application I am interested in the difference between the mean 𝑢𝑖 (divided
by the coefficient of log income) for households with opportunities for corruption and the mean
𝑢𝑖 (divided by the same scalar) for all other households. My main concern, therefore, is how the
2
bias in 𝑢𝑖 due to heteroskedasticity differs between household types, so I parameterize both 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
2
and 𝜎𝑣,𝑖
with an indicator variable for households with opportunities for corruption.

The log-likelihood function of the heteroskedastic model is the same as in (18), except that I
now use (23) and (24) instead of (21) and (22) in place of 𝜎𝑢2 and 𝜎𝑣2 , respectively, in the loglikelihood function. All the parameters of the model are estimated at the same time via the ML
method.
3.2.5 Estimation of Observation-Specific 𝑢𝑖
After I estimate the model parameters, I can estimate the observation-specific 𝑢𝑖 . Although the
definition of this index is intuitive, estimating the index for each observation is less
straightforward. To see this, note that 𝑢𝑖 ~𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 ). The ML estimation of the model yields the
estimated value of 𝜎𝑢2 , which provides information about the shape of the half-normal
distribution of 𝑢𝑖 . This information is all I need to find the average technical inefficiency of the
sample. However, I am interested in the 𝑢𝑖 of each observation, so this information on 𝜎𝑢2 is not
enough because it does not contain any household-specific information. The solution, first
proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982), is to estimate 𝑢𝑖 from the expected value of 𝑢𝑖 conditional on
the composed error of the model, 𝜖𝑖 ≡ 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 . This conditional mean of 𝑢𝑖 given 𝜖𝑖 gives a
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point estimate of 𝑢𝑖 . The composed error contains household-specific information, and so the
conditional expectation yields the observation-specific value of the inefficiency.14 Jondrow et al.
(1982) show that the density function of (𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) is 𝑁 + (𝑢∗𝑖 , 𝜎∗2 ), based on which, the equation of
𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) is (see Appendix B of Kumbhakar et al. 2015):

𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) =

𝜇
𝜎∗ 𝜙 ( 𝜎∗𝑖 )

∗
𝜇∗𝑖 + 𝜇∗𝑖 ,
Φ( )
𝜎∗

(25)

where 𝜇∗𝑖 and 𝜎∗ are defined in (19) and (20). I substitute into the equation ML estimates of the
parameters to obtain the empirical estimate of inefficiency, which is guaranteed to be
nonnegative. Estimates of observation-specific inefficiency assume the model parameters are
known and given, while in fact I estimate them with uncertainty.
3.3 Data and Variables
I use the same raw dataset as Zhong: the 2002 CHIP, which was conducted in 2003 for the prior
year. Ideally, I would use his sample from the raw data, but his dataset is unavailable.15 The 2002
CHIP is a rich dataset collected primarily by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. I use only
the urban survey, which covers 6,835 households and 20,632 individuals in 12 provinces.16
Zhong claims he selected his sample according to three criteria: (i) the household contains two
adults; (ii) the second adult is the wife; and (iii) the head of household is employed (excluding

14

Kumbhakar et al. (2015) likens this to extracting signal from noise.
In personal correspondence, Zhong informed me that he has only a one-page text file with a few hints. The text
file explains how he divided his sample into corrupt and noncorrupt households (and further subsamples), but I was
left to my own devices in constructing the variable for disposable income. I did my best to recreate his sample using
this text file and the paper itself. I believe I was mostly successful due to the similarity of our summary statistics, as
shown in Tables AA2-AA3 in Appendix A. I am also mostly successful in replicating Zhong’s results based on
expenditures on equipment and services. However, I could not replicate Zhong’s results based on clothing
expenditure, an issue I explore in Appendix A.
16
These provinces are Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi,
Sichuan, and Yunnan.
15
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self-employed and retired people).17 The purpose of this sample selection process, Zhong says, is
to avoid differences owing to the preferences of various other household groups, such as single
parents, the self-employed, and pensioners. After the selection process, Zhong is left with 4,213
households. When I attempt to the selection criteria, I encounter a problem: when I drop from the
raw CHIP dataset only households not containing exactly two adults, I am left with only 3,866
households, far below Zhong’s count even before I implement the other criteria. I therefore allow
other adults to reside in the household while following Zhong’s other criteria. My final sample
contains 4,395 households.
I calculate illegal income by estimating how households with opportunities for corruption
differ in their underreporting of income when compared with other households. If the two types
of households differ in their underreporting for another reason — tax evasion — then my results
are confounded. I address this concern as Zhong does. I exclude all self-employed respondents
from my sample. For wage earners, it is relatively difficult to underreport employment income
because of employer reporting. Moreover, unlike most developed countries, the personal income
tax is not a major source of government revenue in China.18 I therefore believe that tax-evasion
motives affect my results only negligibly, although this cannot be tested with the CHIP data.
Zhong divides China’s state sector into three segments: government, budgetary organizations
(BOs), and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). According to him (without citations), BOs are like
nonprofit and nongovernment organizations but are financed by and fully accountable to the

Zhong’s criteria suggest that his sample includes only households with exactly two adults, and footnote 10
suggests likewise. Zhong’s note for his Table 1 defines adults as people age 18 and older.
18
According to Zhong, receipts from the personal-income tax accounted for just 6.9% of China’s total revenue in
2002 (China State Statistical Bureau 2003). Zhong made the following calculations using the 2002 Chinese
personal-income-tax schedule: for those respondents who reported incomes in the 2002 CHIP data, only 41.3% were
required to pay personal income tax, and almost all of them (39.8%) faced a marginal tax rate below 10%.
17

80

government. BOs mainly engage in the sectors of education, scientific research, cultural
activities, and health services. Examples include primary and middle schools, universities,
research institutes, news agencies, healthcare institutions, television networks, publishing houses,
museums, parks, and state-controlled associations. Ostensibly, SOEs are profit-driven
institutions that are self-financing, but some of them are highly subsidized. They are managed by
government-appointed directors, and those directors often switch periodically between being
government officials and firm managers. The government grants significant freedom to directors
and managers of BOs and SOEs, which have more relaxed financial constraints compared to
private firms. The mass media in China frequently reports on these officials’ corrupt behavior,
such as using public money in exchange for personal benefits.
One question in the 2002 CHIP asked respondents about the type of organization for which
they worked. The answer options included: government, budgetary organization, private or
public enterprise, and other. There was also a question on the occupational rank of the
respondent, for which the answer options included: manager of a private firm, self-employed,
professional, director of government agency/institution/enterprise, departmental director of
government agency/institution/enterprise, clerical/office staff, skilled worker, unskilled worker,
sales clerk or service worker, and other.
In what follows, my analysis is an emulation of Zhong’s unless I note otherwise. I start with
the assumption that no household members who are employed in the private sector can engage in
corruption (hereafter called the noncorrupt group), but that all government employees and staff at
the management level in BOs and SOEs can do so (hereafter called the corrupt group).
According to Zhong, most junior staff in BOs and SOEs do not provide services directly to the
population and have limited discretion in allocating public money. Hence I assume that they do
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not have the opportunity to engage in corruption. These assumptions may lead to an
underestimation of the extent of corruption if private-sector employees or junior-level staff in
BOs and SOEs engage in corrupt activities. In this case, the estimates of corruption serve as a
lower bound. Alternatively, I can consider my corruption estimate as a measure relative to the
reference group. In the results section I consider how changes in defining the membership of the
noncorrupt group affect the results and try to find a “cleaner” reference group. I define
households with one or more members in the corrupt group as households with opportunities for
corruption, and all other households as households without them. I (Zhong) classify 958 (879)
observations as households with opportunities for corruption, and 3,437 (3,334) observations as
households without opportunities for corruption.
3.3.1 Variables
For comparability, I use the same variables as Zhong. Dependent variables include the logarithm
of household expenditure on household equipment and services (my main dependent variable),
the logarithm of household expenditure on clothes (to replicate Zhong’s result in the appendix),
and the logarithm of household expenditure on food (for comparison’s sake). The explanatory
variable is the logarithm of household income, which is the sum of a household’s cash income
and other incomes in kind from all sources, excluding taxes and fees.19 All expenditure and
income variables are measured in Chinese Yuan (RMB). Control variables linked to assets
include the number of cars, motorcycles, telephones, washing machines, televisions,
refrigerators, and computers owned by the household. Demographic control variables include the

19

Pissarides and Weber (1989) use a measure of permanent income in the expenditure equation to address income
uncertainty. Zhong and I choose instead to use current income to simplify our analysis. Citing several papers, Zhong
notes that whether households smooth their consumption due to predictable changes in income is a contentious
question. Stephens (2008) shows that household nondurable consumption is sensitive to changes in income in the
presence of credit-market imperfections, which are widespread in developing countries (see Zhong for citations).
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age of the head of household, the square of the age of the head of household, the number of
children in the household, an indicator whether the head of household was in poor health, and
years of education attained by the head of household and the spouse. Control variables
concerning household characteristics include indicators for whether the head of household
worked in a BO, the spouse worked in a BO, the household had a mortgage, the household
needed to pay the cost of education for the children, the household needed to pay rent for
accommodation, the head of household was a member of the Communist Party, the spouse was a
member of the Communist Party, the firm at which the head of household was employed was not
making a loss, the head of household was a director (or manager) of a government
agency/institution/enterprise, and the spouse is working. Also included is a set of dummy
variables for the province in which the household resided. Table 1 reports the statistics for the
whole sample, households with corruption opportunities, and households without corruption
opportunities. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the two subsamples of the noncorrupt
group: private-sector employees, and junior-level staff in BOs and SOEs, which I will use for a
robustness check.20
The statistics for households with corruption opportunities and households without corruption
opportunities indicate that their characteristics are different. In terms of income, consumptions,
and household assets, the corrupt group is considerably better off than the noncorrupt group. My
method relies on the relationship between income and expenditures, so the difference between
the income distributions is a concern. Correct results clearly depend on getting Engel effects
right, the more so as the income distributions of the two groups differ. I draw kernel density plots

20

Tables AA2-AA3 in Appendix A contain these same summary statistics next to the corresponding figures reported
by Zhong. All figures are similar except for the percentage of spouses who work. This indicates that I was mostly
successful in recreating his sample from the raw data.
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of these two income distributions in Figure 1, which shows that the income distribution for the
corrupt group dominates that for the noncorrupt group.21 However, the ranges of the two
distributions are similar. In this case, if I can ensure that the two groups of households are similar
in preferences, then the estimated income-expenditure relationship can be used to fully reflect the
true level of corruption. Figure 2 presents kernel density plots of distributions of expenditures on
household equipment and services for the two groups. The expenditure distribution for the
corrupt group dominates that for the noncorrupt group.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Accounting for Preference Heterogeneity
My analysis has not yet accounted for preference heterogeneity. If corruptible households,
compared to other households, have different preferences for equipment and services, then my
measurement of illegal income will capture both preference heterogeneity and corruption. For
example, officials might enjoy more generous fringe benefits and added job security, and these
things could lead to increased spending on non-necessities like house-cleaning services. Later I
test this hypothesis by adding two variables to the frontier estimation that could indicate a
difference in preferences. Still, there could be other reasons for heterogeneous preferences. For
example, people with different levels of income, wealth, education, household characteristics,
location of residence, and other socioeconomic characteristics may have different consumption
preferences. If some corruptible households, compared to other households, are very different in
those factors, then my corruption interpretation could be incorrect. To mitigate this problem, I
use propensity scoring to restrict those factors in a common support. I calculate the propensity

21

Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests support my comparisons at the 1% level regarding both income distributions and
expenditure distributions of the two household types.
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score for each household and then restrict the sample to areas of common support. I estimate a
probit model in which the outcome variable is an indicator of whether the household is in the
corrupt group. Independent variables include log of income and some other variables that may
affect household consumption.22 By excluding those observations that are not in the region of
common support, I (Zhong) further drop(s) 95 (85) households.
3.4.2 Main Results
Before I estimate illegal income, I follow the SF literature by testing for the one-sided error term,
as explained in Appendix B. The pre-estimation tests (Equations AB1-AB2) strongly support the
existence of a one-sided error term, as does a post-estimation test (AB3).
Using the method outlined in the previous section I proceed to estimate the model of
Equations (12)-(15) with parametric distributional assumptions on 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 , assuming normal
and half-normal distributions, respectively, and correcting for heteroskedasticity. See Table 3 for
the ML estimation. The coefficients of the indicator variable for households with corruption
2
2
opportunities in both 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
and 𝜎𝑣,𝑖
are statistically significant, implying that the inclusion of this

variable in the model is supported by the data (See Equations [23]-[24] and the related
discussion). I test for heterogenous preferences between the household types by adding two
variables to the frontier estimation: dummy interaction variables for noncorrupt households in
which the head of household or the spouse was employed in a junior staff position in a BO. The
government and BOs, Zhong claims, have very similar characteristics, including working hours,

22

See Zhong for a more thorough explanation of our application of propensity-score matching. Independent
variables in the probit model include log income, age of the household head, number of children, household head’s
years of education, spouse’s years of education, need to pay a mortgage, need to pay education costs for children,
need to pay rent for accommodation, household head is a member of the Communist Party, household head is in a
BO, spouse is a member of the Communist Party, spouse is in a BO, spouse is working, and the number of the
following assets owned by the household: cars, motorcycles, telephones, washing machines, televisions, fridges, and
computers.
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fringe benefits, labor-force composition, organizational norms, and morale. However, as shown
in Table 3, the coefficients of the two variables are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Perhaps high-ranking officials have different preferences? I address this concern by adding to the
estimation a dummy variable for households in which the head of household was employed as a
manager or director in his organization. The variable’s coefficient is not statistically significant.
Next, I use Equation 25 to generate the estimated values of 𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) evaluated at 𝜖̂𝑖 .23 I divide
these values by the coefficient of log income to obtain the observation-specific 𝜂𝑖 , averages of
which I calculate for both types of households. Table 4 reports these averages, denoted 𝜂̅𝑖𝑛𝑐 and
𝜂̅𝑖𝑐 , for the noncorrupt and corrupt households, respectively, along with all figures discussed
below.24 The difference between these averages is the illegal income of households with
opportunities for corruption, expressed as a percentage of reported income. This estimate is
10.3% (p-value = 0.0000, according to a two-sided t-test) with a 95% confidence interval of
7.4% to 13.2%. Recall that this illegal income is specifically from bribery and graft under the
assumptions that corrupt and noncorrupt households hide income identically for other reasons
such as tax evasion and black-market participation. Also recall that I can interpret this result as
only a relative corruption measure. My replication of Zhong’s finding for this same percentage is
15.5% with unknown significance, close to his 14.6% (different perhaps due to our using slightly
different samples). The failure of Zhong’s method to correct for endogeneity may explain the
difference between 10.3% and 15.5%. To explain why, I first give a brief description of his

23

To estimate the model, I first set up the likelihood function by using the sfmodel Stata command written by the
authors of Kumbhakar et al. (2015). I then estimate the model by using Stata’s ml max command. Finally, I generate
the observation-specific 𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) using the sf_search command, also provided by Kumbhakar et al.
24
As discussed in the method section, one should interpret the 𝜂𝑖 averages with care because they are potentially
very biased. The overuse estimates of 0.86 and 0.76 may seem high; however, Pissarides and Weber (1989) find in
Britain that on average true self-employment income is 1.55 times as high as reported self-employment income.
Here, I study corruption (and other informal income) in China instead of tax evasion in Britain, but the similarity in
magnitude order is reassuring.
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method. First, he regresses expenditure on log income, the controls, and a dummy indicating
whether a household is corrupt. He then divides the coefficient of the dummy by the coefficient
of log income. To this number he adds a (halved) measurement that I do not explain because of
its relative complexity and because its inclusion usually alters the corruption estimate by only
1% to 3%. Finally, he exponentiates this sum using e as the base, giving the percentage by which
public officials’ reported income must be inflated to equal their true income. If measurementerror bias predominates, causing a downward bias for the coefficient of log income, Zhong’s
method overstates corruption. Because my corruption measurement is a difference in two
similarly biased estimates, I partially correct for this.
Zhong reports the results of his corruption estimation using food expenditures. He claims the
regression results for the quadratic food expenditure equation indicate that a quadratic term for
log income is not statistically significant and unnecessary. He then proceeds to show that the
estimated level of corruption is only 2.2% based on food expenditure, lending support to his
theory that food is often used as bribes in kind and thus cannot be used to estimate corruption.25
My regression results suggest strongly that the quadratic term is necessary, so for reasons given
in the method section, I do not explore this issue with SF analysis.
3.4.3 Estimations With Different Reference Groups
I have assumed that all private-sector employees and junior-level staff in BOs and SOEs do not

Zhong appears to make a mistake in his analysis. In his Table 4 he treats a key parameter (𝛿1′ ), the coefficient for a
dummy indicating that a household is corrupt, as if it were statistically significant, even though the table indicates
that it is not. When I redo the calculations assuming the parameter is zero, I find underreporting of 0.08%, which
only strengthens his argument. It is possible that table contains a typo regarding significance. However, my own
regression indicates a significant coefficient of log income, 0.505 (close to Zhong’s 0.468), with no significance for
the 𝛿1′ parameter. Regarding the 0.08% finding above, it is not clear to me whether I should even proceed with
Zhong’s method after finding 𝛿1′ insignificant.
25
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engage in corrupt activity, a strong assumption.26 To test the extent to which my results depend
on the classification of the noncorrupt group, I divide the noncorrupt group into two subgroups:
one consisting of junior-level staff in BOs and SOEs (the BOSOE group), and the other
comprising private-sector employees only (private group). I then estimate the corruption level of
each group separately. The estimation results based on the corrupt group and the private group
are reported in the section of Table 4 labelled “Reference group (1),” while the results of the
estimation based on the corrupt group and the BOSOE group are reported in the section labelled
“Reference group (2).” Varying the composition of the noncorrupt group does not qualitatively
affect the conclusion regarding the higher level of corruption of government officials in my
results (or Zhong’s). However, compared with the corruption levels estimated with the main
reference group, the estimated corruption levels are lower when I use the private group. This
may indicate that private-sector employees have more opportunities for corruption than juniorlevel staff in BOs and SOEs.27
I divide the 12 provinces of our sample into two groups: rich provinces and poor provinces.28
I then estimate the level of corruption for each group. In his paper Zhong finds that rich

26

According to Zhong, some employees in BOs provide services directly to the population, and hence may have
opportunities to engage in corruption. In addition, the Chinese media often report on employees in the private sector
or SOEs who embezzle funds from stockholders, take bribes from suppliers, and steal money from their employers.
27
According to Zhong, who cites China State Statistical Bureau 2003, privately owned firms are more heavily
concentrated in sectors such as wholesale and retail trading, hotels and catering services, financial intermediation,
and real estate, while publicly owned firms are more concentrated in heavy industries such as mining and power
generation, as well as other sectors such as education and scientific research. Therefore, compared with junior-level
staff in BOs and factory workers in SOEs, private-sector employees may have more opportunities to engage in
corrupt activity, such as asking for rebates from suppliers, taking bribes from clients, and stealing money from
employers. Another possible explanation for this result, Zhong notes, is that private firms may have stronger
incentives to help their employees to avoid taxes, as the effective wage paid in private firms is higher.
28
Zhong and I rank the 12 provinces by average household income, calculated from the 2002 CHIP data. We define
the top six provinces as rich provinces. These provinces are Guangdong, Beijing, Jiangsu, Chongqing, Yunnan and
Liaoning. We define as poor the other six provinces (Hubei, Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Sichuan and Gansu).
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provinces tend to have higher levels of corruption, and he speculates why. I find no remarkable
difference, whether I use the SF method or Zhong’s method (Table 4).
The CHIP survey asks a corruption-related question, to be answered by the household head or
main member. The question asks the respondent to rank the three most important problems of his
or her city. There are nine options, one of which is corruption. When I drop from my sample
people who do not rank corruption as the No. 1 or No. 2 problem (leaving 58.9% of the sample),
average underreporting shoots up to 14.2% (using the SF method with an exponential
assumption) and 22.4% (using Zhong’s method).29 This group is labelled “Less Worried” in
Table 4. When I consider only the opposite group, labelled “Worried About Corruption,” the SF
method detects no underreporting, and Zhong’s method reports a low percentage. So the
households experiencing the least corruption are the most concerned. One can only speculate
about the reasons, as researchers have done with similar findings (see citations in the
introduction). A greater concern for corruption perhaps leads to less corruption, or maybe more
corrupt areas contain more corrupt respondents, who may be less inclined to list corruption as a
top problem.30 Or the result could be a vagary of the data: when I consider only households that
list corruption as the No. 1 problem (874 households, 173 of which are corrupt), the SF method
again reports significant corruption of 7.8%. Regardless, my finding is further evidence that
researchers should be wary of relying too heavily on attitudinal survey questions when assessing
the extent of corruption.
I try to classify a “cleaner” benchmark group according to respondents’ occupations, labelled
“Reference Group (3)” in Table 4. This reference group consists of workers who should have

29

Zhong in his paper does not address this survey question.
This latter conjecture seems unlikely because the proportion of households listing corruption as a top concern is
the same regardless of household type: about 40%.
30
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fewer corruption opportunities: unskilled workers, skilled workers, and service workers in both
the private sector and SOEs. But the estimated level of corruption does not support this
conjecture. This last finding underscores the measurement’s roughness — the trade-off for its
affordability and applicability.
3.5 Conclusion
Zhong claims to provide the first objective estimate of the extent of corruption in China (in
2002). According to his preferred measure of corruption, based on clothing expenditure, the true
incomes of households with more opportunities for corruption are, on average, about 20% higher
than their reported income. This estimate, however, is based on a quadratic expenditure function
requiring a method that, at least according to my analysis in Appendix A, seems to be highly
sensitive to sample selection. On the other hand, I easily replicate Zhong’s estimate based on
expenditure of household equipment and services, which does not require a quadratic term. That
estimate indicates about 15% instead of 20%, although Zhong cannot say whether the estimates
are statistically significant. Using the same household survey, I apply SF analysis to produce a
statistically testable estimate corresponding to Zhong’s 15% measurement. The SF method
indicates about 10%, which is significant at the 1% level. Regarding the difference in our point
estimates, I argue that my method alone may partially correct for bias in a key parameter — and
thus may be closer to the truth. Even so, this paper primarily vindicates Zhong’s approach to
measuring corruption because most of our robustness checks follow similar patterns.
Clearly, a clean benchmark group is hard to find. These estimations, therefore, are best
thought of either as lower-bound estimations or as relative measures of corruption (my
preference). The value of the methods is their ease and affordability in comparison with microlevel analysis based on administrative records, special-purpose surveys, or field experiments.
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With just the variables found in many household surveys, researchers can explore specific issues
such as the relative corruption between specific groups or regions, or the correlation between a
community’s concern for corruption and the extent of corruption. Here, for example, my
estimates seem to indicate a negative correlation. Researchers also can use the SF method to
measure tax evasion. Policymakers, when allocating funds for fighting corruption, could benefit
from objective measures of corruption’s intensity, perhaps by region.
Regarding future research, Zhong points out that many methods exist for estimating the size
of the underground economy, all of which could be applied to answer this paper’s questions, and
all which have their own advantages and weaknesses. China, however, is a peculiar country to
test such methods. The public sector’s predominance makes finding a clean benchmark group
especially difficult. More interesting, perhaps, would be to see how estimates of corruption differ
by country. In Redwine (2018), for example, I apply the SF method to study corruption in
Indonesia.
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Appendix
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Mean of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable
Household income
Log of household income
Clothing expenditure
Log of clothing expenditure
Food expenditure
Log of food expenditure
Household equipment and services
Log of household equipment and services
No. of cars owned by household
No. of motorcycles owned by household
No. of telephones owned by household
No. of washing machines owned by household
No. of televisions own by household
No. of fridges owned by household
No. of computers owned by household
Age of household head
No. of children in household
Household head has poor health
Years of education received by household head
Years of education received by spouse
Need to pay mortgage
Need to pay education costs of children
Need to pay rent for accommodation
Household head is member of Communist Party
Spouse is member of Communist Party
Spouse is working

Full Sample
25,824.15
10.01
1,996.86
7.27
6,807.73
8.69
1,226.66
6.34
0.01
0.20
3.63
0.96
1.27
0.89
0.27
43.53
0.61
0.04
11.39
10.76
0.04
0.14
0.16
0.38
0.22
0.72

Household
with
corruption
opportunities
30,678.77
10.21
2,591.22
7.60
7,384.59
8.78
1,578.66
6.61
0.01
0.21
3.93
0.99
1.32
0.91
0.32
44.08
0.58
0.04
12.55
11.73
0.06
0.16
0.13
0.62
0.41
0.79

Household
without
corruption
opportunities
24,471.01
9.95
1,831.19
7.18
6,646.94
8.67
1,128.55
6.26
0.01
0.19
3.55
0.95
1.26
0.89
0.26
43.38
0.62
0.04
11.06
10.49
0.03
0.13
0.17
0.32
0.17
0.71

Notes: All the expenditure and income variables are measured in Chinese Yuan (RMB).
Telephones include both mobile phones and home phones. Computers include both laptops and
desktops. Children includes all children below age 18. Poor health refers to poor self-reported
health. Education costs of children refers to the education costs paid for children who study in
other cities.
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Table 2: Mean of Subsample Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable
Household income
Log of household income
Clothing expenditure
Log of clothing expenditure
Food expenditure
Log of food expenditure
Household equipment and services
Log of household equipment and services
No. of cars owned by household
No. of motorcycles owned by household
No. of telephones owned by household
No. of washing machines owned by household
No. of televisions own by household
No. of fridges owned by household
No. of computers owned by household
Age of household head
No. of children in household
Household head has poor health
Years of education received by household head
Years of education received by spouse
Need to pay mortgage
Need to pay education costs of children
Need to pay rent for accommodation
Household head is member of Communist Party
Spouse is member of Communist Party
Spouse is working

Private-sector
employees
25,187.60
9.94
1,491.99
6.98
6,951.80
8.69
1,135.64
6.29
0.01
0.25
3.68
0.98
1.27
0.90
0.22
42.02
0.68
0.04
10.40
10.09
0.04
0.11
0.22
0.21
0.12
0.77

Junior-level
staff
BOSOE
25,924.52
10.02
1,964.35
7.28
6,814.89
8.70
1,220.93
6.33
0.01
0.18
3.60
0.95
1.27
0.90
0.29
43.60
0.60
0.04
11.34
10.79
0.04
0.14
0.15
0.35
0.19
0.73

Notes: All the expenditure and income variables are measured in Chinese Yuan (RMB).
Telephones include both mobile phones and home phones. Computers include both laptops and
desktops. Children includes all children below age 18. Poor health refers to poor self-reported
health. Education costs of children refers to the education costs paid for children who study in
other cities. BOSOE refers to budgetary organizations and state-owned enterprises.
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Table 3: ML Estimation Results for the Stochastic Frontier Model
Coefficient
0.962***

S.E.
0.0431

Log of household income
Assets
No. of cars owned by household
0.437***
0.156
No. of motorcycles owned by household
–0.102**
0.0410
No. of telephones owned by household
0.0639***
0.0198
No. of washing machines owned by household
0.185***
0.0575
No. of televisions owned by household
0.0770**
0.0353
No. of fridges owned by household
0.238***
0.0511
No. of computers owned by household
0.0566
0.0416
Demographic controls
Age of household head
–0.0199
0.0202
Square of age of household head
0.000188
0.000229
No. of children in household
–0.0307
0.0382
Household head has poor health
–0.0309
0.0873
Years of education received by household head
–0.00367
0.00702
Years of education received by spouse
0.00144
0.00707
Household controls
Noncorrupt household head is in budgetary
0.0108
0.0479
organization
Noncorrupt spouse is in budgetary organization
–0.0106
0.0571
Need to pay mortgage
0.246***
0.0900
Need to pay education costs for children
–0.0979*
0.0516
Need to pay rent for accommodation
–0.0192
0.0467
Household head is member of Communist Party
0.00253
0.0385
Employer of household head is not at loss
0.0354
0.0535
Spouse is member of Communist Party
–0.0157
0.0444
Household head is a director or manager
–0.0706
0.0531
Spouse is working
0.0661
0.0430
Constant
–2.566***
0.617
2
𝜎𝑢,𝑖
Household with corruption opportunities
–0.253*
0.133
Constant
0.0867
0.115
2
𝜎𝑣,𝑖
Household with corruption opportunities
0.218***
0.0819
Constant
–0.287***
0.0594
N
4,236
Notes: Dependent variable: logarithm of household expenditure on equipment and services. To
save space I do not report the results for the provincial dummies. ***, **, * indicate statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for the Level of Corruption, by Different Reference Groups and Regions

𝑁 𝑛𝑐
𝑁𝑐

𝜂̅𝑖𝑛𝑐
𝜂̅𝑖𝑐

Underreporting
95% Conf.
Interval
Zhong (2018)
Replicated
Zhong (2018)

Main
Results
3,381
855
0.864
(0.006)
0.761
(0.010)
0.103***
(0.015)
0.0740.132
0.155

Reference
Group (1)
854
891
0.814
(0.013)
0.773
(0.011)
0.042**
(0.017)
0.0090.075
0.101

0.146

0.077

Reference
Group (2)
2,527
855
0.879
(0.008)
0.774
(0.011)
0.106***
(0.015)
0.0750.136
0.144
0.151

Reference
Group (3)
2,051
855
0.865
(0.009)
0.799
(0.012)
0.066***
(0.016)
0.0390.098
0.114
0.149

Rich
Provinces
1,653
437
0.932
(0.011)
0.846
(0.018)
0.086***
(0.024)
0.0390.134
0.145
0.150

Poor
Provinces
1,728
418
0.804
(0.009)
0.709
(0.013)
0.095***
(0.019)
0.0590.132
0.153
0.125

CorruptionWorried
1,400
343
0.863
(0.010)
0.879
(0.022)
–0.016
(0.023)
–0.0610.029
0.040

Less Worried
1,981
512
0.898
(0.010)
0.741
(0.013)
0.156***
(0.021)
0.1160.197
0.224

NA

NA
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Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimation of the Income Distributions

Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimation of the Distributions of the Log of Expenditures on
Household Equipment and Services
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Appendix A: Failed Replication of Zhong (2018) Using Clothing Expenditure
This appendix records my unsuccessful attempts to replicate certain results of Zhong (2018),
who uses the same Chinese household survey as this paper. Zhong borrows from Pissarides and
Weber’s (1989) method to measure tax evasion. He first uses OLS to estimate an expenditure
function for households without opportunities for corruption, then inverts the function to forecast
the true income of households with opportunities. The difference between true income and
reported income, he assumes, is the value of illegal income. Zhong’s most prominent analysis is
based on clothing expenditure, although he conducts all his analyses also using expenditure on
household equipment and services (the focus of this paper).
As explained in the results section, Zhong uses the method of Pissarides and Weber (1989)
when he studies expenditures on equipment and services. In this case he regresses log
expenditures on log income, a dummy indicating whether the household is assumed corrupt, and
control variables. Zhong, however, cannot use this method when analyzing expenditure on
clothing because the clothing expenditure function requires a quadratic term for log income. He
thus adapts the method for this special case. In doing so, he must estimate two equations instead
of one. The first equation is for noncorrupt households only:
ln 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝛾1 ln 𝑌𝑖∗ + 𝛾2 (ln 𝑌𝑖∗ )2 + 𝜀𝑖 ,

(𝐴𝐴1)

where 𝐶𝑖 is clothing expenditure of household 𝑖, 𝑋 is a vector of control variables, 𝛽 is a vector
of parameters, 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are two scalars, 𝜀𝑖 is an error term, and 𝑌𝑖∗ is the household’s true
income, which in the case of noncorrupt households is their reported income, 𝑌𝑖 . The second
equation is for corrupt households only:
ln 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝛿1 ln 𝑌𝑖 + 𝛿2 (ln 𝑌𝑖 )2 + 𝜈𝑖 ,
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(𝐴𝐴2)

where the variables are defined similarly as above and, as Zhong explains, heteroskedasticity
must be corrected for at the household level. Zhong shows that the following relationship exists:
𝛿1 = 𝛾1 + 2𝛾2 𝜇̅ ,

(𝐴𝐴3)

where 𝛿1 is defined in (AA2), 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are defined in (AA3), and 𝜇̅ has a simple explanation
that I omit. Zhong then calculates
1
𝜃̅ = exp (𝜇̅ + 𝜎̂ 2𝜂 ) ,
2

(𝐴𝐴4)

which estimates the degree of corruption. The true incomes of the corrupt households are, on
average, (𝜃̅ − 1)% higher than their reported incomes. Zhong assumes 𝜃𝑖 (for which 𝜃̅ is the
average) is log-normally distributed, which implicitly requires 𝜃𝑖 > 1 (see Zhong’s footnote 6).
The 𝜎̂𝜂2 variable in (AA4), the explanation for which I also omit, is calculated using a simple
equation presented in Zhong’s appendix.
Table AA1 below presents my estimations of the parameters above, along with Zhong’s
estimates, for the main sample and the alternative reference groups explained in this paper’s
results section. I also divide the sample into rich and poor provinces as explained in the results
section. Because the method assumes 𝜃𝑖 > 1, whenever my estimation of 𝜃̅ violates this
assumption, I refrain from interpretation and instead record “NA” for the underreporting of
corrupt households. Similarly, when a calculation requires me to divide by zero, I record
“Undefined.” Regarding the notation of the parameters in the leftmost column, “Before”
indicates the samples used in this paper. “After” indicates samples trimmed in a manner
explained below. When I use the same samples used in this paper, I obtain no measurements of
underreporting. Regarding the regression for only corrupt households (AA2) I obtain parameter
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values similar to Zhong’s. But regarding the regression for only noncorrupt households (AA1) I
obtain starkly different parameter values. After considerable trial and error, I was able somewhat
to replicate Zhong’s corruption measurement based on clothing expenditure, but only after
trimming the noncorrupt group based on the 95th and 1st percentiles of income, dropping 205
households and bringing my noncorrupt-group count closer to Zhong’s. This discrepancy could
have arisen due to how Zhong and I matched propensity scores. Or Zhong may have trimmed
outliers for good reasons. Given that our starting samples differed by 182 households, this seems
more likely. (In this paper I choose to include the 205 households. Dropping them leads to only
minor differences.) Also, Zhong reports that his propensity scoring led to the dropping of only 85
noncorrupt households from an initial count of 3,334 households. Thus, if the difference in
propensity scoring does cause the discrepancy in the parameter values, then apparently Zhong’s
quadratic method is highly sensitive to preference heterogeneity, which propensity scoring
addresses.
Even after the ad-hoc trimming, my measurement of underreporting is only 2.8% compared
with Zhong’s 18.9%, despite the similarity of our regression coefficients. This underscores the
sensitivity of parameter 𝜇̅ of (AA3) and (AA4) to even slight differences in coefficients. In
addition, trimming does not produce a robust estimate: I do not obtain reasonable underreporting
estimates when using the alternative reference groups, or when I divide by rich and poor
provinces. As shown at the bottom of Table 4, I do obtain robust results like Zhong’s when I use
the one-equation method of Pissarides and Weber (1989) to analyze expenditure on household
equipment and services.
A full investigation into why I cannot easily replicate Zhong’s clothing results is beyond the
scope of this appendix. In general, two-equation methods, especially those in which the sample is
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divided, are less robust in comparison with one-equation methods. Ideally, I could examine both
Zhong’s dataset and his computer code. Unfortunately, Zhong says he wrote his paper in 2008
and no longer possesses analysis files or his dataset. He also does not remember precisely how
he created it from the raw data. In fact, the only thing he retains is a one-page text file with a few
hints. I did my best to recreate his dataset using this text file and the paper itself. I believe I was
mostly successful due to the similarity of our summary statistics, as shown in Tables AA2-AA3.
And, as mentioned, I am mostly successful in replicating Zhong’s results based on expenditures
on equipment and services.
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Table AA1: Estimation Results for the Level of Corruption, by Different Reference Groups
and Regions, Based on Clothing Expenditure
Main
Results
3.918***
(0.547)
5.972***
(0.979)
6.034***
(0.698)

Reference
Group (1)
5.010***
(1.214)
5.786***
(2.009)
6.011***
(1.125)

Reference
Group (2)
3.279***
(0.637)
5.488***
(1.243)
6.051***
(1.338)

Reference
Group (3)
4.079***
(0.904)
7.626***
(1.499)
6.044***
(1.775)

Rich
Provinces
1.39*
(0.822)
4.383***
(1.444)
5.969***
(0.984)

Poor
Provinces
6.211***
(0.813)
8.374***
(1.513)
6.065***
(1.032)

–0.157***
(0.028)
–0.260***
(0.050)
–0.261***
(0.037)

–0.215***
(0.062)
–0.252**
(0.104)
–0.261***
(0.063)

–0.125***
(0.032)
–0.235***
(0.063)
–0.264***
(0.068)

–0.163***
(0.046)
–0.341***
(0.077)
–0.260***
(0.080)

–0.037
(0.041)
–0.185**
(0.072)
–0.277***
(0.049)

–0.269***
(0.042)
–0.379***
(0.078)
–0.260***
(0.059)

5.960***
(1.325)
5.960***
(1.325)
5.948***
(1.295)

5.960***
(1.325)
5.960***
(1.325)
5.948***
(1.295)

5.960***
(1.325)
5.960***
(1.325)
5.948***
(1.295)

5.960***
(1.325)
5.960***
(1.325)
5.948***
(1.295)

9.682***
(2.542)
9.682***
(2.542)
5.866***
(1.742)

7.934***
(1.932)
7.934***
(1.932)
5.983***
(1.826)

𝛾1

Before

𝛾1

After

𝛾1

Zhong
(2018)

𝛾2

Before

𝛾2

After

𝛾2

Zhong
(2018)

𝛿1

Before

𝛿1

After

𝛿1

Zhong
(2018)

𝜇̅
𝜇̅
𝜇̅

Before
After
Zhong
(2018)

–6.503
0.023
0.165

–2.209
–0.345
0.121

–10.724
–1.00
0.195

–5.770
2.443
0.171

Undefined
–14.322
0.186

–3.203
0.580
0.158

𝜎̂𝜂2 Before
𝜎̂𝜂2 After
𝜎̂𝜂2 Zhong
(2018)

0.049
0.010
0.016

0.039
0.026
0.017

0.031
0.023
0.014

0.018
0.030
0.015

0.071
0.008
0.017

0.035
0.004
0.016

𝜃̅
𝜃̅
𝜃̅

Before
After
Zhong
(2018)

0.002
1.028
1.189

0.112
0.979
1.138

0.000
0.372
1.224

0.003
11.681
1.213

Undefined
0.000
1.215

0.041
1.790
1.180

Underreporting
Before
Underreporting
After
Underreporting
Zhong (2018)

NA

NA

NA

NA

Undefined

NA

2.8%

NA

NA

1,170%

NA

79.0%

18.9%

13.8%

22.4%

21.3%

21.5%

18.0%

Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table AA2: Mean of Variables Used in the Analysis (Zhong 2018 Values in Parentheses)

Variable
Household income
Log of household income
Clothing expenditure
Log of clothing expenditure
Food expenditure
Log of food expenditure
Household equipment and services
Log of household equipment and services
No. of cars owned by household
No. of motorcycles owned by household
No. of telephones owned by household
No. of washing machines owned by household
No. of televisions own by household
No. of fridges owned by household
No. of computers owned by household
Age of household head
No. of children in household
Household head has poor health
Years of education received by household head
Years of education received by spouse
Need to pay mortgage
Need to pay education costs of children

Full Sample
25,824.15
(25,345.07)
10.01
(9.91)
1,996.86
(2,002.25)
7.27
(7.24)
6,807.73
(6,809.39)
8.69
(8.67)
1,226.66
(1,178.42)
6.34
(6.17)
0.01
(0.01)
0.20
(0.21)
3.63
(3.26)
0.96
(0.96)
1.27
(1.25)
0.89
(0.88)
0.27
(0.27)
43.53
(43.08)
0.61
(0.63)
0.04
(0.04)
11.39
(11.35)
10.76
(10.78)
0.04
(0.04)
0.14
(0.14)
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Household
with
corruption
opportunities
30,678.77
(30,575.13)
10.21
(10.11)
2,591.22
(2,607.87)
7.60
(7.59)
7,384.59
(7,377.87)
8.78
(8.76)
1,578.66
(1,527.37)
6.61
(6.49)
0.01
(0.02)
0.21
(0.22)
3.93
(3.50)
0.99
(0.99)
1.32
(1.31)
0.91
(0.90)
0.32
(0.32)
44.08
(43.44)
0.58
(0.59)
0.04
(0.04)
12.55
(12.60)
11.73
(11.82)
0.06
(0.06)
0.16
(0.16)

Household
without
corruption
opportunities
24,471.01
(24,059.81)
9.95
(9.86)
1,831.19
(1,906.47)
7.18
(7.15)
6,646.94
(6,663.87)
8.67
(8.65)
1,128.55
(1,089.09)
6.26
(6.10)
0.01
(0.01)
0.19
(0.20)
3.55
(3.19)
0.95
(0.95)
1.26
(1.24)
0.89
(0.87)
0.26
(0.26)
43.38
(42.99)
0.62
(0.62)
0.04
(0.04)
11.06
(11.11)
10.49
(10.49)
0.03
(0.03)
0.13
(0.14)

Table AA2 (Cont.)

Variable
Need to pay rent for accommodation
Household head is member of Communist Party
Spouse is member of Communist Party
Spouse is working

Full Sample
0.16
(0.16)
0.38
(0.38)
0.22
(0.23)
0.72
(0.84)

Household
with
corruption
opportunities
0.13
(0.13)
0.62
(0.62)
0.41
(0.42)
0.79
(0.88)

Household
without
corruption
opportunities
0.17
(0.17)
0.32
(0.31)
0.17
(0.18)
0.71
(0.81)

Notes: All the expenditure and income variables are measured in Chinese Yuan (RMB).
Telephones include both mobile phones and home phones. Computers include both laptops and
desktops. Children includes all children below age 18. Poor health refers to poor self-reported
health. Education costs of children refers to the education costs paid for children who study in
other cities.

Table AA2: Mean of Subsample Variables Used in the Analysis (Zhong 2018 Values in
Parentheses)

Variable
Household income
Log of household income
Clothing expenditure
Log of clothing expenditure
Food expenditure
Log of food expenditure
Household equipment and services
Log of household equipment and services
No. of cars owned by household
No. of motorcycles owned by household

Private-sector
employees
25,187.60
(25,779.08)
9.94
(9.98)
1,491.99
(2,097.93)
6.98
(7.29)
6,951.80
(6,822.31)
8.69
(8.69)
1,135.64
(1,202.39)
6.29
(6.24)
0.01
(0.02)
0.25
(0.21)
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Junior-level
staff
BOSOE
25,924.52
(23,045.81)
10.02
(9.81)
1,964.35
(1,805.36)
7.28
(7.10)
6,814.89
(6,563.77)
8.70
(8.61)
1,220.93
(1,009.02)
6.33
(6.08)
0.01
(0.01)
0.18
(0.19)

Table AA2 (Cont.)

Variable
No. of telephones owned by household
No. of washing machines owned by household
No. of televisions own by household
No. of fridges owned by household
No. of computers owned by household
Age of household head
No. of children in household
Household head has poor health
Years of education received by household head
Years of education received by spouse
Need to pay mortgage
Need to pay education costs of children
Need to pay rent for accommodation
Household head is member of Communist Party
Spouse is member of Communist Party
Spouse is working

Private-sector
employees
3.68
(3.23)
0.98
(0.97)
1.27
(1.26)
0.90
(0.87)
0.22
(0.26)
42.02
(42.91)
0.68
(0.62)
0.04
(0.04)
10.40
(12.08)
10.09
(10.74)
0.04
(0.04)
0.11
(0.14)
0.22
(0.18)
0.21
(0.28)
0.12
(0.17)
0.77
(0.80)

Junior-level
staff
BOSOE
3.60
(3.11)
0.95
(0.92)
1.27
(1.22)
0.90
(0.87)
0.29
(0.25)
43.60
(43.05)
0.60
(0.63)
0.04
(0.04)
11.34
(10.76)
10.79
(10.11)
0.04
(0.02)
0.14
(0.14)
0.15
(0.16)
0.35
(0.34)
0.19
(0.19)
0.73
(0.82)

Notes: All the expenditure and income variables are measured in Chinese Yuan (RMB).
Telephones include both mobile phones and home phones. Computers include both laptops and
desktops. Children includes all children below age 18. Poor health refers to poor self-reported
health. Education costs of children refers to the education costs paid for children who study in
other cities. BOSOE refers to budgetary organizations and state-owned enterprises.
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Appendix B: Estimation Issues
Pre-Estimation: Existence of the One-Sided Error
The likelihood function of an SF model is highly nonlinear, and estimation can be difficult.
Given this potential difficulty, it is common in the literature to test the validity of the SF
specification prior to the ML estimation (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). If support for the SF
specification is unfounded, then time is better spent on considering other specifications rather
than on the numerical details of the maximization. Schmidt and Lin (1984) propose an OLS
residual test to check for the validity of the model’s SF specification. The idea behind the test is
that for a production-type SF model with composed error 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑣𝑖 distributed
symmetrically around zero, the residuals from the corresponding OLS estimation should skew to
the left. This is true regardless of the distributional function chosen for 𝑢𝑖 in the model
estimation after the pretesting. A test of the null hypothesis of no skewness as opposed to the
alternative hypothesis can thus be constructed using the OLS residuals. If the estimated skewness
has the expected sign, rejection of the null hypothesis provides support for the existence of the
one-sided error. For the skewness test Schmidt and Lin (1984) suggest a sample-moment-based
statistic, commonly referred to as the √𝑏1 test:
√𝑏1 =

𝑚3
𝑚2 √ 𝑚2

(𝐴𝐵1)

where 𝑚2 and 𝑚2 are the second and third sample moments of the OLS residuals, respectively.
The second sample moment of a random variable 𝑥 is ∑(𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )2 /𝑛, and the third sample
̂
moment is ∑(𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )3 /𝑛. A result showing √𝑏1 < 0 indicates that the OLS residuals are skewed
to the left. Under the null hypothesis of no skewness, the statistic should not be statistically
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different from zero. The distribution of √𝑏1 is nonstandard, and its critical values are tabulated in
several studies, e.g., D’Agostino and Pearson (1973).
Coelli (1995) suggests a variant of this test. He notes that under the null hypothesis of no
skewness, the third moment of the OLS residuals is asymptotically distributed as a normal
random variable with mean 0 and variance 6𝑚23 /N. Thus, the statistic
6𝑚3
𝑀3𝑇 = 𝑚3 ⁄√ 2
N

(𝐴𝐵2)

has an asymptotic distribution of a standard normal random variable.
Turning to my data (see main text), I first conduct an OLS estimation of the expenditure
function and plot the histogram of the residuals compared to a normal density. The resulting
chart is reproduced in Figure AB1. There appears to be some evidence of a negative skew,
although it is far from clear. To formally examine and test this, I use the skewness statistic. The
point estimate of the statistic √𝑏1 (AB2) is obtained from the summary statistic of the OLS
residuals. The statistic has a value equal to –0.27. The negative sign indicates that the
distribution of the residuals skews to the left, which is consistent with a production specification.
To assess the statistical significance of the statistic, I conduct the unaltered test as described by
D’Agostino, Belanger, and D’Agostino Jr. (1990). The test returns a p-value that is less than
0.00; I confidently reject the null hypothesis of no skewness. Furthermore, the MT3 statistic
suggested by Coelli (1995), Equation AB2, equals –7.06. Because it has a normal distribution,
the critical value is –1.96, so the result confirms the rejection of the null hypothesis of no
skewness in the OLS residuals. I have found support for a left-skewed error distribution, and the
skewness is statistically significant. I can proceed to the estimation.
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Post-Estimation: Existence of the One-Sided Error
Central to the stochastic frontier model is the one-sided error specification, which represents
technical inefficiency. It is therefore important to test the existence of the one-sided error for the
model. If evidence for the one-sided error specification is not found, the model reduces to a
standard regression model for which a simple OLS estimation would suffice. This amounts to a
test for the presence of 𝑢𝑖 in the model, and a generalized likelihood ratio (LR) test for the null
hypothesis of no one-sided error can be constructed based on the log-likelihood values of the
OLS (restricted) and the SF (unrestricted) model. Recall that the OLS-residual-based skewness
test introduced in the previous section also tests the validity of the one-sided error specification.
Although useful as a screening device, the test does not use the information from the distribution
functions as the random error. The LR test introduced here is more precise to the specific model I
am estimating, but the disadvantage is that it can only be conducted after the ML estimation of
the model has been undertaken. The LR test statistic is
– 2[𝐿(𝐻0 ) − 𝐿(𝐻1 )],

(𝐴𝐵3)

where 𝐿(𝐻0 ) and 𝐿(𝐻1 ) are log-likelihood values of the restricted model (OLS) and the
unrestricted model (SF), respectively, and the degree of freedom equals the number of
restrictions in the test. For the half-normal model, the LR test amounts to testing the hypothesis
that 𝜎𝑢2 = 0. The complication of the test is that the null hypothesis of 𝜎𝑢2 = 0 is on the boundary
of the parameter value’s permissible space, and therefore the LR test statistic does not have a
standard chi-square distribution. Coelli (1995) shows that, in such cases, the test has a mixture of
chi-square distributions. The critical values of the mixed distribution for hypothesis testing are
tabulated in Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986).

109

I test for the presence of 𝑢𝑖 in the model by constructing the LR test statistic (AB3) using the
log-likelihood values of the OLS and SF models. The statistic is 47.3, which I compare with a
1% critical value of 9.50. I can reject the null hypothesis of no one-sided error.
The Independence of 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖
A final estimation-related issue is the independence of 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 . This assumption is not too
restrictive for production models in general because 𝑣𝑖 represents shocks outside the control of a
firm, and therefore it is unlikely to be related to inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖 . One can, however, think of
cases in which production risk is captured by the 𝑣𝑖 term and risk-taking behavior might be
reflected in the inefficiency term. Similarly, one can think of shocks to households that may
affect the degree to which they underreport income. For example, households in the public sector
may embezzle more funds after local disasters. Approaches exist to handle such
nonindependence issues but at the cost of making additional assumptions on the correlation
between 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 . Instead of doing this, I follow most of the production literature and assume
independence.
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Figure AB1: Histogram of OLS Residuals
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4 Chapter 3
Measuring Indonesian Corruption With Household Data: A Stochastic Frontier Approach
Abstract
I apply stochastic frontier (SF) analysis to measure the degree to which public-sector households
in Indonesia underreport their income in comparison with private-sector households, assuming
the resultant differential is illegal income. I find that the true incomes of public-sector
households are, on average, about 50% higher than their reported income, providing a rare
measure of corruption’s magnitude. I then divide the sample to support the findings of MartinezBravo et al. (2017), who exploit the fact that district mayors of the Suharto regime could finish
their terms during the democratic transition. Suharto appointed these mayors in 1994, 1995,
1996, or 1997, leading to exogenous variation in corruption exposure. When I restrict my sample
to shorter-exposed districts (those with mayors whose appointments were in 1994 or 1995), my
corruption measurement falls to 37.1%; when I restrict my sample to longer-exposed districts,
my measurement rises to 56.2%. My results provide a correlation absent from Martinez-Bravo et
al. (2017): that between mayor exposure and corruption magnitude.
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4.1 Introduction
Corruption scholars are always in search of objective measures of bribery and graft. In recent
years they have developed a strand of literature in which they compare the results obtained from
two datasets: one with corruption and one assumed to be without. The data usually stem from
administrative records, special-purpose surveys, or field experiments — all of which can be
costly or difficult to obtain. In this paper, I instead use Indonesian household data that is freely
available. I apply stochastic frontier (SF) analysis to measure the degree to which public-sector
households underreport their income in comparison with private-sector households. I then
assume that this differential represents illegal income.
Zhong (2018) is the first to borrow from the tax-evasion literature to impute corruption
levels.1 With data from only a Chinese household survey, he first uses OLS to estimate an
expenditure function for households without opportunities for corruption, then inverts the
function to forecast the true income of households with opportunities. The difference between
true income and reported income, he assumes, is the value of illegal income. Using an
expenditure function for household equipment and services, Zhong finds that Chinese
households with corruption opportunities underreport their incomes by 14.6%. In Redwine
(2018), I measure corruption using the same data but a different method: SF analysis, which is a
statistical way to estimate a production frontier and each producer’s efficiency based on that
frontier. I calculate a “production” frontier in which the output is household expenditure on
equipment and services, and the input is household income, controlling for location and
household characteristics. I then calculate the degree to which each household “overuses”
income in its expenditure. I assume the differential in overuse between household types, those

1

Specifically, he borrows from Pissarides and Weber’s (1989) method to measure tax evasion.
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with and without opportunities for corruption, is a measurement of illegal income. In Redwine
(2018), I find that Chinese households with opportunities for corruption underreport their
incomes by 8.9%, lower than Zhong’s estimate but directionally consistent. Furthermore, when I
conduct Zhong’s robustness checks using the SF method, I detect mostly similar patterns.
The SF method makes two primary assumptions.2 First, it assumes all households accurately
report expenditures on some items, and that bribes in kind or other forms of corruption do not
influence these expenditures, which are related solely to the household’s true disposable income.
Second, some household groups are not corrupt. Alternatively, the method could assume all
groups corruptible if the goal is to measure how corrupt one group is compared to another. With
these assumptions, I can estimate a reliable expenditure function and uncover illegal income. The
SF method, however, has two substantial advantages over Zhong (2018). First, it can test the
statistical significance of its measure of corruption, whereas Zhong cannot test the significance
of his key parameters, and thus cannot test whether the amount of underreporting is significant.3
Second, it partially corrects for endogeneity, whereas Zhong does not.
This paper is an extension of Redwine (2018) in that it applies the SF method to another
developing country known for corruption: Indonesia. I find that the true incomes of public-sector
households are, on average, about 50% higher than their reported income. I also divide my
sample in various ways to see the effect on my corruption measurement. Martinez-Bravo et al.
(2017) exploit the fact that ex-mayors of the Suharto regime could finish their terms during the
democratic transition. The mayors’ terms were staggered, so this event led to exogenous
variation in corruption exposure. The authors find that districts with longer exposure experience

2

Zhong makes the same assumptions.
Zhong acknowledges this in his paper. In his footnote 17 he says one possible way of estimating standard errors
might be to design an appropriate bootstrapping strategy.
3
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worse government outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition. My results
reinforce their findings in a novel way by addressing corruption magnitude: when I restrict my
sample to shorter-exposed districts, my corruption measurement falls to 37.1%. When I restrict
my sample to longer-exposed districts, my measurement rises to 56.2%. I also divide my sample
based on poor and rich districts, finding corruption much heavier in poor areas. Finally, most
corruption studies rely on perception-based corruption indices, which use corruption ratings
based on expert opinions or surveys of business executives. Several studies, however, have found
that perceptions of corruption are not perfect measures of actual corruption (e.g., Olken 2009 and
Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). This paper adds to this literature by exploiting a corruption-related
question in the household survey. Using the SF method to measure corruption, I find that
households that report trust for the police live in areas with heavier corruption, perhaps because
the least informed citizens live in the most corrupt areas — in which officials and the press do
little to expose that corruption to the community.
Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) were the first to measure corruption using only household
data. They found that public employees in the Ukraine were underpaid compared with their
private-sector counterparts. The wage gap remained even after they controlled for observable and
unobservable characteristics, corrected for endogeneity, and accounted for differences in
working hours, satisfaction, fringe benefits, job security, bonuses, and secondary employment.
At the same time, the levels of expenditures and asset holdings reported by officials and their
private-sector counterparts were the same, indicating bribery as long as the labor market was free
to reach an equilibrium in which total worker compensation was equalized across sectors.
Gorodnichenko and Peter provided evidence that no mobility constraints existed. Because

115

Indonesian public employees are paid more, on average, than their private counterparts, I cannot
apply Gorodnichenko and Peter’s method.
To the best of my knowledge, only two other papers measure corruption using household
data. Both rely on methods different from the one used in this paper. Saha et al. (2014) analyze
the private-public wage gap in India to impute the existence of the unreported income. Because
the gap is both positive and negative, depending on income level, the authors use a quantile
regression technique. Their hypothesis (for which they find support) is that if they observe
positive gaps for both wages and nondurable-good expenditures, but no such gap for durablegood expenditures, then they provide evidence of unreported earnings for official households.
Nguyen (2017) examines whether natural disasters in Vietnam have the same effect on the
income differential between official and nonofficial households as it does on the expenditure
differential. Relying on the exogeneous effects of disasters on income and expenditure, Nguyen
runs a series of regressions with panel data and fixed effects. Included in his analysis is a
regression for disaster-affected areas only. The dependent variable is the ratio of expenditure to
income, logged to represent the expenditure-income gap. Among the independent variables is an
indicator of whether the household contains an official. The coefficient of this variable is
positive and significant, implying that the official households in the affected areas spend more,
even after controlling for reported income. Nguyen assumes this extra expenditure is funded by
illegal income.
Also to the best of my knowledge, few micro-level papers have employed SF analysis to
uncover the underreporting of income. A noteworthy example is Shonkwiler et al. (2011). They
use SF analysis to measure the underreporting of remittances in Armenia. After controlling for
this, they find a strong negative impact of remittances on incentives to work.
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4.2 Method
4.2.1 Overview
As discussed above, I estimate a production function in which the output is household
expenditure on certain items, and the input is household income, with controls for location and
household characteristics. I then calculate the degree to which firms “overuse” income. I
hypothesize that in comparison with private-sector households, public-sector households seem to
require less reported income to buy the same amount of goods (i.e., they are more “efficient”) —
but only because they do not report their illegal income. That is, I assume the differential in
overuse between the two household types is a measurement of the illegal income obtained
through corruption such as bribery and graft.
The SF approach requires that households accurately report expenditure for at least one item.
Disposable income must determine this expenditure, meaning bribes in kind must not include
this item. The data sample of this study is from the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life
Survey (IFLS4). The survey includes household expenditures on a wide variety of items, of
which, I argue, true disposable income most heavily influences expenditures on clothing,
household supplies, and furniture. Thus “household expenditure” in this paper refers only to the
sum of these expenditures. Favor-seekers hardly ever use clothing as bribes because of the
difficulty in obtaining accurate information about the recipient’s size and tastes. Furthermore,
households are unlikely to claim clothing expenditure as a tax-deductible business expense, and
employers are unlikely to subsidize it. Likewise, people are unlikely to bribe with household
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supplies and furniture. Reports issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) empirically support these assumptions.4
SF analysis estimates production inefficiency.5 There are two possible measures of
inefficiency: output-oriented (OO) and input-oriented (IO). The IO measure starts from the fact
that if a producer is not efficient, it does not use inputs effectively. That is, there are slacks in the
inputs, and producers can reduce input usage without reducing output. Consequently, the IO
measure is practical and intuitive when output is exogenous and the objective is to maximize the
proportional reduction in input usage without changing output. This potential maximum
reduction — measured as a percentage of all inputs — is the IO measure. By contrast, OO
technical inefficiency measures the potential increase in output without increasing the input
quantities. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a measure of output loss resulting from failure to
produce the maximum possible output permitted by the technology. Thus, the OO measure is
intuitive when the inputs are exogenously given, and the objective is to produce as much output
as possible.
To summarize, a production plan is technically inefficient if a higher level of output is
attainable for the given inputs (OO measure), or the observed output level can be produced using
fewer inputs (IO measure). In my context I assume household expenditure is a response to
household income, so I choose the OO measure of inefficiency, assuming income is exogenous.
Thus expenditure is the dependent variable, and income is the independent variable. But I do not
wish to measure the magnitude by which households could increase their expenditure given their
income (the OO measure). I wish to measure each household’s overuse of income given its

4
5

See Zhong (2018) for a brief description of these reports.
Kumbhakar et al. (2015) provide a good description of SF analysis.
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expenditure choice. This second type of IO measure is subtly different from the one already
described, which would require income to be the dependent variable. That is, this second type of
IO measure is defined as the first type but estimated differently, leading to a different numerical
value.6 Fortunately, as I explain below, I can easily derive this second type of IO measure from
the OO measure.
Estimates of inefficiency are conditional on the given technology (production frontier). An
input-output combination may appear inefficient for one technology, but it could be efficient
with respect to a different technology. The implication for empirical analysis is that when
estimating the technical inefficiencies of different producers, it is important that they are
estimated with respect to the appropriate technology. In my application, technology is
expenditure preferences: both types of households must have similar preferences for both
clothing and household items. In the next section, I partly control for possible differences
through propensity scoring.
4.2.2. Functional Form
To model the production function, I use the Cobb-Douglas functional form:
𝐽
𝛽

𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐴 ∏ 𝑥𝑗 𝑗
𝑗=1

⇒ ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln 𝑥𝑗 ,

(1)

𝑗

where 𝛽0 = 𝐴.

6

Kumbhakar et al. (2015) note that this issue is like regressing y on x and x on y, in which case the estimated slope
coefficients are not reciprocals.
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In my application, income is the only input, so the functional forms simplify to
𝛽

𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐴𝑥1 1
⇒ ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥 .

(2)

OO technical inefficiency enters the production function as the 𝑢 term in the following
expression:
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥)𝑒 –𝑢 .

(3)

The logarithm of the production function makes – 𝑢 an additive term to the corresponding
neoclassical specification
(4)

ln 𝑦 = ln 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑢.
With IO technical inefficiency (𝜂) in the production function, the expression is
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑒 –𝜂 ),

(5)

which, in logarithmic form, generally becomes

ln 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln 𝑥𝑗 − (∑ 𝛽𝑗 ) 𝜂,

(6)

𝑗

which is essentially the same as the OO model with the reparameterization
𝑢 = 𝜂 ∑ 𝛽𝑗 .
𝑗
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(7)

Thus, once I estimate 𝑢, I can easily obtain 𝜂 from the relationship expressed in (7). In my
application this means dividing 𝑢 by the coefficient of log income.7 In general terms, producers
on average use (𝜂 × 100)% more input than necessary due to technical inefficiency. I
hypothesize that households with corruption opportunities overuse income to a lesser degree only
because they do not report their illegal income. So my method for measuring illegal income
consists of estimating 𝑢𝑖 for each household 𝑖 (using the method described below), deriving an
observation-specific 𝜂𝑖 from 𝑢𝑖 , then calculating the average 𝜂𝑖 for both types of households. The
difference between these averages is my measurement of illegal income as a percentage of
reported income.
As already mentioned, I assume that income is exogenous in the expenditure function, even
though it is endogenous. Nevertheless, the SF method addresses this endogeneity by
construction: the corruption measurement is the difference in two measurements of overuse (the
two 𝜂𝑖 averages), each constructed using the same (likely biased) coefficient of log income. If
the two overuse measures are biased similarly due to this biased coefficient, the corruption
measure should be mostly unbiased due to income endogeneity (though, as I discuss later, I must
correct for possible bias in 𝑢𝑖 itself due to heteroskedasticity). In the results section I report the
overuse of income for each household type, but due to their biases, I analyze only their
differences.

7

The intuition is as follows: think of a single 𝑦 and single 𝑥. Because the relationship between ln 𝑦 and ln 𝑥 is
linear, the vertical distance from a point below the line (which measures OO inefficiency, 𝑢) is the product of the
horizontal distance (IO inefficiency, 𝜂) times the slope (𝛽), that is, 𝑢 = 𝜂𝛽.
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4.2.3 Estimation of Mean Inefficiency
To estimate OO technical efficiency, I can specify a stochastic production frontier model with
OO technical efficiency as
ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln 𝑦𝑖∗ − 𝑢𝑖 ,

(8)

𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0,

ln 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑓(𝒙𝑖 ; 𝜷) + 𝑣𝑖 ,

(9)

where the subscript i denotes observations (households), 𝑦𝑖 is a scalar of observed output
(expenditure), 𝒙𝑖 is a J×1 vector of the one input variable (income) and the controls, 𝜷 is a
vector of the corresponding coefficient vector, 𝑣𝑖 is a zero-mean random error, and 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 is
production inefficiency. Equation (9) defines the stochastic production frontier function. Given
𝒙, the frontier gives the maximum possible level of output, and it is stochastic because of 𝑣𝑖 .
Given that 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0, observed output (𝑦𝑖 ) is bounded below the frontier output level (𝑦𝑖∗ ). I also
can write the model in the form:
ln 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝒙𝑖 ; 𝜷) + 𝜖𝑖 ,

(10)

𝜖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 ,

(11)

where 𝜖𝑖 is the error term often called the composed error term.
I construct a statistic to estimate 𝑢𝑖 as follows. First, recall that I assume the Cobb-Douglas
functional form for the production frontier 𝑓(𝑥). The estimation of the model then involves (i)
estimating the parameters of the frontier function 𝑓(𝑥), and (ii) estimating inefficiency. To
estimate 𝑓(𝑥) I first impose distributional assumptions on the error components, then derive the
log-likelihood function of the model and use numerical maximization procedures to obtain the
ML estimates of the model parameters. A zero-mean normal distribution for 𝑣𝑖 is widely
accepted in this context (Kumbhaker et al. 2015). The choice of distributional assumption for the
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random variable 𝑢𝑖 is more the issue at stake. The distribution must be in the nonnegative
domain, and its joint distribution with 𝑣𝑖 would ideally have a closed form. The literature has
identified several such distributions. In the first estimation of the SF model with distributional
assumptions on 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 , Aigner et al. (1977) assumed a half-normal distribution for 𝑢𝑖 . The
half-normal distribution has a single parameter and is thus relatively easy to estimate.
Subsequent developments in the literature have suggested more flexible (but harder to estimate)
distribution functions such as the truncated-normal distribution with or without scaling properties
(Stevenson 1980; Wang and Schmidt 2002). For my application, however, a half-normal
distribution is appropriate. Recall that I estimate 𝑢𝑖 and then divide by a scalar to obtain 𝜂𝑖 ,
which measures how households overuse income. Households seem to overuse income because
other households do not report their full income and thereby seem “efficient” to varying degrees.
In this way the most dishonest households define the frontier. Studies have shown that survey
respondents tend to underreport income (Ravallion 2003; Freund and Spatafora 2008). I
therefore expect most households to be efficient, which would result in a clustering of 𝜂𝑖 near a
calibrated zero, with a tail to the right representing the households that report honestly to varying
degrees.8
Based on (8) and (9), a production SF with a normal distribution on 𝑣𝑖 and a half-normal
distribution on 𝑢𝑖 is represented as the following:
ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln 𝑦𝑖∗ − 𝑢𝑖 ,

(12)

ln 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝒙𝒊 𝜷 + 𝑣𝑖 ,

(13)

𝑢𝑖 ~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 ),

(14)

The shadow economy could exacerbate underreporting. According to Schneider et al. (2011), Indonesia’s shadow
economy in 2005 was 19.1% of GDP.
8
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𝑣𝑖 ~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣2 ),

(15)

where 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are distributed independently of each other. The 𝜷, 𝜎𝑢2 , and 𝜎𝑣2 are the
parameters to be estimated. Equation (14) assumes that the inefficiency effect follows a halfnormal distribution. One way to derive the half-normal distribution is to treat it as the
nonnegative truncation of a zero-mean normal distribution. I shall denote the distribution derived
in this way as 𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 ), where 𝜎𝑢2 is the variance of the normal distribution before truncation.
Suppose that a random variable 𝑍 has a normal distribution 𝑧~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑧2 ) with the probability
density function denoted by 𝑔(𝑧). If it is truncated from above at the point 𝛼 so that 𝑧 ≥ 𝛼, then
the density function of 𝑧, 𝑓(𝑧), is
1
𝑧−𝜇
𝜙(
)
𝑔(𝑧)
𝜎𝑧
𝜎𝑧
𝑓(𝑧) =
=
𝛼−𝜇
𝛼−𝜇 ,
1 − Φ( 𝜎 ) 1 − Φ( 𝜎 )
𝑧
𝑧

(16)

𝑧 ≥ 𝛼,

where 𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) are the probability density and probability distribution functions,
respectively, for the standard normal variable.9 The density function of 𝑢𝑖 in (14) can then be
obtained by setting 𝜇 = 0 and 𝛼 = 0 in the above equation to give the following:
1
𝑢𝑖
2
𝜙
(
𝜎 ) = 2 𝜙 (𝑢𝑖 ) = 2(2𝜋𝜎 2 )−12 exp (− 𝑢𝑖 ) ,
𝑓(𝑢𝑖 ) = 𝜎
1 − Φ(0) 𝜎
𝜎
2𝜎 2

𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0.

(17)

1
1
𝜖𝑖
𝜇∗𝑖
𝐿𝑖 = − ln ( ) − ln( 𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2 ) + ln 𝜙 (
) + ln Φ ( ),
2
2
𝜎∗
√𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2

(18)

The log-likelihood function based on (12)-(15) for each observation 𝑖 is

9

See Johnson et al. (1995).
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where
−𝜎𝑢2 𝜖𝑖
𝜇∗𝑖 = 2
,
𝜎𝑣 + 𝜎𝑢2

(19)

𝜎𝑣2 𝜎𝑢2
.
𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2

(20)

𝜎∗2 =

For detailed derivations, see Appendix A of Kumbhakar et al. (2015). The log-likelihood
function is then the observational sum of (18), which can then be numerically maximized to
obtain the estimates of the model parameters. There is, however, a computational problem. The
variance parameters, 𝜎𝑢2 and 𝜎𝑣2 , must be positive, but an unconstrained numerical maximization
would not guarantee positive estimates. To ensure that the variance parameter estimates are
positive, researchers in the early literature often used the following parameterization scheme for
the unconstrained numerical maximization:
𝜎𝑢2 = exp(𝑤𝑢 ) ,

(21)

𝜎𝑣2 = exp(𝑤𝑣 ) ,

(22)

where 𝑤𝑢 and 𝑤𝑣 are unrestricted constant parameters. (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). As I explain
momentarily, I choose to go step further and correct of heteroskedasticity.
4.2.4 Correcting for Heteroskedasticity
The original half-normal model of Aigner et al. (1977) assumes that the 𝑣𝑖 and the pretruncated
𝑢𝑖 are homoskedastic, that is, both 𝜎𝑣2 and 𝜎𝑢2 are constants. Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill,
Ford, and Gropper (1995), and Hadri (1999) consider models in which these random variables
are heteroskedastic. Unlike a classical linear model in which heteroskedasticity affects only the
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efficiency of the estimators and not their consistency, ignoring heteroskedasticity in the SF
framework leads to inconsistent estimates (Wang and Schmidt 2002). Kumbhakar and Lovell
(2000, Section 3.4) provide a detailed discussion on the consequences of ignoring the
heteroskedasticity, assuming 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are heteroskedastic. Ignoring the heteroskedasticity of 𝑣𝑖
still gives consistent estimates of the frontier function parameters (𝜷) except for the intercept,
which is downward-biased. Estimates of the technical efficiency are biased. Ignoring the
heteroskedasticity of 𝑢𝑖 causes biased estimates of the frontier function’s parameters as well as
the estimates of technical efficiency. Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill, Ford, and Gropper
(1995), and Hadri (1999) propose the heteroskedasticity can be parameterized by a vector of
2
observable variables and associated parameters. For instance, 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
= exp(𝒛𝑢,𝑖 ; 𝒘𝑢 ), where 𝒛𝑢,𝑖 is

an 𝑚 × 1 vector of variables including a constant of 1, and 𝒘𝑢 is the 𝑚 × 1 corresponding
parameter vector. The exponential function is used to ensure a positive estimate of the variance
parameter. Therefore, the parameterizations are
2
𝜎𝑢,𝑖
= exp(𝒛′ 𝑢,𝑖 𝒘𝑢 ) ,

(23)

2
𝜎𝑣,𝑖
= exp(𝒛′ 𝑣,𝑖 𝒘𝑣 ) .

(24)

The vectors 𝒛𝑢,𝑖 and 𝒛𝑣,𝑖 may or may not be the same vector, and they may contain all or part of
the 𝒙𝑖 vector. In my application I am interested in the difference between the mean 𝑢𝑖 (divided
by the coefficient of log income) for households with opportunities for corruption and the mean
𝑢𝑖 (divided by the same scalar) for all other households. My main concern, therefore, is how the
2
bias in 𝑢𝑖 due to heteroskedasticity differs between household types, so I parameterize both 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
2
and 𝜎𝑣,𝑖
with an indicator variable for households with opportunities for corruption.
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The log-likelihood function of the heteroskedastic model is the same as in (18), except that I
now use (23) and (24) instead of (21) and (22) in place of 𝜎𝑢2 and 𝜎𝑣2 , respectively, in the loglikelihood function. All the parameters of the model are estimated at the same time via the ML
method.
4.2.5 Estimation of Observation-Specific 𝑢𝑖
After I estimate the model parameters, I can estimate the observation-specific 𝑢𝑖 . Although the
definition of this index is intuitive, estimating the index for each observation is less
straightforward. To see this, note that 𝑢𝑖 ~𝑁 + (0, 𝜎𝑢2 ). The ML estimation of the model yields the
estimated value of 𝜎𝑢2 , which provides information about the shape of the half-normal
distribution of 𝑢𝑖 . This information is all I need to find the average technical inefficiency of the
sample. However, I am interested in the 𝑢𝑖 of each observation, so this information on 𝜎𝑢2 is not
enough because it does not contain any household-specific information. The solution, first
proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982), is to estimate 𝑢𝑖 from the expected value of 𝑢𝑖 conditional on
the composed error of the model, 𝜖𝑖 ≡ 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 . This conditional mean of 𝑢𝑖 given 𝜖𝑖 gives a
point estimate of 𝑢𝑖 . The composed error contains household-specific information, and so the
conditional expectation yields the observation-specific value of the inefficiency.10 Jondrow et al.
(1982) show that the density function of (𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) is 𝑁 + (𝑢∗𝑖 , 𝜎∗2 ), based on which, the equation of
𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) is (see Appendix B of Kumbhakar et al. 2015):

𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) =

10

𝜇
𝜎∗ 𝜙 ( 𝜎∗𝑖 )

∗
𝜇∗𝑖 + 𝜇∗𝑖 ,
Φ(𝜎 )
∗

Kumbhakar et al. (2015) likens this to extracting signal from noise.
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(25)

where 𝜇∗𝑖 and 𝜎∗ are defined in (19) and (20). I substitute into the equation ML estimates of the
parameters to obtain the empirical estimate of inefficiency, which is guaranteed to be
nonnegative. Estimates of observation-specific inefficiency assume the model parameters are
known and given, while in fact I estimate them with uncertainty.
4.3 Data and Variables
The IFLS is an ongoing longitudinal survey in Indonesia. The sample is representative of about
83% of the population and contains more than 30,000 people living in 13 of the country’s 27
provinces. This study primarily uses data from the fourth wave (IFLS4), which was conducted in
2007 and 2008 by RAND, the Center for Population and Policy Studies of the University of
Gadjah Mada, and Survey METRE. One question in the IFLS4 asked respondents, “Which
category best describes the work you do?” The answer options included self-employed (in
various categories), government worker, private worker, casual worker in agriculture, casual
worker not in agriculture, and unpaid family worker. I selected my sample according to three
criteria: (i) the household contains at least two adults; (ii) one adult is the spouse; and (iii) the
head of household is either a private worker or a government worker (excluding the selfemployed, casual and unpaid workers, and retired people). The purpose of this sample selection
process is to avoid differences owing to the preferences of various other household groups, such
as single parents, the self-employed, and pensioners. In my analysis, I start with the assumption
that household members who do not work for the government cannot engage in corruption, but
that all government workers can do so. These assumptions may lead to an underestimation of the
extent of corruption if private workers engage in corrupt activities. In this case, the estimate of
corruption serves as a lower bound. Alternatively, I can consider my corruption estimate as a
measure relative to the reference group. I define households with one or more government
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workers as public-sector households with opportunities for corruption, and all other households
as private-sector households without them. I classify 601 observations as public-sector
households, and 1,626 observations as private-sector households.
I calculate illegal income by estimating how public-sector households differ in their
underreporting of income when compared with private-sector households. If the two types of
households differ in their underreporting for another reason — tax evasion — then my results are
confounded. To address this concern, I exclude all self-employed respondents from my sample.
For wage earners, it is relatively difficult to underreport employment income because of
employer reporting. Moreover, unlike most developed countries, the personal income tax is not a
major source of government revenue in Indonesia.11 I therefore believe that tax-evasion motives
affect my results only negligibly, although I cannot test this using the IFLS data.
4.3.1 Variables
The dependent variable is the logarithm of household expenditure on clothing, household
supplies, and furniture. The explanatory variable is the logarithm of household income, which is
the sum of a household’s cash income and other incomes in kind from all sources, minus taxes
and fees. All expenditure and income variables are measured in Indonesian rupiah (Rp). Dummy
control variables linked to housing characteristics include an inside water source, an outside
kitchen, wood floors, and a moderately sized yard. Control variables linked to assets include four
dummies indicating whether the household owns (separately) a toilet, fridge, stove, and
television. I also control for the number of chickens and ducks owned by the household.
Demographic control variables include the age of the head of household, the square of the age of

Receipts from taxes on income, profits, and capital gains of individuals accounted for just 13.6% of Indonesia’s
total revenue in 2008 (OECD 2008).
11
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the head of household, the number of children in the household, an indicator whether the head of
household is in poor health, and years of education attained by the head of household and the
spouse. Control variables concerning household characteristics include indicators for whether the
household owns its home, the household pays education costs, the household pays rent for
accommodation, the household is in an urban area, the head of household is Muslim, and the
spouse is working. Also included is a set of dummy variables for the district in which the
household resides. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables for the whole sample,
public-sector households, and private-sector households. The statistics indicate that the
characteristics of the two types of households are different. In terms of income, consumptions,
and household assets, public-sector households are considerably better off. My method relies on
the relationship between income and expenditures, so the difference between the income
distributions is a concern. Correct results clearly depend on getting Engel effects right, the more
so as the income distributions of the two household types differ. I draw kernel density plots of
these two income distributions in Figure 1, which shows that the income distribution for publicsector households dominates that for private-sector households.12 However, the ranges of the two
distributions look similar. In this case, if I can ensure that the two types of households are similar
in preferences, then the estimated income-expenditure relationship can be used to fully reflect the
true level of corruption. Figure 2 presents kernel density plots of distributions of expenditures for
the two groups. The expenditure distribution for public-sector households dominates that for the
private-sector households.

12

Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests support my comparisons at the 1% level regarding both income distributions and
expenditure distributions of the two household types.
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4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Accounting for Preference Heterogeneity
My analysis has not yet accounted for preference heterogeneity. If public-sector households,
compared to private-sector households, have different preferences for clothing and household
items, then my measurement of illegal income will capture both preference heterogeneity and
corruption. For example, officials might enjoy more generous fringe benefits and added job
security, and these things could lead to increased spending on luxury clothing. More generally,
people with different levels of income, wealth, education, household characteristics, location of
residence, and other socioeconomic characteristics may have different consumption preferences.
If some public-sector households, compared to private-sector households, are very different in
those factors, then my corruption interpretation could be incorrect. To mitigate this possibility, I
use propensity scoring to restrict those factors in a common support. I calculate the propensity
score for each household and then restrict the sample to areas of common support. I estimate a
probit model in which the outcome variable is an indicator of whether the household is in the
public sector. Independent variables include log of income and some other variables that may
affect household consumption.13 By excluding those observations that are not in the region of
common support, I drop 60 households.
4.4.2 Main Results
Before I estimate illegal income, I follow the SF literature by testing for the one-sided error term,

13

See Zhong (2018) for a more thorough explanation of propensity-score matching in a similar context. Independent
variables in the probit model include log income and indicators of an inside water source, an outside kitchen, wood
floors, a moderately sized yard, the household owns its home, the household pays education costs, the household
pays rent for accommodation, the household is in an urban area, the head of household is Muslim, the spouse is
working, and the ownership of a toilet, fridge, stove, and television. Also included are the number of chickens and
ducks owned by the household, as well as the age of the head of household, the number of children in the household,
and years of education attained by the head of household and the spouse.
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as explained in Appendix A. The pre-estimation tests (Equations A1-A2) support the existence of
a one-sided error term, as does a post-estimation test (A3).
Using the method outlined in the previous section I proceed to estimate the model of
Equations (12)-(15) with parametrical distributional assumptions on 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 , assuming normal
and half-normal distributions, respectively, and correcting for heteroskedasticity. See Table 2 for
the ML estimation. The coefficients of the indicator variable for a public-sector household in
2
2
both 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
and 𝜎𝑣,𝑖
are statistically significant, implying that the inclusion of this variable in the

model is supported by the data (See Equations [23]-[24] and the related discussion).
Next, I use Equation 25 to generate the estimated values of 𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) evaluated at 𝜖̂𝑖 .14 I divide
these values by the coefficient of log income to obtain the observation-specific 𝜂𝑖 , averages of
which I calculate for both types of households. Table 3 reports these averages, denoted 𝜂̅𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
and 𝜂̅𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 , for the noncorrupt and corrupt households, respectively, along with all figures
discussed below.15 The difference between these averages is the illegal income of households
with opportunities for corruption, expressed as a percentage of reported income. This estimate is
49.7% with a 95% confidence interval of 42.5% to 57.0%. Recall that this illegal income is
specifically from bribery and graft under the assumptions that public-sector and private-sector
households hide income identically for other reasons such as tax evasion and black-market
participation. Also recall that I can interpret this result as a corruption measure for public-sector
households in relation to corruption of private-sector households. As indicated in Table 3, all

14

To estimate the model, I first set up the likelihood function by using the sfmodel Stata command written by the
authors of Kumbhakar et al. (2015). I then estimate the model by using Stata’s ml max command. Finally, I generate
the observation-specific 𝐸(𝑢𝑖 |𝜖𝑖 ) using the sf_search command, also provided by Kumbhakar et al. (2015).
15
As discussed in the method section, one should interpret the 𝜂𝑖 averages with care because they are potentially
very biased.
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estimates of underreporting mentioned in this paper are significant at the 1% level according to
two-sided t-tests.
4.4.3 Estimations for Different Groups and Regions
How democratic transitions unfold, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017) show, is a key determinant of
the extent of elite capture (interest groups’ influence over politics). The authors exploit quasirandom variation that originated during the Indonesian transition: Suharto-regime mayors could
finish their five-year terms before being replaced by new leaders. Because mayors’ political
cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime
mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. The authors find that slower
transitions toward democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy. Districts with
longer exposure experience worse government outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower
political competition in the medium run. Most relevant to this study is the finding that private
firms in longer-exposed districts are more likely to report that they face regular extortion from
the military and police groups — a finding that sheds light on corruption’s extensive margin. To
test whether my corruption measurement corroborates this story for the intensive margin, I
obtained certain data from the authors (Martinez-Bravo and Stegmann 2018) that allow me to
divide my sample based on whether the district mayors were appointed either in 1994 or 1995, or
in 1996 or 1997. The districts with the 1996 and 1997 appointments experienced longer exposure
to Suharto-appointed mayors. When I drop these districts from my sample (leaving 52.3% of the
sample), average underreporting is 37.1%. In Table 3 I label this group “Shorter Exposure.”
When I consider only the opposite group, labelled “Longer Exposure,” average underreporting is
56.2%. The 95% confidence interval of the latter measure is narrow — 55.4% to 56.9% — and
its lower bound is above the higher bound of the corresponding 95% confidence interval for
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shorter-exposed districts. Thus I find a strong treatment effect that is statistically significant,
providing further evidence that Suharto-appointed mayors helped maintain corruption.
The IFLS4 survey asks respondents to imagine that a police officer has found their lost wallet
or purse containing their ID and 200,000 rupiah (about $14 at the time). The survey then asks
whether it is likely or unlikely that the officer will return the wallet with the money in it. When I
drop from my sample people who distrust the police (leaving 63.9% of the sample), average
underreporting is 76.7%. In Table 3 this group is labelled “Trust Police.” When I consider only
the opposite group, labelled “Distrust Police,” average underreporting is 33.8%. So the
households who trust the police experience greater corruption. One can only speculate about the
reasons, as researchers have done with similar findings (see citations in the introduction). A
greater concern for corruption perhaps leads to less corruption, or maybe more corrupt areas
contain more corrupt respondents, who may be less inclined to indicate distrust for the police.16
Regardless, my finding is further evidence that researchers should be wary of relying too heavily
on attitudinal survey questions when assessing the extent of corruption.17
Finally, I divide the sample into two groups: rich districts and poor districts.18 I then estimate
the level of corruption for each group. Underreporting is 71.4% for poor districts and 31.0% for
rich districts. Because of the bidirectional relationship between economic development and
corruption, these results were not a foregone conclusion. Corruption may harm economic

16

This latter conjecture seems possible because the proportion of households that trust the police varies by
household type: 74.5% of public-sector households, but only 60.4% of private-sector households.
17
Similarly, using this paper’s method to measure corruption, Redwine (2018) finds that Chinese households that
report the most concern for corruption experience the least corruption.
18
I rank the 37 districts by average household income, calculated from the IFLS4 data. I then define the top half of
districts as rich and the other half as poor.
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development, but a high level of economic development may provide more opportunities for
corruption. My results suggest that the former effect dominates in Indonesia.19
4.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a rarity in the literature: an objective estimate of the extent of corruption, in
this case for Indonesia in 2008. According to the SF method, the true incomes of public-sector
households are, on average, about 50% higher than their reported income. Recall that this
estimate depends on the relatively strong assumption that private workers are not hiding income
derived from bribery or graft. This paper’s corruption measures, therefore, are best thought of
either as lower-bound estimations or as relative measures of corruption (my preference).
Using the same SF method with household data, Redwine (2018) finds that Chinese officials
underreport their income by only 10.3%. The reference group here includes not only private
workers, but also officials with fewer opportunities for corruption. When the reference group is
only private workers, the corruption estimate lowers to 4.2%. Why does the SF method produce
such widely different corruption estimates for China and Indonesia? Likely explanations include
differences in the household surveys. The Chinese survey, for example, includes only urban
households. Furthermore, the conductors of the surveys might have addressed, with different
success, a particularly relevant form of self-selection: the most corrupt public officials may have
been less inclined to participate. Another reason for the disparity in corruption measurements
could be the differences in the societies: two rapidly growing economies that have evolved, on
the one hand, from rigid Chinese planning and, on the other, from Suharto-appointed
monopolies. National statistics imply that the public sector permeates China to a greater

19

By contrast, Zhong (2018) finds that the latter effect dominates in China, though Redwine (2018) fails to replicate
this result.
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degree.20 Perhaps this saturation has led to a more corrupt Chinese private sector, lowering the
relative estimate of corruption for public workers. Other possible forces behind the corruptionmagnitude discrepancy between China and Indonesia include differing public-private
differentials in relation to propensities to save and black-market participation, both of which
could be confounding my results. And, of course, Indonesia simply may be more corrupt: the
country does typically fare worse than China in corruption-perception studies.21
Regarding future research, the IFLS is a longitudinal study, so possibly I could employ the SF
method to study corruption estimates across time, using the years 1993/1994, 1997, 2000,
2008/2009 (the data of this study), and 2014/2015. A simple approach is to compare crosssectional measurements.22 In a quick first attempt, I organized the 2014/2015 data as I did for
this paper, then ran the resultant data through the same computer code.23 Surprisingly, in
comparison with the 2008/2009 analysis, the number of public-sector households drops from 541
to 371, and the number of private-sector households drops from 1,626 to 1,187. Nevertheless, I
find that the true incomes of public-sector households are, on average, 55.9% higher than their
reported incomes, a figure that is significant at the 1% level.24 Because of the household attrition
(which deserves closer inspection), I hesitate to emphasize the comparison with the 49.7% figure
found for 2008/2009, but I can say that I fail to find support for a decrease in corruption from

20

For example, the general government final consumption expenditure for China in 2008 was 13.2% of GDP; the
same figure for Indonesia was 8.4% (World Bank 2008).
21
In the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 180 countries in descending
order of corruption, China ranks 72 while Indonesia ranks 126.
22
This simple approach nevertheless would require considerable labor. The IFLS data are separated into numerous
files, and variables vary somewhat across years. Also, the best way to aggregate income is not apparent.
23
The 2014/2015 wave did not record the number of chickens and ducks owned by households, so these controls are
absent from the analysis.
24
The 95% confidence interval is 46.2%-65.6%. Due to its small size, the data do produce statistically significant
results for the sample divisions presented in Table 3.
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2008 to 2015, despite Indonesia’s recent anti-corruption efforts (see Kuris 2012a and 2012b for
an overview).
A more fruitful avenue may be to implement more complicated panel SF models that include
fixed effects to control better for expenditure preferences. Complicating this approach is the
possibility that some households change from the public sector to the private sector and vice
versa. Additionally, due to the IFLS’s small size, this approach may work better with larger
panel data from another source.25
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Appendix
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Mean of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable
Household income
Log of household income
Household expenditure
Log of household expenditure
Inside water source
Outside kitchen
Household has wood floors
Household has moderately sized yard
Household owns a toilet
Household owns a fridge
Household owns a stove
Household owns a television
No. of chickens owned by household
No. of ducks owned by household
Age of household head
No. of children in household
Household head has poor health
Years of education received by
household head
Years of education received by spouse
Home is owned
Household pays rent for
accommodation
Household pays education costs
Household is in an urban area
Household head is Muslim
Spouse is working

Full
Sample
48.88
17.18
1.06
13.35
0.66
0.30
0.45
0.63
0.83
0.54
0.82
0.87
2.24
0.19
38.02
0.36
0.09
9.26

PublicSector
Household
69.32
17.77
1.61
13.80
0.73
0.29
0.55
0.73
0.94
0.74
0.88
0.94
4.90
0.22
42.39
0.57
0.08
11.72

PrivateSector
Household
41.29
16.96
0.86
13.19
0.64
0.31
0.41
0.59
0.79
0.47
0.80
0.84
1.25
0.17
36.40
0.29
0.10
8.35

p-value for
Differences
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.427
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.625
0.000
0.000
0.169
0.000

8.68
0.61
0.13

10.43
0.69
0.08

8.03
0.58
0.14

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.64
0.67
0.90
0.50

0.76
0.66
0.87
0.61

0.60
0.68
0.91
0.46

0.000
0.402
0.001
0.000

Notes: The expenditure and income variables, before logging, are measured in millions of
Indonesian rupiah (Rp). The logged values are measured in rupiah. Household expenditure
includes only spending on clothing, household supplies, and furniture. Poor health refers to poor
self-reported health.
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Table 2: ML Estimation Results for the Stochastic Frontier Model
Log of household income
Assets
Inside water source
Outside kitchen
Household has wooden floors
Household has moderately sized yard
Household owns a toilet
Household owns a fridge
Household owns a stove
Household owns a television
No. of chickens owned by household
No. of ducks owned by household
Demographic controls
Age of household head
Square of age of household head
No. of children in household
Household head has poor health
Years of education received by household head
Years of education received by spouse
Household controls
Home is owned
Household pays rent for accommodation
Household pays education costs
Household is in an urban area
Household head is Muslim
Spouse is working
Constant
2
𝜎𝑢,𝑖

Public-sector household
Constant

Coefficient
0.258***

S.E.
0.0217

0.120***
–0.112***
0.031
–0.018
0.029
0.207***
0.174***
0.144**
0.003
0.014*

0.0419
0.0393
0.0410
0.0398
0.0527
0.0422
0.0543
0.0571
0.0024
0.0077

0.006
–0.000125
0.160***
0.111*
0.021***
0.027***

0.0138
0.000162
0.0312
0.0626
0.00643
0.00675

0.108**
0.109*
0.113**
–0.158***
0.242***
–0.0337
8.124***

0.0456
0.0639
0.0445
0.0467
0.0667
0.0376
0.4351

–0.551**
–0.795***

0.2449
0.2812

0.249***
–0.699***
2,167

0.0964
0.0953

2
𝜎𝑣,𝑖

Public-sector household
Constant
N

Notes: Dependent variable: logarithm of household expenditure on clothing, household supplies,
and furniture. To save space I do not report the results for the district dummies. ***, **, *
indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the Level of Corruption, by Different Groups and Regions

𝑁 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑁 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝜂̅𝑖
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐

𝜂̅𝑖

Underreporting
95%
Conf.
Interval

Main
Results
1,626
541
2.077
(0.020)
1.580
(0.019)
0.497***
(0.037)
0.4250.570

Shorter
Exposure
839
294
2.328
(0.038)
1.957
(0.039)
0.371***
(0.068)
0.2390.504

Longer
Exposure
937
279
0.562
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
0.562***
(0.004)
0.5540.569

Trust
Police
982
403
2.823
(0.041)
2.056
(0.032)
0.767***
(0.068)
0.6340.900

Distrust
Police
644
138
1.074
(0.011)
0.737
(0.010)
0.338***
(0.024)
0.2900.386

Poor
Districts
590
162
2.701
(0.055)
1.988
(0.050)
0.714***
(0.108)
0.5020.926

Rich
Districts
1,036
379
1.404
(0.012)
1.094
(0.011)
0.310***
(0.023)
0.2700.350

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimation of the Income Distributions
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimation of the Distributions of the Log of Expenditures on
Clothing, Household Items, and Furniture

Appendix: Estimation Issues
Pre-Estimation: Existence of the One-Sided Error
The likelihood function of an SF model is highly nonlinear, and estimation can be difficult.
Given this potential difficulty, it is common in the literature to test the validity of the SF
specification prior to the ML estimation (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). If support for the SF
specification is unfounded, then time is better spent on considering other specifications rather
than on the numerical details of the maximization. Schmidt and Lin (1984) propose an OLS
residual test to check for the validity of the model’s SF specification. The idea behind the test is
that for a production-type SF model with composed error 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑣𝑖 distributed
symmetrically around zero, the residuals from the corresponding OLS estimation should skew to
the left. This is true regardless of the distributional function chosen for 𝑢𝑖 in the model
estimation after the pretesting. A test of the null hypothesis of no skewness as opposed to the
alternative hypothesis can thus be constructed using the OLS residuals. If the estimated skewness
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has the expected sign, rejection of the null hypothesis provides support for the existence of the
one-sided error. For the skewness test Schmidt and Lin (1984) suggest a sample-moment-based
statistic, commonly referred to as the √𝑏1 test:
√𝑏1 =

𝑚3
𝑚2 √ 𝑚2

(𝐴1)

where 𝑚2 and 𝑚2 are the second and third sample moments of the OLS residuals, respectively.
The second sample moment of a random variable 𝑥 is ∑(𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )2 /𝑛, and the third sample
̂
moment is ∑(𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )3 /𝑛. A result showing √𝑏1 < 0 indicates that the OLS residuals are skewed
to the left. Under the null hypothesis of no skewness, the statistic should not be statistically
different from zero. The distribution of √𝑏1 is nonstandard, and its critical values are tabulated in
several studies, e.g., D’Agostino and Pearson (1973).
Coelli (1995) suggests a variant of this test. He notes that under the null hypothesis of no
skewness, the third moment of the OLS residuals is asymptotically distributed as a normal
random variable with mean 0 and variance 6𝑚23 /N. Thus, the statistic
6𝑚23
√
𝑀3𝑇 = 𝑚3 ⁄
N
has an asymptotic distribution of a standard normal random variable.
Turning to my data (see main text), I first conduct an OLS estimation of the expenditure
function and plot the histogram of the residuals compared to a normal density. The resulting
chart is reproduced in Figure A1. There appears to be some evidence of a negative skew,
especially in the distribution’s central region. To formally examine and test this, I use the
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(𝐴2)

skewness statistic. The point estimate of the statistic √𝑏1 (A2) is obtained from the summary
statistic of the OLS residuals. The statistic has a value equal to –0.10. The negative sign indicates
that the distribution of the residuals skews to the left, which is consistent with a production
specification. To assess the statistical significance of the statistic, I conduct the unaltered test as
described by D’Agostino, Belanger, and D’Agostino Jr. (1990). The test returns a p-value that is
0.054; I reject the null hypothesis of no skewness. Furthermore, the MT3 statistic suggested by
Coelli (1995), Equation AB2, equals –1.93. Because it has a normal distribution, the critical
value is –1.96, so the result confirms (with a p-value of 0.054) the rejection of the null
hypothesis of no skewness in the OLS residuals. I have found support for a left-skewed error
distribution, and the skewness is statistically significant. I can proceed to the estimation.
Post-Estimation: Existence of the One-Sided Error
Central to the stochastic frontier model is the one-sided error specification, which represents
technical inefficiency. It is therefore important to test the existence of the one-sided error for the
model. If evidence for the one-sided error specification is not found, the model reduces to a
standard regression model for which a simple OLS estimation would suffice. This amounts to a
test for the presence of 𝑢𝑖 in the model, and a generalized likelihood ratio (LR) test for the null
hypothesis of no one-sided error can be constructed based on the log-likelihood values of the
OLS (restricted) and the SF (unrestricted) model. Recall that the OLS-residual-based skewness
test introduced in the previous section also tests the validity of the one-sided error specification.
Although useful as a screening device, the test does not use the information from the distribution
functions as the random error. The LR test introduced here is more precise to the specific model I
am estimating, but the disadvantage is that it can only be conducted after the ML estimation of
the model has been undertaken. The LR test statistic is
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– 2[𝐿(𝐻0 ) − 𝐿(𝐻1 )],

(𝐴3)

where 𝐿(𝐻0 ) and 𝐿(𝐻1 ) are log-likelihood values of the restricted model (OLS) and the
unrestricted model (SF), respectively, and the degree of freedom equals the number of
restrictions in the test. For the half-normal model, the LR test amounts to testing the hypothesis
that 𝜎𝑢2 = 0. The complication of the test is that the null hypothesis of 𝜎𝑢2 = 0 is on the boundary
of the parameter value’s permissible space, and therefore the LR test statistic does not have a
standard chi-square distribution. Coelli (1995) shows that, in such cases, the test has a mixture of
chi-square distributions. The critical values of the mixed distribution for hypothesis testing are
tabulated in Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986).
I test for the presence of 𝑢𝑖 in the model by constructing the LR test statistic (A3) using the
log-likelihood values of the OLS and SF models. The statistic is 14.98, which I compare with a
1% critical value of 9.50. I can reject the null hypothesis of no one-sided error.
The Independence of 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖
A final estimation-related issue is the independence of 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 . This assumption is not too
restrictive for production models in general because 𝑣𝑖 represents shocks outside the control of a
firm, and therefore it is unlikely to be related to inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖 . One can, however, think of
cases in which production risk is captured by the 𝑣𝑖 term and risk-taking behavior might be
reflected in the inefficiency term. Similarly, one can think of shocks to households that may
affect the degree to which they underreport income. For example, households in the public sector
may embezzle more funds after local disasters. Approaches exist to handle such
nonindependence issues but at the cost of making additional assumptions on the correlation
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between 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 . Instead of doing this, I follow most of the production literature and assume
independence.

Figure A1: Histogram of OLS Residuals
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5 Conclusion
In this dissertation I study corruption and collusion with data derived from a laboratory
experiment and household data. In Chapter 1 I test the theory of Compte et al. (2005), who prove
the general existence of a collusive equilibrium in which all sellers in a procurement auction bid
the government’s reserve and submit the highest bribe the agent will accept. In the lab I
implement a specific version of their theory to test the extent to which the equilibrium emerges
in a simplified setting. Only 13.5% of auctions in the closing periods display the perfectly
collusive outcome because only half of subjects attempt such collusion. Yet due to imperfectly
collusive bidding, another 45.2% of selling prices are noncompetitive. Therefore in most
auctions the selling price is much higher and efficiency much lower than would be expected if
subjects simply raised their honest-auction bids by the maximum bribe. Much of Chapter 1 tries
to explain why many subjects, having chosen to bid above a certain amount, fail to realize that
the most sensible bid is the reserve. Confusion and gender seem to be the main reasons, though
some subjects learn from others. My essay, while contributing to the corruption literature, holds
a firmer place in the experimental literature on collusion, in which little evidence exists of tacit
collusion among sellers who are continually rematched. An important difference between my
study and previous auction studies is that bounded rationality, much more than trust, is the
limiting factor for collusion.
My existence proof of Compte et al.’s collusive equilibrium in the lab does not determine
whether the theory is applicable to more complicated markets. Even so, I argue that real-world
firms have a greater chance at optimal collusion. Especially in the world of lucrative government
contracts, corrupt firms probably often do wish to pay a bribe beyond what the agent will accept,
and this market imperfection probably does often lead to collusion, even if such collusion better
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resembles one of the more complicated models described by Compte et al. Furthermore, firms
are less likely than lab subjects to face hindrances such as confusion and joy of winning (which
are not accounted for in Compte et al.’s model anyhow), and thus may achieve collusion more
easily. Firms also may choose explicit collusion over tacit collusion due to the latter’s fragility.
One possibility for future research is allowing subjects to communicate with each other, which
would likely lead to less confusion and more perfect collusion, albeit explicit.
My inspiration for Chapter 2 is Zhong (2018), who claims to provide the first objective
estimate of the extent of corruption in China (in 2002). Using a household survey, Zhong first
uses OLS to estimate an expenditure function for households without opportunities for
corruption, then inverts the function to forecast the true income of households with opportunities.
The difference between true income and reported income, he assumes, is the value of illegal
income. According to his preferred measure of corruption, based on clothing expenditure, the
true incomes of households with more opportunities for corruption are, on average, about 20%
higher than their reported income. This estimate, however, is based on a quadratic expenditure
function requiring a method that, at least according to my analysis in Chapter 2’s Appendix A,
seems to be highly sensitive to sample selection. On the other hand, I easily replicate Zhong’s
estimate based on expenditure of household equipment and services, which does not require a
quadratic term. That estimate indicates about 15% instead of 20%, although Zhong cannot say
whether the estimates are statistically significant. Using the same household survey, I apply
Stochastic Frontier (SF) analysis to produce a statistically testable estimate corresponding to
Zhong’s 15% measurement. The SF method indicates about 10%, which is significant at the 1%
level. Regarding the difference in our point estimates, I argue that my method alone may
partially correct for bias in a key parameter — and thus may be closer to the truth. Even so, this
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paper primarily vindicates Zhong’s approach to measuring corruption because most of our
robustness checks follow similar patterns.
Clearly, a clean benchmark group is hard to find. These estimations, therefore, are best
thought of either as lower-bound estimations or as relative measures of corruption (my
preference). The value of the methods is their ease and affordability in comparison with microlevel analysis based on administrative records, special-purpose surveys, or field experiments.
With just the variables found in many household surveys, researchers can explore specific issues
such as the relative corruption between specific groups or regions, or the correlation between a
community’s concern for corruption and the extent of corruption. Here, for example, my
estimates seem to indicate a negative correlation. Researchers also can use the SF method to
measure tax evasion. Policymakers, when allocating funds for fighting corruption, could benefit
from objective measures of corruption’s intensity, perhaps by region.
In Chapter 3 I apply the method presented in Chapter 2 to an Indonesian dataset. I find that
the true incomes of public-sector households are, on average, about 50% higher than their
reported income, providing a rare measure of corruption’s magnitude. I then divide the sample to
support the findings of Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017), who exploit the fact that district mayors of
the Suharto regime could finish their terms during the democratic transition. Suharto appointed
these mayors in 1994, 1995, 1996, or 1997, leading to exogenous variation in corruption
exposure. When I restrict my sample to shorter-exposed districts (those with mayors whose
appointments were in 1996 or 1997), my corruption measurement falls to 37.1%; when I restrict
my sample to longer-exposed districts, my measurement rises to 56.2%. My results provide a
correlation absent from Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017): that between mayor exposure and
corruption magnitude.
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Regarding future research, the IFLS is a longitudinal study, so possibly I could employ the SF
method to study corruption estimates across time, using the years 1993/1994, 1997, 2000,
2008/2009 (the data of chapter 4), and 2014/2015. A simple approach is to compare crosssectional measurements. A more fruitful avenue may be to implement more complicated panel
SF models that include fixed effects to control better for expenditure preferences. Complicating
this approach is the possibility that some households change from the public sector to the private
sector and vice versa. Additionally, due to the IFLS’s small size, this approach may work better
with larger panel data from another source.
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